Philippine academic: The Philippines’ challenge facing China’s aggression

Amid increasing hostilities in the South China Sea (SCS) between the Philippines and China, government officials from the two nations came together for a dialogue under the 9^th Bilateral Consultation Mechanism (BCM) held in Manila in July 2024. The BCM came on the heels of a violent confrontation between the two countries during a resupply mission by the Philippine Navy (PN) to the Second Thomas Shoal in June.

The China Coast Guard (CCG) interdiction operation aboard PN vessels, involving armed officers with knives, machetes, hammers, and axes, resulted in injuries to several members of the Philippine Navy (PN) and damage to their military vessels.

The BCM represents a positive step amid the increased use of low-level force in the SCS. However, significant differences between the two states, and recent incidents that have escalated the maritime dispute, highlight the limitations of diplomacy and dialogue.

The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs noted that the BCM aims to restore trust and confidence and create conditions for productive dialogue and interactions. The two sides signed a provisional agreement on maritime communication mechanisms, establishing hotlines and direct channels between their coast guards, foreign ministries and even presidential offices.

The department stressed that continued diplomacy and dialogue, based on mutual respect, are the critical solutions to facilitate peace and stability at sea. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr in his 2024 State of the Nation Address, said: “We will assert our rights and interests in the same fair and pacific way that we have always done. Proper diplomatic channels and mechanisms under the rules-based international order remain the only acceptable means of settling disputes.”  

Observers view the BCM as a hopeful sign, especially in light of the recent Second Thomas Shoal incident, which has raised concerns about the risk of a major conflict. China’s more aggressive manoeuvres resulted in injuries to Philippine personnel — one soldier lost a thumb — and caused significant damage to their inflatable vessels.

China’s action is pushing its relations with the Philippines into a game of brinkmanship that increases the risks of miscalculation and escalation, and there have been suggestions for the Philippines and the US to consider resorting to the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). 

However, despite substantial efforts to come to the table, the Philippine department lamentably expressed that “significant differences” remain. Apart from enhancing maritime communication lines, it is unclear what concrete measures are included in the provisional agreement and what progress has been made.

The agreement only serves as a stopgap measure to halt heightened tensions but has yet to achieve concrete results. Besides, the areas of cooperation agreed upon in this dialogue are not new, as they have been previously discussed in similar meetings.

Also, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs account of the 9^th BCM is instructive of Beijing’s unwavering position on its claims in the SCS, particularly the Second Thomas Shoal. Chinese officials have called on the Philippines “to stop maritime infringement and provocation at once, earnestly abide by the provisions of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC)”.

In the 8th BCM held in January 2024, China similarly displayed its strong position on the SCS, particularly on the Taiwan issue, demanding that the Philippines abide by the “one China” principle and immediately stop its wrong words and deeds on Taiwan-related issues. The rebuke came after the Philippine President congratulated Taiwan’s then President-elect, Lai Ching-te, on his victory via social media in January. 

The Philippines, meanwhile, remains steadfast in peacefully resolving these issues but “will not be intimidated”. In a news report, Marcos was quoted saying: “We will never be intimidated or oppressed by anyone.”

The Philippine president vowed to uphold the country’s rights and freedoms under international law while pursuing its national interests. China’s actions received condemnation from Western and Asian states, including the US, Japan and Australia. The war of words between the Philippines and China, with both sides blaming each other for sparking the incident, is likely to deepen the rift in their already fraught relationship. 

More importantly, recent encounters between Philippine and Chinese air and land vessels highlight the limitations of diplomacy and dialogue. Just weeks after the conclusion of an agreement and a successful Philippine resupply mission to the Second Thomas Shoal, new incidents have arisen at other flashpoints between the two nations:

While on a routine patrol over Scarborough Shoal, another contested area, on 8 August, two Chinese air force aircraft dropped flares along the path of a Philippine air force aircraft.

On 19 August, Chinese and Philippine coast guard vessels collided near the Sabina Shoal (close to the Second Thomas Shoal), where two of the latter’s ships sustained damage; another collision occurred on 31 August.

Also on 19 August, a Chinese aircraft was accused of firing flares near a civilian plane of the Philippine Bureau of Fisheries Aquatic Resources (BFAR), which was conducting maritime surveillance near Scarborough Shoal. Additionally, on 22 August, flares were also deployed near the same BFAR plane during its monitoring of poachers within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone and territorial seas.

On 25 August, Chinese coast guard ships used water cannons and deliberately rammed a Philippine BFAR civilian vessel, which was en route for a humanitarian mission near the disputed Sabina Shoal, to deliver food, medical, and diesel supplies to Filipino fishermen.

The clashes mentioned above reveal a disturbing shift in Chinese intimidation tactics. For one, China’s new regulation at sea gives teeth to its claim. Beijing’s regulation, which took effect in June, authorises the CCG to detain foreign ships illegally entering China’s territorial water and adjacent waters for up to 60 days.

Also, there is an apparent increase in the number of encounters between the two sides and the intensity of the violence. An August 2024 study by the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) revealed that the Chinese use of force at Second Thomas Shoal — defined as either non-lethal force (physical contact between ships) or less-lethal force (use of devices such as lasers, water cannons, and handheld tools) — had increased both in frequency and intensity through the use of smaller Chinese vessels. The US think tank also suggested that China will likely apply the same tactic at Scarborough Shoal and other hot spots.

Moreover, China’s recent activities have targeted not only Philippine military vessels but also civilian crafts. Given these shifts, we are more likely to witness the same scenarios playing out in other flashpoints — a more dangerous use of force by China without prejudice to the type of vessel entering these contested waters.

The Philippines, therefore, needs to rethink its strategy.

According to one Filipino scholar, so far, Manila has dealt with Beijing using a multi-pronged approach: unilateral, bilateral, minilateral and multilateral levels. Still, none of these strategies has significantly reduced China’s actions in the SCS.

Unilaterally, the Philippines’s transparency initiative to expose China’s “bad” behaviour has failed to deter the latter from taking coercive actions. Bilaterally, its alliance with the US still plays the most significant role. Last July, Washington pledged to provide an additional US$500 million to Manila for military funding as part of the former’s strengthening of its regional alliances to counter Beijing.

Of course, this US move strongly indicates the backing of a powerful ally, much to China’s dismay. Invoking the MDT may not be ripe, and whether the Philippines and the US are ready to enter an even bigger conflict vis-à-vis China remains unclear.

However, based on a news report, a low-key use of the MDT is a reasonable option but should be within the context of consultations. A high-ranking US military official has suggested that the US military is open to talks on escorting Philippine crafts in the contested waters.

Minilateral and multilateral levels imply that other nations also worry about what is happening in the region, but much needs to be done to make a dent in China’s behaviour.

As the smaller and weaker state in this situation, Manila may have limited space to manoeuvre, and there is no easy answer to dealing with Beijing’s provocative behaviour. Therefore, the Philippines needs to develop more sound and extensive strategies to counter China’s behaviour. Without a carefully thought-out strategic plan, China will continue playing its dangerous game of coercion. 

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