(All photos courtesy of Hsu Chung-mao unless otherwise stated.)
Following the 20th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the new Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) has been revealed and Chinese President Xi Jinping is in firm control, with many of the old appointees being replaced. One exception is fourth-ranked Wang Huning — considered Xi’s top brain and trusted by both Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin, it is not too much to say he has been a counsellor to three generations of leaders.
As fate would have it, I was friends with Wang Huning over 30 years ago, and we first met in Singapore. For me, he feels like a friend lost in the vortex of time.
Wang is the PSC member in charge of ideology. Over the past five years, he has led propaganda, which is an important role for the CCP, where ideology guides policy. But unlike the previous people who held that role, Wang is an established academic who has published works on history and political thought, showing a comprehensive grasp of theoretical context. Also, his low-profile style lends him an air of mystery. And so, everyone is anxious to know everything about Wang, as a reference base to assess and analyse the CCP’s central policies.
A debate that brought people together
In May 1988, I flew from Manila to Shanghai, my second time in mainland China. After dropping off my luggage at Broadway Mansions Hotel, I rented a car and went to Fudan University.
A month earlier, I had spent a month with Fudan’s debate team led by professor-in-charge Wang Huning in Singapore, and we clicked. It was the international university Chinese language debate organised by Singapore Broadcasting Corporation, with invited teams from mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Malaysia and host Singapore.
Taiwan’s martial law was just lifted, and it was the first time university students from both sides of the Taiwan Strait were debating, and it immediately created a buzz in Taiwan. Their every move was reported at length in Taiwan media. This was the first “spring” in cross-strait exchanges, and because young people were involved, all the more there was a sense of togetherness and hope.
After we parted, they might have thought we would send letters once or twice a year, before we met again. But just one month later, I was speeding to the Fudan campus. This was a surprise visit, and the entire Fudan debate team came to receive us — the good times we had in Singapore came flooding back. And as my generation of Taiwanese was instilled with a rich sense of Chinese-ness, we felt close to China’s history and land. As one people, we quickly built a bond with the teachers and students of Fudan.
At the time, Wang Huning was just 32 years old, and Fudan president Xie Xide (also known as Hsi-teh Hsieh or Hilda Hsieh) was a prominent liberal intellectual. In 1984, US President Ronald Reagan gave a famous speech in Fudan, extolling the spirit of freedom and democracy in US history.
China was then five years into reform and opening up; extreme leftist thought was completely rejected, but it was still feeling its way forward. The Chinese people saw the prosperity, vibrancy and freedom of the American people, and shifted from objecting to US imperialism to being filled with admiration and desire for the US.
Seeds of ‘new authoritarianism’
Nevertheless, China had its own circumstances to deal with. There were many proposals and debates on how to shift from an extreme leftist and people-based system to modern democratic thought and a system-based framework. One well-known proposal was “new authoritarianism”, meaning that the Chinese people should move towards modern democracy — however, as the social economy and education levels were lacking for Chinese democracy, a “new authoritarianism” style of governance was required for a period, to create the conditions necessary for democracy in the future. New authoritarianism was not just a policy proposal, but its historical basis was that modern democracy evolved from the rule of law as initiated by the bourgeoisie, and the process involved a period of governance by liberal authoritarianism.
At the time, I was not clear about how Wang thought, but he gave me some of his academic works. At the same time, the Fudan students mentioned that Wang agreed with new authoritarianism. We did not have much opportunity to discuss ideas, but Wang was then a university teacher with no official position, and had few qualms when speaking.
There were salons in Fudan, where teachers and students would chat over beer — I had good talks with Wang Huning. Come to think of it, in 1988, many flaws with urban economic reform were already showing in mainland China, with many complaints among the people. The intellectuals wanted the European and US system, and were disgusted with the current situation. The first sparks of social unrest were quietly burning.
