The side war against a not-yet-ready China

Linking US President Donald Trump’s foreign policy actions to a coherent strategy can be risky, but while it is evident he is reluctant to pick a fight with China directly, it looks like he is attacking Beijing from the side.

Trump has failed to subdue China with trade tariffs, and in the National Defense Strategy report published on 23 January, the Pentagon emphasised that the US would seek stable ties with Beijing and not confrontation.

The opposite may be true. The US leader’s recent moves suggest he is actually trying to break the Chinese by harassing or threatening their international partners and clients. His latest warning to strike Iran if it will not negotiate a deal on its nuclear programme is a case in point.

In Trump’s calculus, the persistent threat to decapitate Iran’s religious leadership, the armed blitz against Venezuela, tariff threats against Canada for its trade with China, as well as pressure to push NATO allies to prevent Chinese ambitions in Greenland and the entire Arctic region may have a better chance of hindering Beijing’s global rise.

The modus operandi of the US commander-in-chief is quite clear. He is bashing nations that supply or might potentially supply fossil fuels to China, and that he deems vulnerable enough to be coerced — nuclear-armed Russia, which has a partnership with “no-limits” with China, does not fall into that category, for instance.

The noose is now tightening for Iran, a primary geopolitical and oil-rich partner of China.

Announcing a US naval buildup in the Persian Gulf region, Trump has warned Iran not to restart its nuclear and missile programmes. He recently backed down from a threat to bombard the Islamic Republic, accused of killing protesters in response to massive internal upheavals.

Trump had already ordered missile strikes against Iran in support of Israeli attacks on Iran’s nuclear sites in June — which Beijing did not counter practically. A new, more extended military operation against Tehran could possibly disrupt oil and gas exports to China from the Middle East.

The region provides over 50% of China’s imported oil, crucial for supporting its growing energy needs, with Saudi Arabia and Iraq serving as top suppliers. Iran also heavily relies on China, which buys over 90% of its oil exports. Around 25-30% of total liquefied natural gas (LNG) sales through the Strait of Hormuz go to the Chinese market, with Qatar and the United Arab Emirates being key suppliers.

Even US attacks on Venezuela and the capture of its President Nicolás Maduro, which has apparently led to Washington’s control of the Venezuelan government and the South American country’s energy resources, appear aimed at weakening China.

Venezuela under Maduro was a close political partner of China, which is still Caracas’s largest creditor and has been its major investor in and purchaser of oil and mineral products in recent years.

Venezuelan crude should account for only 4 to 4.5% of China’s seaborne imports, and Beijing would be able to compensate for such a loss by acquiring from other countries. However, Venezuela has the largest proven reserves in the world, according to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and Chinese refiners had the advantage of purchasing Venezuelan oil at lower prices than market ones.

The US-China energy game is also in the background when it comes to Trump’s fresh threat to level a 100% tariff on all Canadian goods if Ottawa finalises a trade agreement with China.

Canada is hardly a military heavyweight, and its Prime Minister, Mark Carney, is embracing the idea that Western nations have to nurture alternative ties to hedge against the potential risks of an unbalanced relationship with an ally like Washington, which has become ever less predictable.

Carney recently reached a deal with Chinese President Xi Jinping to reduce tariffs on electric vehicles imported from China in return for Beijing’s lowering of duties on Canadian agricultural products, drawing Trump’s ire.

However, it is the potential of China-Canada energy cooperation that might threaten the US president’s “plan” to scorch the earth around the Chinese economy. China has become a top destination for Canadian oil after the Trans Mountain Expansion pipeline came online two years ago. As of mid-2025, Canada reportedly supplied the Chinese market with over 200,000 barrels per day of crude with the prospect of further export growth towards 2027.

The control of mineral resources (rare earths, iron, uranium, but also oil and gas) that could end up in Beijing’s hands is also central in Trump’s threats to take over Greenland, even by force if the Europeans do not yield to his demand to buy the Arctic island from NATO ally Denmark.

The crisis seems to have subsided for now, after he repeatedly pointed out that Greenland was key to US national security interests, claiming without evidence that there is a massive presence of Chinese (and Russian) military assets around the island. However, European leaders continue staying on alert, as they have to deal with a US president appearing willing to disrupt NATO to reach his goals.

In essence, Trump has unleashed a war of attrition against China in the attempt to suffocate its growth at home and reduce its geopolitical maneuverability across the globe. In doing so, the US president is alienating allies and adversaries alike, but has definitely put his Chinese counterpart Xi on the defensive.

Beijing does not yet have the political, military and economic capabilities to save friendly regimes which are geographically distant, such as Venezuela and Iran. And it can only rhetorically defend its right to trade freely with clients such as Canada or Europe.

Related: Canada turns pragmatic — and looks East | A whole new game: China rewrites its strategy towards the US