Whoever strikes hardest wins? Trump’s big stick returns to the Americas

President Theodore Roosevelt famously advised that in international affairs, one should speak softly and carry a big stick. In 2026, Donald Trump has inverted the formula: the stick remains, but the whisper is gone. Shouting now accompanies American power, setting a confrontational tone that is likely to define US foreign policy in the months ahead.

In a move that reverberated far beyond Caracas, the US captured Venezuela’s president, Nicolás Maduro, and his wife in a special forces operation supported by roughly 150 aircraft as well as coordinated cyber and kinetic strikes that disabled Venezuela’s air defence systems and rapid response forces. Trump asserted that Washington would “run” the country until what it called a “safe, proper and judicious” transition could be arranged.

As a contingency plan, the US is ready to put “boots on the ground” and to open the door for American oil companies in a nation long defined also by vast reserves. Venezuela, rich not only in crude but also in strategically important rare minerals, has sat squarely in Trump’s sights for years, since his 2017 first term, when his administration began framing Maduro as a narco-terrorist rather than a head of state. 

China’s foreign ministry demanded the immediate release of Maduro and his wife, urging that the crisis be resolved through dialogue and negotiation. Venezuela is a pillar of the Belt and Road Initiative in Latin America, and the US move is compromising Beijing’s long-term rising footprint in the region. A few hours before being captured by American forces, Maduro met Qiu Xiaoqi, Beijing’s special envoy for Latin American affairs, showcasing the privileged bond between China and Venezuela.

For more than a decade, Caracas has functioned as China’s principal strategic and economic hub in the region, sustained by billions of dollars in loans and technology transfers exchanged for oil. Beijing is Venezuela’s financial lifeline, and the massive oil purchases that account for roughly 80% of the country’s total exports are a case in point. It was no coincidence that Donald Trump stressed that once the US “runs” the country, Venezuela would continue selling oil to its existing customers. The assurance was aimed squarely at Beijing, though this time, on Washington’s terms.

Also, Russia, along with several governments in Latin America, including Cuba, Colombia, Mexico and Brazil, condemned the operation as a violation of sovereignty. In this respect, the message from Washington, however, appears deliberately broader than Venezuela alone. It is a warning shot to leaders across Latin America from Havana to Bogotá and even to figures well outside the region, including Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The signal is unmistakable: the US is willing to act unilaterally, and decisively. 

Europe, meanwhile, is caught between a rock and a hard place. European officials trod carefully, wary of antagonising Trump even as they struggle to square their criticism of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine with a deafening silence over American action in Venezuela.

Notably, Washington has not decapitated the Venezuelan government itself. Instead, it removed Maduro and left the regime intact, betting that the shock of his capture would be enough to coerce cooperation. While the legal rationale of the capture echoes an earlier case: that of Manuel Noriega, the Panamanian leader seized by US forces in 1989. As American courts argued then, and again after Maduro’s 2020 indictment, it is not how a defendant comes into US custody that matters, but whether the indictment and proceedings meet the standards of law. Noriega lost that argument, and probably history will repeat itself with the case against Maduro.

Nevertheless, Beijing’s economic toolkit for expanding the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) across Latin America remains largely intact, despite the uncertainty unleashed by events in Venezuela. If anything, much of Latin America’s left-leaning bloc is likely to draw even closer to Beijing. Moreover, in countries such as Brazil, Peru, and Chile, China has already surpassed the US as the largest trading partner, positioning itself as both an economic anchor and a diplomatic counterweight to Washington, at a moment when Beijing still relies on expanding exports to sustain its growth.

The limits of that realignment are equally clear. Panama had little choice but to step away from the BRI; countries such as Colombia and Cuba have even less room to manoeuvre as they confront demands from Mr Trump. Their leaders understand a central reality: China is an economic juggernaut, not a security guarantor.

China’s foreign ministry spokesman, Lin Jian, mentioned that Beijing continues to maintain “positive communication and cooperation” with the Venezuelan government, stressing that its readiness to deepen ties, including on oil export, would remain unchanged, regardless of how the crisis unfolds.

At the same time, in an age shaped by artificial intelligence and globalisation, geography still exerts its pull: Latin America lies close to America’s borders, and far from China. In the 2025 US National Security Strategy document, Washington claimed its sphere of influence over the entire American continent, North, Central and South, from Canada to Chile, with a wide detour that also takes in Greenland.

The message for 2026 is unmistakable: international norms and shared values have been cast aside, and power has reverted to its oldest rule: whoever strikes hardest, wins.

Related: What Maduro’s arrest means for China’s influence in Latin America | Trump’s Maduro raid and the hypocrisy of the West