Cambodia’s autonomy enhanced by defence ties with South Korea

On 15-18 of May, Hun Manet paid his first visit to South Korea as Cambodian prime minister at the invitation of South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol. The meeting resulted in good cooperation between the two countries.

In addition to elevating bilateral relations to the level of strategic partnership —the second highest level of Cambodia’s foreign relations — the two countries committed to strengthening military cooperation which includes port calls and joint military exercises.

Prior to the visit, military cooperation between the two countries has been on an uptrend, going by the exchanges between senior officials. For instance, in April 2024, General Mao Sophan, deputy commander of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF), paid an official visit to South Korea and met with various South Korean senior military officers including General Park An-Su, chief of staff of the South Korean Army, and Admiral Kin Myung-Soo, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The visit aimed to enhance the military cooperation between the two countries.

Earlier in November 2022, Cambodia and South Korea had inked a memorandum of understanding (MOU), focusing on the transfer of heavy military materials under the tripartite project of the United Nations peacekeeping operations. Hun Manet has previously mentioned the importance of elevating and achieving “fruitful” military cooperation with South Korea.

Defence cooperation with South Korea is crucial for Cambodia to enhance its defense capability and modernise its armed forces. It was emphasised in Cambodia’s Defence Policy (2022) that enhancing the kingdom’s defence cooperation with foreign countries, particularly on capacity building and technical assistance, would significantly contribute to strengthening skills, knowledge and experience of RCAF officers.

Currently, the Cambodian government has demonstrated its commitment to modernise its military capability. This can be seen via the continual increase of Cambodia’s defence budget. The defence budget increased from US$635 million in 2020 to US$641 in 2021, reaching US$770 million in 2022. The budget is expected to reach US$1.02 billion by 2027.

The increasing military budget will enable Cambodia to purchase heavy and modern military technology. According to the Global Fire Power Index 2024, Cambodia ranks 111 out of 145 countries, far behind its giant neighbours such as Vietnam and Thailand. Both countries ranked 22 and 25 respectively.

In addition to its weakness in airpower and naval forces, the lack of heavy modern military equipment is also Phnom Penh’s major drawback. Cambodia’s current main battle weapons were manufactured or used during the Cold War, such as Russian-made tank model T-54, T-55, and Chinese-made tank type 59. Rocket launchers are considered to be Cambodia’s most powerful and important weapons such as the Russian BM-21 and Czech RM-70. These weapons are out of service in some countries.

Recognising this concern, Cambodia has increased the purchasing of heavy military equipment. However, most of those came from China. In 2020, Cambodia was suspected to be the first customer of the Chinese-made FTC-2000G multi-role aircraft following its acquisition of Chinese Harbin Z-9 helicopters. In 2022, Cambodia received heavy military equipment from China, including truck-mounted howitzers and AR2 300mm and Type 90B 122mm multiple rocket launchers.

Currently, Cambodia plans to enhance its air defence capabilities by establishing an air defence centre and expanding a radar system near Ream Naval Base. It was reported that according to officials, there would be no involvement from China.

In August 2023, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) trained 127 RCAF officers in using short-range air defence missiles. The training took place a year after then Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen announced the building of an air defence team of 300 troopers, to specialise in the use of air defence weapons.

The recent edition of the annual Cambodia-China bilateral military drill, known as Golden Dragon also highlighted Cambodia’s ambition of acquiring modern weapon and technology, as the military exercise involved various heavy and modern Chinese warfare equipment such as robotic “dogs of war”, drones and massive warships such as Qilianshan and Qijiguang amphibious craft. Back in September 2022, the then Cambodian Defence Minister Tea Banh had urged RCAF officers to learn to use Chinese military equipment. 

Prior to the military exercise, China had also sent two of its corvettes, capable of being equipped with missiles and torpedoes, to Ream Naval Base for more than five months to train RCAF officers to use these warships. This signifies that Cambodia will pursue more arms procurement from China, particularly on modern military hardware and technology. However, one important aspect is that Cambodia’s military modernisation could come at the expense of its autonomy if Phnom Penh does not diversify its source of weapons procurement.

The increasing military cooperation between Cambodia and South Korea, particularly joint naval drills and increasing the number of RCAF officers sent to study in ROK, could allow the RCAF officer to get familiar with South Korea’s military technology. This could pave the way for RCAF to consider purchasing arms or having cooperation on defense industry with South Korea in the future, thus providing an alternative option for Cambodia to diversify its arms procurement.

Diversifying the source of arms supplies could allow Cambodia to maintain its autonomy and independence, which is at the heart of Cambodia’s foreign policy and defence policy. South Korea’s weapons are also getting popular in the region, with countries like Vietnam and the Philippines actively seeking weapons procurement from Seoul. In addition to its good quality, some consider South Korea’s military equipment to be at North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) standards, the price is also affordable.

While Cambodia’s limited defence budget could constrain its ability to acquire more modern weapons from South Korea, the strengthening of relations with Seoul could mitigate this issue. Seoul’s arms export strategy often takes geopolitical significance and diplomatic relations into account.  

Cambodia is important to South Korea’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. In 2022, President Yoon launched the Korea-ASEAN Solidarity Initiative (KASI) in Phnom Penh, aiming to enhance South Korea’s strategic alignment with ASEAN member states, particularly Cambodia. Against this backdrop, Cambodia could try to acquire South Korean arms via loan payment or establish a homegrown defence industry with technology transfer from South Korea.

In addition, Cambodia’s military cooperation with South Korea, particularly on naval visits and joint naval drills, will reduce the concern of growing Chinese military influence on Cambodia.

Following the speedy modernisation of Ream Naval Base and Cambodia’s plans to construct the 180-kilometre Funan Techo Canal, concerns about Chinese military presence in Cambodia have reemerged and intensified. While some believe that Ream Naval Base is threatening Vietnam and could aid China’s military strategy in the South China Sea, others are concerned that the Funan Techo Canal could be used for military movement by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

The Cambodian government denied the allegation, citing Cambodia’s constitution of not allowing foreign military on its soil. Given Hun Manet’s effort to improve relations with many countries including Western countries via his many foreign visits, Phnom Penh being perceived as a client state of Beijing is not a good sign.

Thus, the strengthening of Cambodia’s military cooperation with South Korea, particularly naval visits by South Korea to Cambodia and joint naval drills, will help to clear the doubt of Chinese military presence in Cambodia.

On the one hand, joint naval drills and port visits will enable the South Korean Army to access some parts of Cambodian port including the Ream Naval base, which has been suspected of hosting Chinese military assets. This is possible given the fact that Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force ships were previously welcomed at Ream Naval Base, including in 2022 and 2024. 

On the other hand, South Korea is a key ally of the US. It also has good relations with Vietnam and a shared interest in balancing Chinese influence in the region. In this regard, South Korea will serve as a mediator between Cambodia and its neighbouring countries, as well as other major powers like the US, to convey Cambodia’s peaceful intentions in modernising its military capabilities, particularly of Ream Naval Base.

Overall, Cambodia’s decision to improve its defence cooperation with South Korea is in the mutual interest of both countries. While it enables South Korea to balance against Chinese influence in the region, it could also enable Cambodia to modernise its arms force, as well as diversify its weapons procurement. However, it requires political commitment from the Cambodian and South Korean governments.

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