P. S. Suryanarayana

China and India have surprisingly cooperated in facing a polarised geopolitical ambience during the G20 summit in Delhi on 9-10 September 2023, says Indian academic P. S. Suryanarayana. China supported India’s leadership in reaching a G20 consensus on the Ukraine crisis and the development priorities of the global south. The nuances of acquiescence by the US-led West may be key to the future of world affairs, because the G20 reflects today’s realities.

The geopolitical Russia-India-China (RIC) troika was conceptualised by Russian leader Yevgeny Primakov in 1996 to challenge the unipolar dominance of the US. With waxing and waning progress, though, the RIC today faces an existential dilemma. China and Russia are coordinating among themselves for a “new era”; India is autonomously making common cause with the US, Australia and Japan in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. However, the RIC could still explore geostrategic coordination and geoeconomic partnership. For this, the troika must seize the opportunity of India hosting the summits of both the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Group of Twenty later this year.

China’s aspirational “Asian moment” in global governance will come true if a China-India geoeconomic concert drives India’s presidency of the G20 in 2023. For this to happen, the two Asian neighbours must rise above the geopolitics of their ongoing military hostility and work together to advance global economic recovery.

Beijing is keen that Delhi should express support for PRC’s territorial sovereignty over Taiwan. For India, though, the unresolved Sino-Indian boundary dispute and their ongoing military standoff force a reality check in this relationship. In the absence of a Chinese reciprocal one-India policy, Delhi is messaging that while it will not bandwagon with pro-Taiwan forces, a new template of Sino-Indian ties is required.

With his visit to Asia in May and the launch of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity which includes India, US President Joe Biden clearly seeks to recast the strategic environment in which China operates. On its part, China had earlier launched the Global Security Initiative and is articulating its vision of a changing world order. For India, therefore, the long-term choice is either strategic autonomy, or the role of a pro-US or even pro-China “swing state”.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine has disrupted global geopolitics and geoeconomics. By supporting Ukraine, the US-led NATO is trying to clip the powerful military wings of its strategic rival, Russia. Furthermore, US President Joe Biden’s massive sanctions on Russia have produced cascading adverse consequences for many economies. Amid greater uncertainty, might the G20 under UN auspices be a good avenue of negotiating the new global order?

Chinese President Xi Jinping has suggested a “balanced, effective and sustainable security architecture” to manage the fallout of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and to ensure stability regionally and worldwide. He seems to suggest that the balance of national interests, not balance of power, is better at promoting a regional order for Asia or East Asia too.

Mind games among the US, China, Russia and India may influence Sino-Indian engagement in the new year and beyond. China could move even closer to Russia in dealing with India, and the US could further call on India as a “major defence partner” in its intense competition with China. External factors aside, a peaceful and cooperative China-India future requires synchronised political will in their bilateral and global diplomacy. Key is unequal power and core interests as China and India each employ the diplomacy of smart power. Will an uneasy status quo be maintained in their long-unresolved boundary dispute, and will they find the impetus for collaboration in a post-Covid-19 order?

China’s efforts to reap strategic gains in Kabul, in partnership with Pakistan and Russia, are of real concern to India following the US pullout from Afghanistan. Will Beijing reinforce Islamabad’s navy in retaliation for the AUKUS pact? Is an alternative arrangement linking China, Pakistan and Russia emerging to rival the US-led Quad which includes India?