China-US trade war

Japanese academic Sahashi Ryo notes that with Biden taking office, the US needs to look at the changing needs of diplomacy and rebuild international relationships, and figure out how to negotiate its ties with China.

Innovation features prominently in the proposals for China's 14th Five-Year Plan. Apart from building up long-term resources such as education and basic scientific research, much government weight will be thrown behind building self-reliance in core technologies, including in the semiconductor industry, says Erik Baark and Qian Jiwei.

Zaobao correspondent Yu Zeyuan says that while US President-elect Joe Biden will have his hands full with domestic issues when he assumes office, at the very least, his approach to US-China relations will be less antagonistic than that of his predecessor’s. That in itself leaves room for the relationship to move forward from ground zero.

The arrest of Huawei’s CFO Meng Wanzhou in Vancouver in December 2018 brought China-Canada relations to an all-time low. But the recent round of hearings in which the Canadian judge agreed to admit new evidence may turn things around. Hong Kong academic Wang Jiangyu says that China might now be getting their hopes up that Canada will not simply do the bidding of the US.

Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou has been living in limbo since she was detained in Vancouver on the back of an extradition request from the US in relation to bank fraud charges. A Canadian judge ruled last week that part of Meng’s statement had an “air of reality” and that she was entitled to providing some additional evidence “to a limited extent”. Does this signal an upward momentum for Meng’s lawyers to overturn the US’s extradition request? Much would depend on seemingly extraneous factors such as the outcome of the US presidential race, says Beijing correspondent Yang Danxu.

China has already flexed its muscles and shown that it can retaliate if provoked. Hence, although the US continues to play the devil’s advocate and wades into issues pertaining to Hong Kong, South China Sea and Taiwan, China will not fall into the trap as both sides know that the stakes are too high to engage in a hot war.

Since 2016, China has presented itself as a strategic competitor to the US. In turn, the Trump administration has been accused of incoherence in its policies toward China and its approach to the Indo-Pacific has led to concerns in regional states. Whether Trump or Biden wins in November, Washington needs to recognise some non-negotiables with regards to Southeast Asia: the avoidance of presenting binary choices for regional states to make amid Sino-US rivalry; the need for a looser cooperative approach in pushing back China’s assertiveness, particularly in the South China Sea; and the need to build regional connectivity networks and infrastructure.  

Shenzhen has grown rapidly over the past 40 years, such that its GDP reached a massive 2.7 trillion RMB in 2019. Just this month, the Chinese government released a five-year plan to make Shenzhen a “pilot demonstration area for socialism with Chinese characteristics”. Amid plans for reforms and new initiatives, EAI academic Yu Hong asks: How much autonomy will Shenzhen have, and what challenges will it face?

US President Donald Trump did not meet a single leader from Southeast Asia since November last year. Despite his administration's seemingly disengaged approach, US relations with key Southeast Asian states including Vietnam and Thailand have improved. ISEAS academics Ian Storey and Malcolm Cook look at the Trump administration's engagement data with Southeast Asian countries over the past year, the party platforms of both the Republicans and the Democrats, as well as recent developments in the region, as they give their take on the possible regional geopolitical environment after the presidential election.