Zheng Weibin

Analyst and writer

Zheng Weibin is an analyst with a China think tank. He does media work, with a focus on mainland China politics, cross-strait relations, and Hong Kong politics.

Traders work during the IPO for Chinese ride-hailing company Didi Global Inc on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) floor in New York City, US, 30 June 2021. (Brendan McDermid/Reuters)

If not the US, can the Chinese government provide better IPO choices for internet companies?

Analyst Zheng Weibin notes that the clampdown on Didi shows that the competitive relationship between China and the US has affected the global interactions of tech giants, and political factors will matter more in global investments of startups in China. In the aftermath, will technological innovations such as digital manufacturing through artificial intelligence be straitjacketed?
Refrigerated tractor trailers used to store bodies of deceased people are seen at a temporary morgue, with the Statue of Liberty seen in the background, during the Covid-19 outbreak, in the Brooklyn borough of New York City, US, 13 May 2020. (Brendan McDermid/Reuters)

China is not the answer to America's problems

Analyst Zheng Weibin compares the current China-US competition to the Cold War, and notes that much of US domestic policy is in fact targeted at China, which perhaps distracts from the real domestic issues that the US should be tackling.
US President Joe Biden holds a semiconductor chip as he speaks prior to signing an executive order, aimed at addressing a global semiconductor chip shortage, in the State Dining Room at the White House in Washington, US, 24 February 2021. (Jonathan Ernst/Reuters)

America turning to state intervention to win US-China tech war

Analyst Zheng Weibin notes that heightened US-China competition means a technological edge will be key. To safeguard that advantage, the US may rely on state intervention in the science and technology sector, while tapping on its alliance network. How will this approach affect China and the world?
Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen (centre) attends the inspection of a Republic of China Navy fleet in Keelung on 8 March 2021. (Sam Yeh/AFP)

Taiwan is America's best asset against China, but for how long?

Despite concerns that Taiwan might lose US support under the Biden administration, so far it seems that the opposite is true — the US has in fact maintained or even stepped up its support for Taiwan. But as platforms and mechanisms evolve in relation to containing China, how valuable will Taiwan still be as a geostrategic asset?
This photo taken on 11 December 2020 shows tourists looking at an illuminated ice sculpture at the Changchun ice and snow grand world in Changchun, Jilin province, China. (STR/AFP)

A multipolar world order is good for us all

Zheng Weibin asserts that the US will soon be stepping back into an international arena that is much changed. The US cannot hope to regain a unipolar dominance, if it arguably ever had it. Rather, a multipolarity ruled by regional pockets of issues-based interests is taking shape, starting in Asia.
A supporter of US President-elect Joe Biden waves a flag as people celebrate on Black Lives Matter plaza across from the White House in Washington, DC on 7 November 2020. (Alex Edelman/AFP)

Can the US take a backseat in Asia and maintain peaceful coexistence with China?

Zheng Weibin assesses that the future of the US’s leading role in Asia depends on whether it can see itself retreating from the region and letting their allies in Asian exert influence by proxy. If that is the case, Taiwan may no longer be such a key set piece. Moreover, if both the US and China recalibrate their thinking about each other, they might reach a consensus on coexistence.
A girl sits on the shoulders of her father outside the Forbidden City during the national day marking the 71st anniversary of the People's Republic of China and the country's national "Golden Week" holiday in Beijing on 1 October 2020. (Nicolas Asfouri/AFP)

RCEP: The start of a new ‘China-centric’ order?

RCEP, the largest free trade agreement signed thus far, includes China, Japan and South Korea — the largest, second, and fourth largest economies in Asia. This heralds a new Asian era, says Zheng Weibin. Apart from the pure economic benefits that this will bring, the fact that the US is not a part of the grouping gives China some leverage against moves from the US such as its military presence in East Asia and attempts to reforge alliances against China. In this game of move and countermove, who will be the first to say "checkmate"?
US President Donald Trump arrives to address a briefing on the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic at the White House in Washington, 13 August 2020. (Kevin Lamarque/REUTERS)

To manage Trump the 'destroyer', China needs 'guerrilla’ tactics

Analyst Zheng Weibin says that as the Trump administration continues to target China without a clear shape to its strategic competition strategy, Beijing cannot afford to think that it can brazenly respond in kind. Employing stealthy guerrilla warfare tactics may be more appropriate.
In this file photo former Chinese communist leader Chairman Mao Zedong (L) welcomes former US President Richard Nixon at his house in the Forbidden City in Beijing on 22 February 1972. (Handout/AFP)

Was Nixon’s policy of engaging China a failure?

US State Secretary Mike Pompeo made a key speech on China at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum recently. The venue could not have been more symbolic, given former President Nixon’s role in the US’s rapprochement with China in the 1970s, and the current Trump administration’s belief that a new approach to China is necessary as the US’s engagement strategy “has not brought the kind of change inside China that President Nixon hoped to induce”. Analyst and writer Zheng Weibin weighs up the costs and benefits of this new approach.