After former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s assasination on 8 July, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) won a landslide victory in the upper house election on 10 July. Analysts say that Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has a firm grip on power now that his arch rival in the party is gone.
As general elections are not imminent, Kishida is thought to have “three golden years” ahead of him to transition from Abenomics to a new capitalism and to realise constitutional revision, a feat that Abe was not able to pull off.
With the demise of the highly influential Abe, Kishida will have greater freedom in personnel and policy decisions. However, it remains to be seen if he will remain firmly in power. Achieving “three golden years” is not so clear-cut due to various challenges, not least rebuilding order within the LDP.
Stability of the dual-leadership structure
The upper house election showed once again the feebleness of the opposition. It is clear that the stability of Japanese politics hinges not on challenges by other parties, but the internal stability of the LDP. The latter has been given a hard knock with the removal of Abe, a key pillar of the party.
First, Abe’s eight-year rule put in place a unified political order at the core of the LDP and the Japanese government. It also gave Japanese politics an unprecedented period of long-term stability since the end of the Cold War.
When former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi retired in 2006, Japanese politics became volatile, with a revolving door of prime ministers. The LDP regained some structural stability at the end of 2012 when Abe took office for the second time and was re-elected as the party president for three consecutive terms.
Second, after Abe’s resignation in 2020, Japanese politics began to transform from Abe’s unified party government structure to a dual leadership structure. Then Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga, who took over Abe and only for a year, was more of a transitional prime minister.
... the relationship between Abe and Kishida was far more complex than the political rivalry that some reports suggest. They were political rivals but also partners.
In 2021, Kishida was elected prime minister and won the lower house election. Although he became the LDP president, Kishida’s faction was only ranked fourth, and he had to rely on the leaders of the three larger factions for stability.
Kishida appointed Toshimitsu Motegi of the Motegi faction, the second largest faction, as the party’s secretary-general, and Taro Aso of the Aso faction, the third largest, as the vice-president. Although Abe, the leader of the largest faction, was not appointed to any post in the party, Kishida often sought his opinion regarding domestic and foreign affairs. Kishida knew that with Abe’s continued strong influence within the party, his long-term rule and the cabinet’s stability under his leadership would only be possible with Abe at the core of LDP’s stability.
In other words, the relationship between Abe and Kishida was far more complex than the political rivalry that some reports suggest. They were political rivals but also partners. Kishida needed Abe to rein in the nearly 100 members of the National Diet and retain control of the party, thus reducing his burden of maintaining the LDP’s stability.
WIth the respect that Abe commanded, Kishida could gain some latitude in government decisions. This was Kishida’s idea of transitioning from Abe’s unified party-government stability to a stable dual structure. However, this is now moot with Abe’s demise.
A decisive and resolute leader
Thus, with his political partner within the LDP gone, Kishida could face greater opposition within the party. He will now be directly confronted with the internal political pressures of personnel deployment, policy decisions and resource allocation.
Abe’s demise means that the LDP conservatives are without a leader. Is the original ruse of strategic ambiguity still tenable?
If Kishida is unable to restore order within the party in the next two years, the outcome of the next general election will be uncertain. Kishida is in fact in a precarious position. While it would be ideal if Kishida gains sufficient authority to rebuild a unified order within the party and government, this could prove to be a great challenge.
Abe was able to do that because he was a highly controversial and action-oriented leader. Due to his economic policies for quantitative easing and security-related legislations, Abe’s reputation domestically was mixed but evidently won him authority within the party.
Meanwhile, Kishida has been more of a coordinating politician quietly waiting to succeed Abe and is more ambiguous in his policy propositions. Even after taking office last year, he has maintained policy ambiguity to hold the party together and to avoid opposition from its main factions.
However, Abe’s demise means that the LDP conservatives are without a leader. Is the original ruse of strategic ambiguity still tenable?
On the economic front, it is unclear what Kishida’s new capitalism entails; merely increasing government subsidies will further worsen the financial situation. On Japan’s security policy, the pace and the sources of the proposed increase in defence expenditure to 2% of GDP remain unclear. Regarding the energy policy to tackle peak electricity consumption in summer and winter as crude oil and natural gas prices hit record highs, questions remain on whether to restart nuclear power or increase coal-fired power. What will become of Japan’s international commitment to green transition? These issues require a decisive and resolute politician.
China-Japan relations amid rebuilding order within LDP
Kishida currently heads the LDP’s Kochikai faction that has produced former prime ministers Shigeru Yoshida and Masayoshi Ohira in post-war Japan. If Kishida stays in power for a long time, Japanese politics may revert to centrism that could open up opportunities for China-Japan relations. However, it must also be recognised that rebuilding order within the LDP may bring significant challenges for the relations between the two countries.
As uniting the former Abe faction is critical for long-term rule (as seen from the decision on Abe’s state funeral), this may pose considerable challenges to improving China-Japan relations.
First, the leaderless LDP conservatives may unite in their attitudes towards China. Without Abe, his faction that makes up 94 members of the National Diet may face internal dissociation or even fragmentation. The LDP’s China policy may be the pivotal issue that unites the conservatives in the post-Abe era, and discussions on China policy will put internal pressure on Kishida’s cabinet.
As uniting the former Abe faction is critical for long-term rule (as seen from the decision on Abe’s state funeral), this may pose considerable challenges to improving China-Japan relations.
Second, the ideological interpretation of Japanese liberalism will affect China-Japan relations. In contrast to the Japanese liberalism in the post-war Shigeru Yoshida era, which focused on economic development and not the military, after the Cold War the Japanese liberals have placed greater emphasis on postmodern norms and values.
For example, on the nuclear threat issue, the US and Japan issued the Joint Statement on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in early 2022, noting China’s ongoing increase in its nuclear capabilities and requesting China to contribute to arrangements that reduce nuclear risks, increase transparency and advance nuclear disarmament.
Although this can be interpreted as Japan’s liberal view of a peaceful world without nuclear weapons, it also lends legitimacy to the US providing Japan, with whom it shares common values, the necessary nuclear umbrella through its own enormous nuclear stockpile. To China, this smacks of double standards, and it will fuel distrust between China and Japan.
Related: Foreign and security policy in Japan’s upper house elections | Constitutional revision is not entirely Japan's domestic affairs | Are Chinese fears of a rise in Japanese militarism post-Abe valid? | Can Japan rise above factional politics and become the 'bridge to the world' under new PM Kishida?
