Takaichi is manufacturing a crisis — and rewriting Japan’s security future

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has, in an unprecedented move, explicitly linked a potential Taiwan Strait crisis to the possibility of the Japan Self-Defence Forces being deployed. Even under Beijing’s countermeasures, she refused to retract her remarks. This can be read not only as a hardline signal sent to both Beijing and Washington, but also through a “Machiavellian” lens — as part of a domestic strategy aimed at driving a long-term shift in Japan’s security posture.

Japan faces a fundamental contradiction: its surrounding strategic environment has deteriorated rapidly (mainly due to changes in China, North Korea and Russia), yet Japanese society remains pacifist both constitutionally and psychologically. Any major transformation of strategic doctrine therefore requires preparing the public to accept it in advance.

By forcefully putting forward the idea that a “Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency”, Takaichi may be attempting to accelerate the “normalisation” of Japan’s national security — laying political groundwork for military expansion, revising constitutional interpretations, deepening US-Japan operational integration, and, in extreme scenarios, even building the foundation for future nuclear capabilities.

This interpretation does not claim that she currently intends for Japan to immediately pursue nuclear weapons; rather, it suggests that her rhetoric is deliberately heightening the sense of threat in order to create political space.

Under this logic, Beijing’s countermeasures — even if limited to the economic realm — become useful catalysts. Once the Japanese public internalises China as an “existential threat”, formerly taboo policies (pre-emptive strike capabilities, weapons exports, nuclear discussions) begin to enter the realm of open debate. This is Machiavellian logic: creating a crisis to drive transformation.

Takaichi’s remarks are strategically extraordinary and significant for three reasons. First, she is the first sitting prime minister in decades to explicitly link a “Taiwan contingency” with the possibility of Japanese military deployment. Second, she chose to speak publicly despite knowing it would trigger a strong reaction from China. Third, she refused to retract her statement and insisted that Japan’s position had not changed.

Against the backdrop of Japan’s traditionally cautious diplomatic style — typically marked by ambiguity and avoidance of direct confrontation — such declarations represent a major departure. Her statement comes precisely at a moment when several broader trends are unfolding.

First, the US-Japan alliance is moving toward integrated operations, including intelligence and surveillance, counterstrike capabilities, and joint command structures. Second, Japanese public opinion is shifting toward viewing China as a security threat, and support for increased defence spending is rising. Third, the LDP’s right wing believes that a historic window of opportunity has arrived to achieve security normalisation.

Takaichi herself is ideologically driven, hawkish and inclined toward historical revisionism; she has long advocated constitutional revision, offensive military capabilities and a stronger defence posture. From a Machiavellian perspective, she is manufacturing a sense of threat to push public opinion in a desired direction.

In Machiavelli’s theory, leaders create the perception of an “imminent threat” in order to consolidate power and reshape institutions. The Taiwan issue is particularly suited to this logic: it is geographically close; it has enormous implications for trade, semiconductors, and regional stability; it involves US-Japan security treaty obligations; and China’s countermeasures are predictable and highly visible to the Japanese public.

The possible mechanism of action is as follows.

First, issue a strong, provocative signal that triggers anger and economic retaliation from China. Second, elevate domestic threat perception by reinforcing the narrative: “China is coercive; Japan is vulnerable; only strong nations survive.” Third, broaden national security consensus — once fear is internalised, the public becomes more willing to accept higher defence spending, looser restrictions on weapons exports, deeper integration with US command structures, adjustments to counterstrike capabilities and military posture, and even revisions to Article 9 of the constitution.

Fourth, open the door to nuclear weapons discussions, though not immediate nuclearisation. Japan’s latent nuclear capabilities are well known — large plutonium stockpiles, advanced delivery technologies and world-class scientific expertise — but public resistance remains strong. If a leader intends to keep the possibility of future nuclearisation open, the Overton window — the range of ideas that are considered acceptable by the public and mainstream at any given time — must be shifted gradually from “absolutely not”, to “a theoretical option”, to “considerable if China crosses certain lines”. Takaichi’s “deliberate provocation” accelerates this psychological transition.

Why might nuclearisation emerge from this logic? Because Japan’s strategic position is deteriorating as China holds clear numerical advantages across almost all major categories of conventional forces; US extended deterrence appears less absolute due to domestic polarisation and recurring “America First” tendencies; North Korea possesses nuclear weapons; South Korea has openly debated nuclearisation; and Russia is increasingly hostile and itself a major nuclear power.

Within the next decade, Japan may face an environment in which only “sovereign-level deterrence” can guarantee survival, especially if US commitments become less certain. For hawkish leaders, shaping domestic acceptance of nuclear weapons requires long-term psychological preparation. Elevating the political salience of the Taiwan Strait crisis is one such tool.

Takaichi may not intend to push for immediate nuclearisation, but she may be attempting to establish a broader logic: that the nation must pursue survival by any means necessary. Once this logic is accepted, nuclear weapons cease to be taboo.

Beijing’s forceful reaction may in fact be reinforcing the very narrative Takaichi seeks to advance. Economic retaliation becomes “evidence of China’s bullying nature”; diplomatic denunciations become “Chinese interference in Japan’s sovereign defence debates”; military demonstrations become “proof that Japan is in danger and needs deterrence”. In this sense, Beijing has inadvertently become a megaphone for Japan’s hawks.

Is Takaichi capable of this level of strategic thinking? She has three relevant traits: a strong nationalist ideological orientation, longstanding affiliation with the most hawkish faction of the Liberal Democratic Party and an admiration for hardline leaders such as former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

She believes that political will, rather than public opinion, is what drives national rise. That is why she must differentiate herself from Shinzo Abe’s more moderate successors and from Fumio Kishida’s cautious approach. Her goal may be to become the prime minister who ends Japan’s postwar pacifism. Manufacturing crisis is precisely the Machiavellian path.

Although this Machiavellian interpretation is illuminating, it is not the only possible reading. She may simply be reacting passively, or responding to expectations within the US-Japan alliance. She may genuinely feel anxious about the Chinese threat; she may have made a diplomatic misjudgement; or she may be making symbolic statements to position herself domestically. But given her professional trajectory — historical revisionism, hawkishness and willingness to provoke Beijing — this move appears strategic rather than accidental.

Is nuclearisation her ultimate objective? It may not be a short-term goal, but within a Machiavellian framework, Takaichi may be deliberately using the Taiwan Strait crisis as a political tool: provoking China to trigger countermeasures, mobilising Japan’s sense of fear, steering public opinion toward a “comprehensive national security” mindset and creating conditions for a possible future nuclear deterrent.

In other words, she may not be calling for Japan to go nuclear today, but she may be cultivating the political psychology that would make nuclearisation an acceptable option tomorrow.

This article reflects the writer’s personal views.

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “高市早苗“台湾有事”的核意图”.

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