Yet, in the intellectual community, there was an open climate of bold speech; in some sense, it was even more liberal than today. I have seen much bolder expressions in many published works of that time, as compared to now. This stark division in thought was also reflected in the top levels of the CCP, and sowed the seeds of schism.
A firsthand experience of the US
In April 1989, I was back in Fudan. I spent the night chatting with the students in the hostel, and left by scaling the wall in the early hours of the following morning, before the superintendent opened the doors. This second trip to Fudan was memorable. Over the past year, Wang Huning had won the Henry Fok Foundation Scholarship and spent some time in the US. When he returned, I saw that his dressing was much more modern. He spoke with enthusiasm of his experiences in the US, and the many insights he had gained.
He said Taiwan sent an “amazing” number of students to the US, which had an enormous impact on Taiwan’s development. He also said that American families were more religious than he expected. Wang’s knowledge of the US was no longer based on books, but on firsthand encounters with society and true ground sentiments.
Two months later, China Times sent me to mainland China again to cover the Tiananmen incident. I was there to take over from my two colleagues who had been there for a couple of months; one week later, I found myself lying in a pool of blood in Tiananmen. Over the next six months, I went from darkness to gradually recovering my senses. Such major events can only be left to the judgement of history.
Before Tiananmen, many mainland Chinese leaders wore Western suits; after that, they went back to wearing Chinese tunic suits. Clothes seemed to become a sort of political statement.
In June 1990 — one year after Tiananmen — I was back visiting friends at Fudan. Some friends had been expelled from Fudan after being involved in Tiananmen; they went into business in southern China and made a lot of money, becoming just one of many such stories of the time.
On that trip, I had a few words with Wang Huning in his office. Unlike the previous year on his return from the US, he had gone back to wearing a simple white shirt. Before Tiananmen, many mainland Chinese leaders wore Western suits; after that, they went back to wearing Chinese tunic suits. Clothes seemed to become a sort of political statement. We did not speak much, but we did touch on Tiananmen and the changing situation in Eastern Europe. He said China could not be like Eastern Europe, which was in line with his theory. So what should China be like? He did not say, but we can infer.
An admirer of Taiwan’s structure in the early years
In 1992, four years after the university debate, Wang Huning attended a forum in Taiwan, and a group of us went to his hotel room. Wang said Taiwan was well built up, and the greenery beside the expressways was well done. I thought that given Wang’s intelligence, he had observed Taiwan for just a few days, but he was far from hazy and would be able to get at some key points. After all, he had long grasped the rational knowledge part; what he needed was emotional understanding. In 1993, Wang brought the debate team to Singapore again, where I was also conducting interviews. This time, our interaction was limited, but we took many photographs. It was also the last time I met Wang Huning.
According to current information, in 1995 Wang Huning went to Beijing to serve as head of the Political Affairs Division of the Central Policy Research Office (CPRO). He had previously catalogued a large number of theoretical essays for then-Shanghai mayor Jiang Zemin; now, he began helping General Secretary Jiang guide ideology, which in effect was guiding the thinking and theory of the CCP and country. In 1998, Wang became the deputy head of the CPRO; in 2002, he was promoted to the CCP Central Committee and CPRO head. Subsequently, he was promoted to be a member of the CCP Secretariat and Politburo — in 2017, he became a member of the PSC.
...he does not just plot out ideas, but provides a concrete way to win the battle, which is a basic criterion as a strategist.
Wang Huning’s thoughts in practice
What is Wang Huning’s ideology? What is his political style? If his thinking and style represent the CCP’s policy direction and implementation, how do we deduce the current CCP’s handling of international issues like Taiwan, Hong Kong and the US? These questions may well be an important key to how global intellectuals and politicians understand mainland China.
Wang Huning left a deep impression on me in two areas: his thoughts and writing, as well as his reaction when we spoke of the Tiananmen incident and the changes in eastern Europe; and his strategy as a teacher in charge of the Fudan debate team. The second part is probably frequently overlooked, but because I was there, it is hard to forget that Wang has ideas and a strong awareness of strategy, and can lead a solid winning strategy.
