Ian Storey

The PLA has increased the number of military exercises conducted with its smaller regional neighbours this year. But the scope, frequency and sophistication of the exercises still lag behind those conducted by the US. The aims and outcomes of China's joint exercises also differ from those of the US. ISEAS researcher Ian Storey says that all this points to a lack of trust on China's part.

ISEAS senior fellow Ian Storey examines the factors driving defence modernisation in Southeast Asia and how the region may draw lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war.

US President Joe Biden has done a creditable job in upgrading and reinvigorating America’s treaty alliances. Thailand, one of Washington’s oldest treaty allies in Asia, is an outlier. ISEAS senior fellow Ian Storey examines the reasons why the US is not closer to Thailand, especially in defence.

Cambodia’s hearty relations with Russia means that it should have taken a less strident view of the latter’s invasion of Ukraine. Intriguingly, Phnom Penh’s position has tacked closer to Western critics of the Kremlin. Not only did Cambodia support the UNGA's resolution to condemn Russia, but it also co-sponsored it. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen has also said he is not afraid to anger Moscow.

Russia has been the largest exporter of arms to Southeast Asia over the past two decades but the value of its defence sales to the region has fallen sharply since its annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will only exacerbate this downward trend. Not only that, as the war looks set to drag on for months and possibly years, and sanctions increasingly disrupt Russia’s economy, Moscow’s dependence on Beijing may deepen. China will seek quid quo pros, probably including discounted energy imports, increased access to the Russian defence industrial sector’s most sensitive military technology and greater support for its "core interests" in Asia such as Taiwan and the South China Sea.

Southeast Asia’s initial responses to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine varied considerably, with Singapore taking the strongest stance and Myanmar supporting the Kremlin’s actions. As the conflict intensified, regional responses strengthened somewhat: eight ASEAN members voted for a United Nations General Assembly resolution condemning Moscow’s invasion; Vietnam and Laos, Russia’s two closest partners in the region, abstained. The Russia-Ukraine war is likely to have varying degrees of economic, political and security impacts on the region. A key concern is if China takes a leaf from Russia's playbook in terms of using manufactured histories and grey zone/hybrid warfare tactics, and disregarding international law.

The chief of Thailand’s air force wants to buy eight American-built F-35 fighter jets. While the sale would be a shot in the arm for the US-Thailand alliance, Washington may be reluctant to approve the sale because of Thailand’s growing military ties with China. ISEAS academic Ian Storey examines the factors at play.

Amid the spectre of China's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea, Indonesia plans to convene a meeting with some of its ASEAN colleagues — including the Philippines, Vietnam and Singapore. If the meeting happens, Beijing may not dial down its activities in the disputed areas, but the point would have been made that Indonesia is prepared to take the lead in galvanising ASEAN on South China Sea matters. The idea of a meeting is not new, but this time it might just work.

Last month, Myanmar became the first Southeast Asian country to take delivery of a made-in-China submarine, the UMS Minye Kyaw Htin. Given that the EU will not sell arms to Myanmar, that leaves China and Russia as possible arms suppliers. The latest sale gives China an advantage over Russia to supply Myanmar with a new fleet of submarines, as both countries ignore US calls to ban arms sales to Myanmar. This means that price and geopolitics will decide which country wins.