Trump’s hardline push in Latin America strengthens China
Trump’s revived Monroe Doctrine leans on pressure and alliances, but each move risks driving Latin America closer to Beijing. The region’s balance of power may be shifting in ways Washington never intended. US academic John Calabrese takes stock of the situation.
Donald Trump’s second administration has reoriented US foreign policy back toward the western hemisphere in a manner unprecedented in decades — an approach rooted in coercive leverage, zero-sum competition and a stark division of the region into allies and adversaries. The result is a hemispheric landscape defined by pressure campaigns, selective economic favours, ideological realignment and a growing backlash — one that Beijing has exploited with increasing sophistication.
Latin America as a stage, not a priority
Trump’s approach to Latin America rests on three pillars: maximum pressure, using coercion to achieve compliance; homeland security, prioritising migration, narcotics and border control over traditional diplomacy; and sphere-of-influence thinking, treating the western hemisphere as the US’s natural domain. Together, these priorities frame a regional agenda focused less on Latin America itself than on perceived threats, namely illegal immigration, drug trafficking, and, above all, China’s expanding influence.
This worldview has led the administration to amass warships and aircraft in the Caribbean, rattle sabres against Venezuela and openly contemplate strikes on Mexican and Colombian territory — moves that echo the “gunboat diplomacy” of a century ago. Trump declared he would be “proud” to expand military strikes from alleged drug-running vessels to land targets and suggested he might deploy US troops into Mexico.
A growing band of conservative governments — Ecuador, Paraguay, El Salvador, Argentina — have emerged as preferred partners.
Friends, foes and forced choices
From this strategic foundation, the administration has carved the hemisphere into friends and foes. A growing band of conservative governments — Ecuador, Paraguay, El Salvador, Argentina — have emerged as preferred partners. For these countries, alignment with Washington promises trade concessions, investment and political cover. The administration has rolled out trade and investment frameworks centred on containing China. These agreements link preferential access to US markets with commitments on export controls, investment screening, supply chain de-risking and resisting “non-market economy distortions” — thinly veiled language for limiting Chinese influence.
Even so, these benefits are uneven. Conservative presidents may enjoy symbolic closeness to Washington, but the tangible rewards remain modest and fragile insofar as they depend on political loyalty to Trump.
For other governments, Trump’s approach has been a heavy-handed affair marked by punitive tariffs, sanctions and overt threats. Mexico has absorbed the brunt of this coercion. With little room to manoeuvre, President Claudia Sheinbaum ultimately tightened border enforcement and — more recently — proposed steep tariffs on Chinese autos and industrial products.
Panama’s experience offers another example of coerced alignment. After Trump floated seizing the Panama Canal and railed against Chinese involvement there, Panama’s comptroller-general filed suits seeking to nullify the concession of a Hong Kong company operating key canal ports.
Washington has likewise tightened the screws on left-authoritarian governments.
Brazil offers the clearest counterexample. When its courts pursued coup-related charges against Jair Bolsonaro, Trump responded with 50% tariffs and sanctions, among the harshest ever against a democratic partner. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva stood firm, with Brazil’s exports shifting toward China, now its largest market. Trump eventually sought a rapprochement with Lula, illustrating the inconsistency and volatility many regional governments see in Washington’s approach.
Washington has likewise tightened the screws on left-authoritarian governments. Nicaragua faces threats of 100% tariffs, Cuba confronts intensified isolation, and Venezuela is the centrepiece of the administration’s punitive posture. US forces have struck 21 vessels allegedly involved in drug trafficking — killing 83 people — without publicly presented evidence. Trump has openly mused about military options against Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro, while asserting US dominion by renaming the Gulf of Mexico as the “Gulf of America”. This escalation has raised alarms across the region, prompting China to warn the US not to destabilise the hemisphere or violate state sovereignty.
China’s strategic openings
China has capitalised on the openings created by Trump’s coercive turn, pairing opportunistic diplomacy with a sharp contrast in tone and predictability. Even as sovereign lending through its policy banks has tapered, Xi Jinping used a May ministerial meeting of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) to pledge a fresh US$9 billion credit line at a moment when US and Western development financing is in dramatic retreat.
Beijing’s aggressive outreach — free-trade agreements for key partners, membership or observer status in numerous regional bodies, visa-free entry for South American travelers, and rapid deployment of AI and green-technology solutions — has begun to outflank Washington’s sanctions-heavy approach. China has also framed the region as a “zone of peace”, sending a hospital ship to Nicaragua even as US naval deployments expand.
While coercion may extract short-term concessions, it also drives countries toward China, intensifying competition Washington seeks to limit.
This is particularly significant as countries hedge against overreliance on any single power. Brazil’s growing partnership with China — spanning trade, energy, telecommunications, aerospace and agriculture — illustrates this multipolar logic, while even US-aligned states like El Salvador and Argentina maintain back channels with Beijing. Chinese firms continue investing in infrastructure, renewable energy, ports and technology, giving Latin American governments leverage unavailable in eras of US dominance.
The broader consequence is that Trump’s revived Monroe Doctrine faces structural limits. While coercion may extract short-term concessions, it also drives countries toward China, intensifying competition Washington seeks to limit. Each new tariff or military threat reinforces the perception — across Brazil, Chile, Colombia and beyond — that the US is reverting to unilateralism that disregards sovereignty.
At the same time, Trump’s most reliable allies — conservative governments pursuing hardline security policies — may not offer stable long-term returns. Argentina’s Milei faces deep economic turmoil, El Salvador’s Bukele faces international criticism over democratic backsliding and Ecuador’s fragile institutions continue to struggle with violence. If these leaders fall or recalibrate, Washington may find that its influence was built on narrow ideological affinity rather than durable strategic interests.
The paradox of primacy
Trump’s bid to reassert an exclusive US sphere of influence has produced an unintended outcome: the more Washington squeezes, the more valuable China becomes as a counterweight. The region is now increasingly polarised.
Mexico and Panama, under economic pressure, have become reluctant enforcers of US priorities, while Argentina, Paraguay and El Salvador form a bloc of ideological fellow travellers. Brazil, Chile and Colombia continue to hedge, rejecting binary alignment. And the authoritarian left — Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba — has doubled down on Beijing and, in some cases, Moscow. In effect, Trump’s bid to restore US primacy risks deepening the very strategic vulnerabilities it aims to resolve.
