China-India relations

China’s aspirational “Asian moment” in global governance will come true if a China-India geoeconomic concert drives India’s presidency of the G20 in 2023. For this to happen, the two Asian neighbours must rise above the geopolitics of their ongoing military hostility and work together to advance global economic recovery.

Zaobao correspondent Yu Zeyuan analyses the outcomes of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit held in Uzbekistan and the implications of China’s perceived stronger courting of the Central Asia region.

After more than two years since the start of the pandemic, Chinese President Xi Jinping will resume making diplomatic visits overseas with his Central Asia tour this month. The geopolitical situation has vastly transformed during his physical absence in the international arena. Zaobao correspondent Yang Danxu explores the implications of these changes.

Beijing is keen that Delhi should express support for PRC’s territorial sovereignty over Taiwan. For India, though, the unresolved Sino-Indian boundary dispute and their ongoing military standoff force a reality check in this relationship. In the absence of a Chinese reciprocal one-India policy, Delhi is messaging that while it will not bandwagon with pro-Taiwan forces, a new template of Sino-Indian ties is required.

As the deepening US-China conflict over Taiwan generates widespread concern in Asia and the world, India’s new ambiguities on the "one China" policy, as well as the nuances of Delhi’s engagement with Taipei, have come into sharp relief. As India’s boundary tensions with China persist, Delhi’s navigation between the logic of expanding ties with Taipei and the dangers of further deterioration of bilateral relations with Beijing has become more challenging.

Amid the tense situation arising from US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, the Chinese public have made loud cries against China’s seemingly disappointing response. Academic Zhang Chengxin assesses what led to such sentiments and how they can be abated.

While the last thing it wants is to be caught up in the crosshairs of US-China competition, Nepal is in the spotlight with the recent passing in the Nepali parliament of the US$500 million MCC-Nepal compact with the US. The US and Nepal have both denied that this grant is tied to the US’s Indo-Pacific strategy, but China is riled up as India watches closely.

Over the past several years, Chinese private firms have ferociously invested in India’s tech start-ups. Initially welcomed, China’s diversion of interest from erstwhile US investment has been viewed with some measure of suspicion since the Galwan Valley conflict. Are we living in a world where investment patterns are determined by statecraft? ISAS academic Karthik Nachiappan examines the issue.

With his visit to Asia in May and the launch of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity which includes India, US President Joe Biden clearly seeks to recast the strategic environment in which China operates. On its part, China had earlier launched the Global Security Initiative and is articulating its vision of a changing world order. For India, therefore, the long-term choice is either strategic autonomy, or the role of a pro-US or even pro-China “swing state”.