I feel that this is the biggest difference between him and other theorists — he can come up with a workable plan to defeat opponents. I believe this is a key reason why he has won political trust: he does not just plot out ideas, but provides a concrete way to win the battle, which is a basic criterion as a strategist.
“The conditions for choosing to pursue a political ideal can soon be created, but building a systematic political democracy is definitely not easy..." - Wang Huning
In terms of theory, Wang’s work Comparative Political Analysis (《比较政治分析》) says: “Philosophical political democracy is a political ideal and objective, and a moral framework. Choosing to pursue it is in line with historical trends. On the other hand, when it comes to systematic political democracy, a society that is in the process of modernisation is the least grounded, the most unprepared and the least trained. The conditions for choosing to pursue a political ideal can soon be created, but building a systematic political democracy is definitely not easy, without which philosophical political democracy usually leads to instability.”
To put it simply, for Wang, democracy is ultimately not a moral sentiment, but a systematic, rational practice. This can be extended to explore many questions, such as whether there is a training process for a systematic political democracy, when should it start, and whether China will start this process. Also, since philosophical political democracy usually leads to instability, and China urgently needs to stabilise its long-term growth, does that mean philosophical political democracy will be put off indefinitely to avoid creating instability?
Based on this definition, it seems that it will forever be difficult to achieve democracy in China. Similarly, those in office would not go for overly radical policies and create a disaster, because radical policies also stem from philosophical sentiments.
These are tough questions to answer — perhaps the final answer lies in the top leader’s values. If the top leader pursues building political, economic and military strength as the marker for the rejuvenation of the Chinese people, then the democratic process will forever be a rational tool to achieve that objective; it can be put off for a long time, or even permanently. Based on this definition, it seems that it will forever be difficult to achieve democracy in China. Similarly, those in office would not go for overly radical policies and create a disaster, because radical policies also stem from philosophical sentiments.
A good strategist
As for Wang’s strategic awareness, the motion of the debate between Fudan and National Taiwan University (NTU) was “Can Confucianism counter the bad influence of the West?” Why say the West is a bad influence to begin with? Fudan did not like that but could only accept it. One Fudan student later told me that Wang came up with a way for the Fudan team to criticise Confucius from various angles. The attack came in waves that the NTU students could not handle. Their arguments were torn to bits and they could not get their narrative together and lost the debate.
This was not a tussle over truth, but a competition of debating skills. We can see that Wang had keen strategic awareness; even in a student competition, he was clear on each side’s strengths and weaknesses, and found a point of entry to leverage the advantage. In the two competitions that Wang led, the Fudan debate team defeated the elites of Chinese universities from various places and came in first — this was no fluke. When such strategic ideas are extended to domestic and foreign policies, including towards Taiwan and Hong Kong and the US, they are still applicable. For a long time, Wang often accompanied Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping on overseas visits, which probably had a lot to do with his status as a strategist.
In summary, Wang represents a utilitarian style of thought, where utility ultimately trumps sentimentality as the basis for difficult decisions. Being unfettered by sentimentality, they are able to come to firm decisions and actions; at the same time, being dispassionate, they would not make irrational decisions like Mao Zedong’s generation. They would firmly implement their plan for national development and not allow anything to disrupt the process. Of course, on the other hand, they would also make non-peaceful preparations, as a deterrent and last resort.
The consequence of using the democratic process as a tool might be the normalisation and extension of authoritarianism, which is the opposite of the ultimate goal of philosophical democracy, and goes against the original aim of growth.
Are there no obstacles or weaknesses to using democracy purely as a political tool without human sentiment, but with a strong sense of policy operations?
Amid external tussling, domestically there is a need to improve cohesion in China. The combative language of the Mao era would resurface and the sentiments of the extreme left would be encouraged. However, this would restrict those in office from truly moving towards modernisation, while the use of ideas as tools might become the ideation of tools instead.
