Trump’s return: Can China offer an alternative to US unpredictability?

While President-elect Donald Trump’s “America First” doctrine was emblematic of US withdrawal from global leadership in his first term, China appears poised to seize the moment. At the G20 summit in Brazil, Chinese President Xi Jinping unveiled an ambitious slate of eight measures on global development and five initiatives on global governance aimed at bolstering the global south, signalling Beijing’s growing ambition to champion multilateralism in a world facing heightened polarisation.

The measures and initiatives, ranging from increased financing for development to expanded cooperation in green energy, are only the latest examples of China’s pivot to coalition-building. As the US drifts toward isolationism under the influence of Trump’s protectionist rhetoric, China is methodically crafting an alternative vision for global governance — one rooted in shared economic growth and south-south solidarity.

With a series of high-profile multilateral events planned over the coming years overlapping with Trump’s second and only four-year presidency, Beijing is cementing its leadership role in multilateral forums, positioning itself as a stabilising force in the face of potential US retrenchment.

Central to this effort is China’s robust diplomatic calendar. In 2025 alone, Beijing will chair the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit and take part in the second China-Central Asia summit held in Kazakhstan. Both platforms underscore China’s growing influence in Eurasia, a region pivotal to the success of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and inland border security.

The SCO, which includes Russia, India, Iran, Pakistan, several Central Asian states, and most recently Belarus, offers Beijing a mechanism to counterbalance the US and NATO’s security influences, particularly as Russia’s geopolitical clout wanes under the weight of the Ukraine conflict, and India-China relations are seeing a prospect for recovery.

Meanwhile, the China-Central Asia summit first launched in 2023 in Xi’an highlights the deepening Russia-China strategic trust for China’s penetration into traditional Russian sphere, and China’s ability to step into leadership voids left by others, fostering closer ties with nations critical to its connectivity, energy and resources ambitions.

Beyond Eurasia, China is expanding its reach into other key regions. Beijing announced at the recently concluded Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit that it will host the mechanism’s 2026 summit, joining South Korea (2025), Vietnam (2027) in securing an APEC roadmap towards trade liberalisation and digital economy initiatives across the Pacific Rim.

In the same year, it is scheduled to convene the second China-Arab States summit, reinforcing its strategic partnerships in the Middle East, and potentially penetrating the Middle East’s conflict-resolution or post-conflict reconstruction processes.

Notably, the Gulf states and broader Arab world have become key players in China’s economic and energy security calculus, given their participation in the BRI and burgeoning RMB-denominated trade deals.

Furthermore, following the high-profile China-Africa summit this year in Beijing, the planned 2027 China-Africa summit in the Republic of the Congo would further underscore Beijing’s sustained commitment to African development, a cornerstone of its efforts to promote the global south as a counterweight to Western-led institutions.

While no official announcements have been made, diplomatic precedent also suggests China may host the third biennial Belt and Road Forum in 2025 and the BRICS summit in 2027.

BRICS+, particularly, following Russia’s strong push for an alternative international financial system at this year’s BRICS summit in Kazan, could serve as a platform for advancing de-dollarisation initiatives, as BRICS nations along with the new members and partners are increasingly exploring alternatives to US-dominated financial systems.

Together, these gatherings present China with unparalleled opportunities to solidify its position as a linchpin of the global south and multilateralism.

Xi’s recent state visits to Brazil and Peru during the G20 and APEC summits also highlight the lengths Beijing is willing to go to secure its influence in Latin America.

Xi’s launch of Chancay port in Peru, a flagship regional connectivity hub, along with meetings with various Latin American leaders on the sidelines, could pave the way for the elevation of the existing China-CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum to a summit-level dialogue. Such a move would significantly deepen China’s engagement with a region traditionally considered within the US sphere of influence.

Coupled with China’s growing trade ties with the region — it is now the top trading partner for several Latin American nations — deeper engagement would empower China, providing more leverage against the Trump administration’s maximal pressure tactics and further challenging US dominance in the Western hemisphere.

The contrast with Trump’s anticipated foreign policy could not be more stark. Trump’s first term was defined by an antagonistic approach to multilateral institutions, from withdrawing from the Paris Climate Agreement to undermining the World Trade Organization. His re-election would likely bring more of the same, including heightened trade and technology tensions with China and a renewed emphasis on unilateralism.

Yet while Trump’s tariffs and tech sanctions pose clear risks to Beijing, they also offer opportunities. By deepening its economic and political alignment with the global south, China can present itself as a reliable partner to nations disillusioned by Washington’s erratic behaviour.

Critics, of course, argue that China’s multilateralism is far from altruistic, highlighting how Beijing often ties aid and development financing to political loyalty, particularly in the context of contentious issues like Taiwan. Additionally, some global south countries are growing wary of what has been portrayed as China’s debt diplomacy, as large-scale and long-term infrastructure projects under the BRI have allegedly left nations like Sri Lanka and Zambia mired in economic crises.

Still, for many developing nations, the allure of Chinese financing and infrastructure expertise outweighs the risks, especially in the absence of comparable alternatives from Western nations.

Ultimately, China’s drive for multilateralism reflects a pragmatic calculation: filling the vacuum left by a disengaged US strengthens its global influence while reinforcing domestic economic prospects amid global doubts. For Beijing, the benefits of this strategy are twofold.

On the one hand, it positions China as a leader in shaping the future of global governance, particularly in areas like free trade, infrastructure, development aids, climate change and digital economy standards. On the other hand, it mitigates the economic fallout of Trump-era trade wars by deepening ties with markets in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East.

As the world braces for the potential return of Trump’s isolationist policies, China’s push for multilateral engagement is a reminder of the importance of global cooperation in addressing shared challenges. While its approach is far from perfect, Beijing’s efforts to rally the global South highlight an evolving power dynamic in which the US no longer holds a monopoly on global leadership.

Whether Washington chooses to re-engage or retreat further into isolationism in the coming years, one thing is clear: China’s multilateral momentum shows no signs of slowing down.

Related: Chinese investment in Southeast Asia: Threat to Japan, South Korea and Taiwan? | Mutual interests: China-UAE ties strengthen amid Western pressure | More Chinese learning Russian as China-Russia ties strengthen