Mao Zedong

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s 20th Party Congress opened with CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping giving a summary of the party report, during which he highlighted the key achievements over the past five years, as well as the way forward. Zaobao correspondent Yu Zeyuan takes us through the key points and what to expect over the next few days.

As the 20th Party Congress approaches, Zaobao correspondent Yu Zeyuan looks at the power game in China. He examines evolving rhetorics and terms used by Chinese leaders since Mao, and reflects on the way President Xi Jinping has consolidated and enshrined power in the past decade.

While Chinese politicians can be classified into different factional groups such as the princelings, the Shanghai gang, the Youth League group, and the Tsinghua clique, these are not necessarily functional factions in real politics. What is more pertinent is politicians’ relations with the paramount leader, Xi Jinping, who has in the last ten years tried to eliminate the various factions and lump them into one loosely connected “anti-Xi faction”. This is the second in a series of four articles on President Xi Jinping and the road ahead.

While Chinese President Xi Jinping is likely to secure a third term at the 20th Party Congress, Loro Horta recalls the saying that one should “be careful what you wish for”. The road ahead in his third term looks to be fraught with challenges, both domestically and externally. This is the first in a series of four articles on President Xi Jinping and the road ahead.

Russian academic Artyom Lukin revisits Mao’s Three Worlds Theory to explain that while the world looks to be on the cusp of great change, the paradigms of the past can still inform the future. Much will depend on the “fourth world” of Russia and other perceived US adversaries who are drawing closer to China. This is the third in a series of four articles contemplating a changing world order.

While the Chinese government has paid more attention to the navy and air force contingents of the People’s Liberation Army in recent times, it is still the land forces that have the most political influence. The party is well aware that it is the latter’s might they would need in the event of internal uprisings and it is this constituent’s loyalty and strength they must ensure.

East Asian Institute senior research fellow Lance Gore argues that two contexts made Xi’s resurrection of ideological orthodoxy almost inevitable — Leninist party rule and China’s rise on the global stage. But Xi’s return to ideology may be to China’s detriment, as it could reverse achievements of the reform and opening up era, and also set China on a collision course with Western liberal democracies.

EAI academic Lance Gore notes that China’s “peaceful rise” is a particular hard sell because it involves the rise of a major heterogeneous civilisational power, which is different from the mere transfer of hegemony between states from the same civilisation. Thus China needs to work on gaining acceptance from the international community by conveying the merits of its civilisational traits and avoiding pitfalls such as a reversion to cultural dead wood or failed Marxist orthodoxy.

Domestic and external pressures compel China to face the issue of democracy. With growing affluence and diversity in the population, the government needs to find a way to incorporate various views that goes beyond the Mao-era “mass line”. In forging a new path, the Chinese Communist Party is feeling its way around bringing about a socialist neo-democracy, or what has been verbalised as “whole-process people’s democracy”. But what stands in the way of putting thought into action?