When Chinese mining meets weak governance in Africa — who pays?
The Lubumbashi dam collapse exposes the human and environmental toll of Chinese mining in Africa. Weak oversight leaves communities and forests at risk — a warning spotlighted at COP30. Researcher Genevieve Donnellon-May unpacks the stakes.
On 4 November, a containment dam at Congo Dongfang International Mining (CDM), a major Chinese-operated mining supplier of cobalt, collapsed, flooding neighbourhoods with industrial waste in Lubumbashi, a city of more than three million people in the south of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).
The DRC’s Mines Minister Louis Watum Kabamba criticised the company for its waste storage and processing facilities that do not meet international standards. He pointed out a lack of watertight barriers, structural stability, control devices and emergency plans. Authorities responded by suspending CDM’s operations for three months. The country’s President Felix Tshisekedi also expressed “very high concern” over the environmental damage, signalling the broader political, social and governance implications of the incident.
China plays an outsized role: almost all cobalt mined in the DRC is exported to China for refining and processing. Meanwhile, Chinese firms control over 70% of the country’s copper production...
China’s grip on the DRC’s critical minerals
China’s expanding presence in Africa’s mineral sector forms part of a broader economic engagement that accelerated with the launch of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000 and strengthened further under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) from 2013. Over 50 African countries, along with the African Union, have signed a memorandum of understanding with China to jointly build BRI cooperation.
Two-way trade has surged in recent years. Beijing’s pledge earlier this year to grant zero-tariff treatment on all tariff lines for African partners further signals its intent to integrate African economies more deeply into China-centred supply chains.
Chinese investment today remains concentrated in four sectors: construction (35%), mining (22%), manufacturing (14%) and financial services (12%). Within this portfolio, mining has become a strategic pillar. Africa holds roughly 30% of the world’s mineral reserves.
The DRC, a BRI member since 2021, is central to this engagement. After upgrading bilateral relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2023, economic ties intensified. In the first half of 2024 alone, China-DRC trade reached US$12.34 billion, making the DRC China’s largest investment destination in Africa.
Mining anchors the relationship. The DRC produces more than 70% of global cobalt and holds vast reserves of copper and cobalt, minerals indispensable for renewable energy, advanced technologies and China’s industrial base. China plays an outsized role: almost all cobalt mined in the DRC is exported to China for refining and processing. Meanwhile, Chinese firms control over 70% of the country’s copper production, backed by investments exceeding US$20 billion and stakes in 15 of the country’s largest copper and cobalt mines.
As global demand for lithium, copper, cobalt and rare earths accelerates, driven by electric vehicles, renewable power and artificial intelligence applications, China’s reliance on African minerals will only deepen, heightening both its economic exposure and geopolitical sensitivities across the continent.
The region has already “lost” about 10% of its forest area between 1990 and 2025. The DRC, which holds more than half of the Basin’s trees, lost over 1.2 million hectares of forest cover in 2024 alone.
Congo Basin at a tipping point
The Congo Basin rainforest has become a central focus in global climate diplomacy. Often described as the world’s “second lungs” after the Amazon, it spans six Central African countries, covers more than 300 million hectares, and is home to around 130 million people. The DRC alone contains 60% of this forest. As the world’s second-largest tropical rainforest, the Basin serves as a critical carbon sink, regulates regional rainfall by generating up to 83% of local precipitation and sustains one of the richest biodiversity zones on the planet.
Yet the Basin has long been overlooked in global climate finance and policy. Between 2008 and 2022, the three major rainforest regions received a combined US$20 billion in international funding: US$9.3 billion (47%) for the Amazon and US$7.4 billion (37%) for Southeast Asia, but just US$3.2 billion (16%) for the Congo Basin. Academic research mirrors this pattern: a 2023 study found roughly 2,000 publications on the Congo Basin, compared with more than 10,600 on the Amazon. This disparity highlights a persistent gap between the Basin’s global strategic value and the investment required to safeguard it.