The consequence of using the democratic process as a tool might be the normalisation and extension of authoritarianism, which is the opposite of the ultimate goal of philosophical democracy, and goes against the original aim of growth.
Wang’s ability in political strategy is also shown in how he crafts different narratives according to the style of various leaders. During Jiang Zemin’s time, the “Three Represents” were aimed at removing the extreme left. During Hu Jintao’s time, it was the idea of a “harmonious society”, as shown in efforts to ease social tensions amid rapid growth. As for the Chinese dream, that reflects Xi Jinping’s ambitions of strengthening China in all areas.
Given the tussling with the West to be a world leader, China’s rhetoric contains quite a few mentions of “fighting”. With China and the US in a global strategic clash, China’s leadership is facing heightened challenges. To keep the country united in facing external parties, society moved towards semi-militarisation. At the same time, for the stability of the developing society, economic growth was very much about fair distribution, and curbing the expansion of private capital through strong administrative powers. The Chinese people suffered under the Mao Zedong era and do not want to go back to the past, but in the face of Western containment, instinctively they would tap on Chairman Mao’s indomitable spirit of independence, and yet still be wary not to go back to the mistake of an extreme left-wing economy.
Perhaps, in the end, the most important thing is not what Wang thinks, but the intentions of the top leaders that he serves; he will then craft a theoretical framework to help them achieve their aims.
To put it simply, Wang has his own core ideas, but still operates based on strategic awareness. He proposes narratives and political frameworks based on the image and style of the various leaders; this is an important reason why he is highly regarded and politically strong. Perhaps, in the end, the most important thing is not what Wang thinks, but the intentions of the top leaders that he serves; he will then craft a theoretical framework to help them achieve their aims.
Today, Xi Jinping is undoubtedly a strong leader who has taken a hardline stance on Taiwan, Hong Kong and the US. Even though he is careful and prudent, once he takes action, it will be strong and thorough.
A US that is getting weaker, and a China getting stronger
In 1991, Wang published a political book America vs America (《美國反對美國》), noting that given too much personal freedom, hedonism and irreversible party tussling, the US would not escape division. This book is now an important theoretical basis for how the CCP leaders see the US, and a source of confidence in strengthening China.
On the other hand, it also represents the very different perspectives in which the intellectuals of China and the US see the world; and this fundamental difference in thought has led to an irreconcilable intrinsic conflict between the two countries. As the Western political and intellectual arena is still dominated by a strong media, the Western narrative is more open and commonly understood, including its criticism of China’s lack of democracy, closed governance system, and growing aggression, and even predictions that China’s current system will collapse.
Finally, looking back at Wang Huning, the Fudan professor of 30 years ago, and then looking from a distance at today’s party and national leader Wang Huning, sometimes I can’t help but wonder: is this the same person?
Western views of China are all predicated on the Western system being superior to China’s, and taking for granted that most Chinese desire the Western system and lifestyle, with little interest in how China’s intellectuals see the West. It is hard for them to imagine that 30 years ago, China’s leadership-level intellectual elite predicted that the US’s current system would not be able to withstand too much personal freedom and unlimited utilisation of resources, and would ultimately fracture. This is not an angry comment borne of political opposition, but the result of observations of human civilisation development and history. Americans’ predictions of China’s future are easily heard among the international community; conversely, Chinese predictions about Americans are hardly heard. Perhaps by the time they are heard, they have already come true.
Finally, looking back at Wang Huning, the Fudan professor of 30 years ago, and then looking from a distance at today’s party and national leader Wang Huning, sometimes I can’t help but wonder: is this the same person? Factually, of course it is the same person — whether that free and easy university professor who drank beer and chatted cheerfully in the salon on campus, or today’s stern-faced leader chairing national propaganda meetings, I believe that he is the same on the inside. In any case, the good times we had 30 years ago in Singapore and the Fudan campus symbolises an idyllic period of amicable cross-strait exchanges that will forever remain sweet memories.
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