Former Taipei mayor Ko Wen-je’s downfall could impact cross-strait relations

02 Sep 2024
politics
Han Yong Hong
Associate Editor, Zaobao; Editor, Zaobao.com
Translated by James Loo, Grace Chong
Taiwan People’s Party chair Ko Wen-je has landed in hot water as a graft probe has shattered his “clean politics” image. Lianhe Zaobao associate editor Han Yong Hong looks at the events that led to the allegations and the implications for Taiwan’s political scene.
Ko Wen-je of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), attends a press conference in Taipei, Taiwan, on 12 January 2024. (Carlos Garcia Rawlins/Reuters)
Ko Wen-je of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), attends a press conference in Taipei, Taiwan, on 12 January 2024. (Carlos Garcia Rawlins/Reuters)

On 31 August, the leader of Taiwan’s third political force, chair of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) and self-proclaimed “above Blue-Green” politician Ko Wen-je was suddenly arrested for his alleged involvement in a graft case. At the time of writing, Ko had already been detained at the Taipei District Prosecutors Office for two nights. (NB: Ko was released without bail on 2 September, early Monday morning.) 

Wealth exposed

Who is Ko Wen-je? He was one of Taiwan’s presidential candidates in this year’s election, receiving 3.69 million or 26.46% of votes. Ko ran on a platform of clean politics that claimed to shun the corrupt money politics of the Blue and Green camps. Ko’s supporters called themselves “little grass” and launched the “little grass movement”, representing the grassroots’ hopes of changing Taiwan. 

Yet, their leader Ko is now sucked into the scandal of money politics, causing an uproar. This graft probe also caught the eye of Western mainstream media, with Bloomberg, Reuters, AFP and more carrying relevant reports. 

It took around 20 days from the start of events leading up to the collapse of Ko’s image. The most potent force in thoroughly lambasting Ko in public was not his political enemies outside of the TPP, but rather a former TPP aide, as well as ex-supporters of Ko who label themselves as “fans turned haters” and formed an active “anti-Ko” group online. 

On 6 August 2024, as Ko celebrated his 65th birthday, Grace Woo, his former head of digital affairs, accused him on Facebook of using deceptive methods to divert political contributions from the “little grass” campaign to MuKo Public Relations Marketing (木可公关公司), a company named after Ko’s surname (柯). Although Woo had previously revealed MuKo’s existence, her latest post triggered a series of controversies regarding Ko’s use of funds.

On 9 August, two other companies issued a statement alleging that Ko’s electoral campaign headquarters had misfiled NT$9.16 million (US$285,900) in political contributions. Following that, Ko’s wife Peggy Chen was exposed for looking at million-dollar houses to buy for her son. It was also revealed that Ko purchased a commercial office unit under his name using NT$43 million from the TPP’s presidential elections subsidy.  

The “little grass” realised that their earnest donations to Ko were made to a man who was not in the least bit poor, but instead is a wealthy millionaire.

A supporter of Ko Wen-je wears a cap with a “little grass hairpin and hair band“ at the rally in Tainan on 8 January 2024. The “little grass” was a symbol of Ko Wen-je’s election campaign. (SPH Media)

The Ko family did not break the law by looking at houses or buying offices, but in comparison with other presidential candidates who donated their presidential election subsidies, Ko’s actions were not well received. The “little grass” realised that their earnest donations to Ko were made to a man who was not in the least bit poor, but instead is a wealthy millionaire.

Political persecution?

As negative reports came out one after another, in late August it was exposed that NT$4.5 million was transferred from MuKo to Ko’s personal account for the rights to use his image, stirring even more intense public debate. Ko and his team’s clumsy response to these crises also further contributed to the negative perception from external observers. 

These controversies were only part of Ko’s woes. On the judicial side, he faces five major cases from his time as Taipei mayor, including the Core Pacific City case and the Beitou-Shilin Technology Park case. Ko’s residence, office as well as the TPP headquarters were all searched on the morning of 30 August, and Ko himself was summoned and detained mainly due to the Core Pacific City case. 

Once the world’s largest dome-shaped building, the Core Pacific City in downtown Taipei closed down in 2019 after 18 years of operation due to huge operating losses. Developers are converting it into the Core Pacific Plaza, which is expected to be completed by 2026. 

In 2020, Ko allowed the floor area ratio of the Core Pacific City to be increased from 560% to 840%, which fuelled accusations of his abuse of authority in allowing a large corporation to benefit illegally. 

Ko himself admitted to unclear declarations of political donations for his election campaign and the purchase of an office unit. This is sufficient to show his lack of regard for the rule of law and his failure to understand the expectations that come with his level of political position. 

Ko Wen-je, presidential candidate for Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), engaging his supporters at Shanhua night market in Tainan, Taiwan, on 9 January 2024. (SPH Media)

During the period when he was summoned, pro-Green media outlets continued to allege that he had NT$7 million in unexplained assets.

Did Ko land himself in such a predicament because he was indeed involved in serious wrongdoing or was it due to political interference, such as the political persecution alleged by the TPP? Until there is concrete evidence, the media and public opinion should not prematurely judge and insist that Ko has definitely broken the law. 

However, Ko himself admitted to unclear declarations of political donations for his election campaign and the purchase of an office unit. This is sufficient to show his lack of regard for the rule of law and his failure to understand the expectations that come with his level of political position. 

Moreover, whether the “Ko haters” are smearing him to gain attention or to seek justice, they all highlight internal management issues, the poor treatment of others and serious infighting within the TPP.

With these conditions readily available, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) could easily use them to damage Ko’s image and undermine his confidence. This could pave the way to removing him from the race and overcoming public opinion obstacles, effectively clearing a path for Taiwan President Lai Ching-te’s bid for a second term in 2028.

The fact that the KMT remains a bystander unfazed by the TPP’s serious predicament is befuddling. It must be noted that after the TPP is severely weakened, the next target of attack could be the KMT. 

Risk for the KMT

In Taiwan’s political spectrum, Ko’s stance on independence versus unification can be summarised as “one family across the Taiwan Strait”. While this statement is vague, it offers the public a third option aside from the Kuomintang (KMT)’s 1992 Consensus and the DPP’s clear pro-independence stance. In terms of political manoeuvring, the opposition parties, the KMT and TPP, are clearly interdependent on each other. 

Lawmakers from the main opposition Kuomintang (KMT) display a banner reading “Parliament reform and anti-corruption” after voting for reconsidering controversial bills at Parliament in Taipei, Taiwan, on 21 June 2024. (Sam Yeh/AFP)

The fact that the KMT remains a bystander unfazed by the TPP’s serious predicament is befuddling. It must be noted that after the TPP is severely weakened, the next target of attack could be the KMT. The ideal situation of a Blue-White alliance overseeing the Legislative Yuan could also be torn apart. 

Given such circumstances, the political stars of the pan-Blue camp have neither lent support to Ko’s camp nor publicly supported the investigation, showing that the KMT lacks both strategy and stance on Ko’s case, which is a dereliction of duty on the part of the KMT. 

Taiwan’s latest polls show that over 70% of surveyed Taiwanese do not favour the Chinese Communist Party and do not support reunification. Under Lai’s aggressive leadership, the opposition parties’ ability to act as a check on both domestic and cross-strait issues will diminish, which also means that Taiwan will move further in the direction of independence.

Ko’s fall from grace not only shocked Taiwan but will also indirectly affect cross-strait relations. To keep Taiwan from moving further towards independence, Beijing’s options — if not relying on cooperation with the US to manage the Taiwan Strait situation — might be to rely on the People’s Liberation Army.  

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “柯文哲案对两岸关系的影响”.

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