Last man standing: Xi’s purge of the Central Military Commission
Only Chairman Xi Jinping and the lowest-ranking member, Zhang Shengmin, remain on the Central Military Commission. Lianhe Zaobao correspondent Yu Zeyuan analyses the purge of Zhang Youxia and other top PLA leaders, underscoring the CCP’s uncompromising stance on corruption and disloyalty.
On 24 January, Chinese authorities announced that Zhang Youxia, a member of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC); and Liu Zhenli, a CMC member and chief of staff of the CMC’s joint staff department, had been placed under investigation. As a result, of the seven members of the 20th CMC formed in October 2022, all but CMC Chairman Xi Jinping and Zhang Shengmin, the lowest-ranking member, have been removed from office.
Such a large-scale purge of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s top leadership over a period of just over three years is indeed highly unusual, and one can easily imagine the shockwaves it has sent through China’s military and political circles.
As expected, following the investigations into Zhang and Liu — on top of the earlier downfall of CMC Vice- Chairman He Weidong, Defence Minister Li Shangfu, and Miao Hua, director of the CMC’s Political Work Department — the PLA will continue to probe senior officers implicated in these cases, with another wave of theatre- and corps-level commanders likely to be involved.
PLA Daily editorial
The harm inflicted on the PLA by the downfall of Zhang and other CMC leaders was summed up in an editorial published by the PLA Daily on 25 January.
The editorial asserted that Zhang and Liu have “seriously trampled on and undermined the system of ultimate responsibility resting with the CMC chairman; severely fuelled political and corruption problems that threaten the party’s absolute leadership over the armed forces and undermine the party’s governance foundation; gravely tarnished the image and authority of the CMC leadership and severely damaged the political and ideological foundation of unity and progress among all military personnel; and inflicted grave harm on efforts to strengthen political loyalty in the military, the military’s political environment, and overall combat readiness, posing a serious adverse impact on the party, the country and the military”.
Zhang and others may not have necessarily sought to set up an alternative centre of power or to covet the top leadership position.
Although these characterisations are framed in principled terms and do not spell out the specific offences involved, they are by no means empty rhetoric. The references to “seriously trampling on and undermining the system of ultimate responsibility resting with the CMC chairman” and “severely fuelling political and corruption problems that threaten the party’s absolute leadership over the armed forces and undermine the party’s governance foundation” point to Zhang and others merely paying lip service to Xi’s instructions while covertly undermining his authority, and engaging in extensive corruption — appointing cronies and forming factions, selling posts for profit, and taking bribes in areas such as arms procurement and engineering contracts.
Why action was taken
Notably, Zhang and others may not have necessarily sought to set up an alternative centre of power or to covet the top leadership position. Had they truly been involved in a coup or posed a direct political challenge to the top leader, Xi — given the tight control he has built over the CCP and the military over the past decade — would neither have promoted them to such senior posts in the first place, nor taken three years to deal with them, but would have moved to quickly neutralise them at the earliest sign of disloyalty.
Zhang’s father, Zhang Zongxun, was a founding general of the PRC who fought alongside Xi’s father, party elder Xi Zhongxun, during the early years.
The PLA Daily commentary actually also pointed out the political impact that Zhang and others brought to the military, namely that they “severely damaged the political and ideological foundation of unity and progress among all military personnel; and inflicted grave harm on efforts to strengthen political loyalty in the military, the military’s political environment, and overall combat readiness, posing a serious adverse impact on the party, the country and the military”.
That is, by adhering to Xi publicly while in fact defying him privately and engaging in massive corruption, Zhang and the others not only caused enormous harm to the political principle of “the party commands the gun”, it also negatively affected the military’s combat capability and severely damaged the image of the CCP, the government and the military — hence the “serious adverse” impact.
Generally, for “party and state leaders” of Zhang Youxia’s stature, occasional minor bribery might not have been enough for top leadership to destroy their reputations. Moreover, Zhang and Liu were among the few senior military leaders with real-world combat experience from the China-Vietnam border conflict. Zhang’s father, Zhang Zongxun, was a founding general of the PRC who fought alongside Xi’s father, party elder Xi Zhongxun, during the early years. The two families maintained close ties even after the PRC’s founding. On a personal level, if Zhang’s case had not been so serious, Xi would not have needed to act so ruthlessly.
Discipline and standards of conduct
Zhang’s downfall is therefore shocking. At the same time, it underscores Xi’s point that corruption remains the CCP’s greatest threat and that the fight against it “must not stop for a moment or yield an inch”.
A PLA Daily commentary noted that the decision to investigate Zhang and Liu for suspected serious violations of discipline and law again demonstrates the firm stance of the CCP Central Committee and the CMC: there are no forbidden areas, no exceptions and zero tolerance in punishing corruption. All cases will be investigated, no matter how deep-rooted, making clear that no one — regardless of rank — will be shielded from accountability.
... the CCP is still a long way from achieving a “complete victory” in the struggle against corruption, especially in terms of establishing effective systems and mechanisms for regulating and constraining power.
On 16 January, Zhang Shengmin, CMC vice-chairman since October 2025 and the only CMC member left besides Xi Jinping, outlined the next phase of the PLA’s anti‑corruption drive: stricter party governance, deeper political rectification and supervision tied to combat readiness. Discipline will be enforced, corruption relentlessly punished and power-regulating systems strengthened to eliminate the conditions that allow corruption to thrive.
However, the downfall of Zhang and other senior military leaders shows that the CCP is still a long way from achieving a “complete victory” in the struggle against corruption, especially in terms of establishing effective systems and mechanisms for regulating and constraining power.
This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “解放军高层接连落马带来的冲击”.
