BRI

Taiwanese academic Chiung-Chiu Huang explains the concept of China’s “international united front” strategy which remains a guiding principle today. By using this softly-softly approach that seeks common ground and low-hanging fruit, China has managed its relations with countries it deems not outrightly hostile. In doing so, it may not win friends, but it may at least make fewer enemies.

Presidents Xi Jinping and Joko Widodo witnessed the test "ride" of the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Rail (HSR) via livestream during Chinese President Xi's visit to Indonesia for the G20 Summit in Bali. Economic cooperation remain high on the cards of bilateral relations, but while China’s trade and investment in Indonesia have grown substantially since the early 2000s, the Indonesian public does not share Jakarta’s desire to wholeheartedly embrace Beijing.

Two China-driven projects show striking contrasts. The newly opened Phnom Penh-Sihanoukville Expressway has been well-received by Cambodians. But grand plans for Sihanoukville to be an investment hub and “multi-purpose” city have instead seen Chinese businesses crowding out locals, a boom-bust cycle in construction and illicit trades.

Ahead of the 18th Joint Council for Bilateral Cooperation (JCBC) meetings between Singapore and China — the first to be held in person since the outbreak of the pandemic — Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister and Coordinating Minister for Economic Policies Heng Swee Keat sets out a few priorities in taking Singapore-China relations to new heights.

Despite challenges arising from the slowing Chinese economy, China is likely to continue pushing forward on the BRI, it being a key plank of President Xi Jinping’s foreign policy. Along the way, however, it will have to make certain adjustments for a smooth transition into BRI 2.0.

Central Asia is a linchpin between Eurasia and Southeast Asia and a strategic node in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Chinese President Xi Jinping notably visited Central Asia in his first foreign visit in over two years. But while China’s economic engagement is welcome in the region, it is currently not a confident security provider. Could things change in the near future?

The BRI’s implementation will be slowing down as a result of multiple factors ranging from the global Covid-19 pandemic, the shift in the global geostrategic environment and the Chinese economic slowdown. As it changes its model to suit change, it could focus more on sustainable financing for BRI countries and lower the long-term financial impacts of loans for infrastructure projects. It could also pursue “third-party market cooperation” as a flexible approach in its pursuit of cooperation with other countries under the BRI umbrella. This is the second in a five-part series of articles on the future of China.

East Asian Institute academic Yu Hong analyses the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, an update from the earlier Build Back Better World Initiative. With the aim of mobilising up to US$600 billion over the next five years, it is a much more robust effort to counter China’s BRI. But will such heft be enough? This is the first in a five-part series of articles on the future of China.

Shutting out the din of international debates on US-China competition, Professor Zha Daojiong puts perspective on changing global dynamics, asserting that China is circumspect about its place in the world and the prospect of decoupling is further than people think. Besides, other players, albeit smaller ones, hold sway over the changing global order too. This is the first in a series of four articles contemplating a changing world order.