China-Russia relations

East Asian Institute academic Li Nan asserts that China’s joint military exercises with Central Asian countries and Russia are done in the context of furthering “strategic partnerships” to deal with domestic and intramural security threats but not external threats. While it is clear that China aims to build a regional security order in Central Asia, its adherence to non-interference may hinder its efforts.

It seems that the longer the war in Ukraine drags on, the more dependent Russia will be on China. After more than three centuries of Russia-China relations, it seems that the situation is coming full circle and Russia is becoming increasingly subordinate to China.

US academic Zhu Zhiqun notes that the international community has been watchful of China’s moves since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. China’s ambiguous stance, tense relations with the US and failure to actively mediate following the outbreak of the war have caused its international standing to decline. China will need to take a clear position on fundamental issues, as well as do its utmost to bring about peace talks between Ukraine and Russia.

University of New South Wales academic Alexander Korolev takes stock of the China-Russia relationship from the angles of consistency, growing military-technical cooperation, and structural shifts in great power politics.

Zaobao correspondent Yu Zeyuan analyses the outcomes of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit held in Uzbekistan and the implications of China’s perceived stronger courting of the Central Asia region.

China seems to be pulling back while Russia wants to take a step forward, as seen from the Xi-Putin parlay at their meeting in Uzbekistan. But the delicate dance is not only at the surface level of the Ukraine war, but China’s deeper strategic goals in Central Asia, where Russia considers itself a dominant power.

After more than two years since the start of the pandemic, Chinese President Xi Jinping will resume making diplomatic visits overseas with his Central Asia tour this month. The geopolitical situation has vastly transformed during his physical absence in the international arena. Zaobao correspondent Yang Danxu explores the implications of these changes.

The BRI’s implementation will be slowing down as a result of multiple factors ranging from the global Covid-19 pandemic, the shift in the global geostrategic environment and the Chinese economic slowdown. As it changes its model to suit change, it could focus more on sustainable financing for BRI countries and lower the long-term financial impacts of loans for infrastructure projects. It could also pursue “third-party market cooperation” as a flexible approach in its pursuit of cooperation with other countries under the BRI umbrella. This is the second in a five-part series of articles on the future of China.

As the world rapidly shifts from an economic one to a highly political one, competition will no longer be about who wins more but about who loses less. In the shift from a win-win to a zero-sum game, China is torn as it strives to get closer to the developed world yet seeks to maintain a distance from the third world and Russia. In navigating these troubled waters, three critical developments — relations with Russia, Taiwan, and decoupling from the West — may alter the fate of China. This is the last in a series of four articles contemplating a changing world order.