Has Venezuela become a test of US power — and China’s resolve?

Will the Gulf of Tonkin incident that shocked the world in 1964 happen again?

The US has recently been steadily reinforcing its military deployment in waters near Venezuela. On 16 December, US President Donald Trump even posted on social media, declaring that the Nicolas Maduro regime has been designated a “foreign terrorist organisation”. He ordered a “total and complete blockade” of all sanctioned oil tankers entering and leaving Venezuela, directly targeting Venezuela’s economic lifeline.

Trump also accused Venezuela of stealing US oil, land and other assets “to finance themselves, drug terrorism, human trafficking, murder and kidnapping”.

Last week, the US already seized an oil tanker near Venezuelan waters, claiming it was under sanctions and stating that the oil on board would be kept by the US. The seizure operation was led by the US Coast Guard; a video posted by attorney general Pam Bondi on social media showed armed US forces moving around the vessel after dramatically fast roping from a helicopter onto the ship.

Voice of America reported that according to the US House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the US and the Chinese Communist Party, the seized tanker has direct links to China. 

On 15 December, Republican congressman Nathaniel Moran said on X that the tanker used deceptive tracking tactics and was “connected with China‑managed vessels”. 

Maduro fiercely condemned this, and stated that the US has opened a “new era of criminal naval piracy” in the Caribbean.

After Washington released a new National Security Strategy (NSS) earlier this month, defining Latin America as a “core interest zone” for the US, its military actions towards Venezuela have escalated. Behind this also lies the intention to contain China’s growing influence in Latin America.

The NSS makes clear that it will implement a Trump version of the Monroe Doctrine, in order to restore US dominance in the Western hemisphere, and protect homeland security and strategic corridors in key areas there.

Although the report does not name China, it states that it will deny “non-Hemispheric competitors” the ability to position forces, or from owning or controlling strategically vital assets. In addition, US officials must understand “hostile foreign influence”.

Citing anti‑narcotics operations as a reason, the US continues to amass military forces in waters around Venezuela, including aircraft carriers, destroyers and F‑35 fighters crowding into the Caribbean, with a total force of 15,000 personnel. CBS reported earlier this month that since early September, US forces have carried out at least 21 strike operations in international waters in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific.

It is believed that Washington’s real intention is not only to bring down Maduro and push for regime change in Venezuela, but also to reshape the Latin American geopolitical landscape, win comprehensive control over the Western hemisphere, and eliminate China and other actors that it deems “hostile foreign influence”.

The US has also backed right‑wing governments and candidates in elections in countries such as Argentina and Honduras. Trump has even repeatedly stated that he does not rule out using military means to take control of the Panama Canal.

After the US released the NSS, on 10 December, China issued its third Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean — nine years since the last one — signalling that it has no intention of yielding in the US’s “backyard”.

In contrast to the US’s emphasis on exclusivity, China is raising the banner of the “Global South”, stating: “The region [Latin America and the Caribbean] as a whole boasts a glorious tradition of independence and unity for strength, and enjoys bright prospects. It is an essential force in the process toward a multipolar world and economic globalisation.” 

Beijing has also pointedly stated that the China–Latin America relationship “does not target or exclude any third party, nor is it subjugated by any third party”.

Beijing’s response shows that China rejects Washington’s claims to comprehensive control over the Western Hemisphere, and that China–US rivalry in Latin America is bound to intensify.

China and Russia are Venezuela’s two main partners. China is the largest buyer of Venezuelan crude, and Beijing reportedly provided Venezuela with more than US$60 billion in loans and oil-backed credit lines. Venezuela is also among the top three recipients of Chinese development funding; between 2010 and 2020, it also received about 86% of China’s arms sales to the Americas. 

Despite the close China–Venezuela relationship, there is no indication that Beijing intends to offer military backing or provide substantive support to help Maduro withstand the immense pressure from the US.

It is generally believed that China will not confront the US directly over Venezuela, so as not to jeopardise the hard-won temporary tariff truce. Instead, Beijing is likely to safeguard its interests in Venezuela and across Latin America through diplomatic statements and economic support.

Xinhua reported that, during a phone call with Venezuelan Foreign Affairs Minister Yvan Gil on 17 December, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that China opposes all unilateral bullying and supports all countries in defending their sovereignty and national dignity, adding that Venezuela has the right to independently develop mutually beneficial cooperation with other countries. 

He asserted that China believes the international community understands and supports Venezuela’s position of safeguarding its legitimate rights and interests.

China’s foreign ministry spokesperson has repeatedly stated China’s opposition to unilateral sanctions that have no basis in international law and are not authorised by the United Nations Security Council, as well as to any interference by external forces in Venezuela’s internal affairs under any pretext, and has called on the US to lift its illegal and unilateral sanctions.

Just as the Russia–Ukraine war has offered the world a range of lessons about wartime conditions, a US military operation against Venezuela under the banner of “Operation Southern Spear” is likewise believed to provide important insights for China and other countries.

Two points stand out most clearly. First, if the US were to launch a full-scale attack on Venezuela, some Latin American countries might purchase more weapons from China, just as European countries sharply increased their defence spending after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Although Taiwan and Venezuela are incomparable — Venezuela is a sovereign state — the way in which the US might conduct military operations, incrementally applying pressure on Maduro through military intimidation, including deploying helicopters to insert coast guard units to seize vessels and attempting to cut off Venezuela’s economic lifelines, can serve as a lesson for Beijing in terms of a blockade in the Taiwan Strait.

Equally noteworthy is whether, after Trump fired the first shot at Venezuela under his revived Monroe Doctrine, the world could be carved into spheres of influence — the Western Hemisphere dominated by the US, and Asia by China.

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “美国封锁委内瑞拉给中国什么启示？”.

Related: Trump’s hardline push in Latin America strengthens China | Venezuela exposes the limits of China’s global power