Momentum is slowly shifting. At the 30th Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP30) in Brazil, Congo Basin conservation received renewed political attention. At the 2nd African Climate Summit earlier this year, Congo Basin youth leaders reaffirmed their commitments to confronting climate challenges. The new France and Gabon-led initiative, the Belem Call for the Forests of the Congo Basin, aims to mobilise US$2.5 billion over five years to help protect it and also end deforestation in the Congo Basin by 2030.
The situation remains critical. A recent report found the Basin absorbs roughly 600 million tonnes of carbon dioxide annually, but this capacity is declining due to accelerating deforestation, with consequences for rainfall patterns, ecosystems and local livelihoods. The region has already “lost” about 10% of its forest area between 1990 and 2025. The DRC, which holds more than half of the Basin’s trees, lost over 1.2 million hectares of forest cover in 2024 alone.
Projections are alarming: if current trends persist, more than one-quarter of the Congo Basin rainforest could be lost by 2050.
Fault lines in Africa-China mining
The incident reveals a web of interrelated environmental, governance and developmental challenges surrounding Chinese-linked mining in the DRC.
Yet weak regulatory enforcement — hampered by corruption, violence and local political issues — continues to allow companies to operate without adequate oversight, simultaneously heightening risks of industrial accidents, labour violations and long-term ecological damage.
Domestically, the impacts have been immediate and politically charged. Local residents reacted not only to the contamination but to what they view as a continuation of longstanding injustices: mining revenues flow to political and business elites — Congolese and foreign — while surrounding communities bear the environmental and health costs. Civil society groups argue that despite major foreign investment, environmental safeguards, labour protections and local development benefits remain insufficient. Allegations of Chinese market manipulation have further raised concerns about distorted pricing and economic dependence.
Attempts to tackle these structural issues have produced uneven results. The government’s renegotiation of the 2008 Sicomines minerals-for-infrastructure deal followed a 2023 audit claiming the mines had been heavily undervalued. The revised 2024 agreement commits Chinese firms to up to US$7 billion in infrastructure and a 1.2% royalty.
Yet weak regulatory enforcement — hampered by corruption, violence and local political issues — continues to allow companies to operate without adequate oversight, simultaneously heightening risks of industrial accidents, labour violations and long-term ecological damage. The DRC’s heavy reliance on mining, which accounts for roughly 75% of gross domestic product, further constrains its bargaining power.
There are broader implications for Africa-China relations too. Environmental failures involving Chinese companies pose diplomatic and strategic risks for Beijing and are fuelling rising resource nationalism among host governments seeking greater control over mineral extraction and value chains.
The February collapse of a Chinese-owned dam at the copper mine of Sino-Metals Leach Zambo (a subsidiary of the state-run China Nonferrous Metal Mining Group) in Zambia, which released cyanide- and arsenic-laden waste into the Kafue River and triggered an enormous US$80 billion lawsuit by Zambian farmers, has further intensified scrutiny of Chinese-affiliated projects across the region. These incidents may prompt regulators to tighten oversight through stricter safety audits, mandatory remediation plans, and harsher penalties for non-compliance.
The Lubumbashi spill — like other recent industrial failures across the region — underscores how environmental governance has become inseparable from the politics of resource extraction and Africa-China relations.
Concurrently, they undermine Beijing’s narrative of “green development” at a moment when climate governance is putting greater focus on Africa and forests. In this context, high-profile pollution events such as the Lubumbashi spill have become powerful symbols of the gap between rhetoric and practice.
Intensifying pressure
The Lubumbashi spill — like other recent industrial failures across the region — underscores how environmental governance has become inseparable from the politics of resource extraction and Africa-China relations. Each incident sharpens public and political expectations that foreign investors, including Chinese firms, must demonstrate real environmental responsibility.
As scrutiny grows, the pressure on Chinese companies to meet higher ecological standards abroad is likely to intensify, both from African regulators and from Beijing’s own need to safeguard its reputation as a reliable partner in sustainable development.
