How Sanae Takaichi crossed China’s four untouchable red lines

After Sanae Takaichi, a right-wing Japanese politician, became prime minister, many observers expected a deterioration in China-Japan relations. But few anticipated that it would come so quickly, and be ignited directly by Takaichi herself. 

On 7 November, during a Diet session, Takaichi stated that a “Taiwan contingency” could constitute a “situation threatening Japan’s survival”, a condition under which Japan would be allowed to exercise its right to collective self-defence — an implicit indication that Japan might intervene militarily in a Taiwan conflict. Her remarks immediately triggered an intense reaction from China.

Judging from the speed, scope and intensity of Beijing’s response, this was clearly not a routine diplomatic quarrel, but an event that — in a short period of time — touched multiple highly sensitive red lines within China’s political system, and reached a critical point embedded in the structural contradictions of China-Japan relations.

In the past week, China’s criticism of Takaichi has shown no signs of easing. The diplomatic apparatus has issued statement after statement, and even took the unusual step of summoning Japanese officials “by order of superiors” (奉示约见) — a formulation almost never seen in the history of China-Japan diplomacy, and one that signals Beijing now regards the incident as a quasi-political crisis. Party-state media such as People’s Daily, Xinhua and the PLA Daily have published a flurry of sharply worded commentaries, warning Japan not to misjudge the situation over Taiwan — otherwise, as some articles bluntly stated, “the flames of war will engulf all of Japan”. 

China’s Ministry of Culture and Tourism and the Ministry of Education have both issued notices advising Chinese tourists and students to avoid travelling to Japan in the near term. Economically, Beijing has already suspended imports of Japanese seafood. Militarily, the China Coast Guard has clearly intensified its patrols around the Diaoyu Islands, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has announced an eight-day live-fire drill in the Yellow Sea, with the exercise zone positioned closer to the Japanese side. In addition, multiple cultural exchange events have been abruptly cancelled.

Beijing is almost certain to adopt further pressure tactics. All signs point to one conclusion: China will not let this issue go easily unless Takaichi retracts her remarks in some form — yet both Takaichi and the Japanese government have made it clear they will not withdraw them.

Some may argue that Takaichi was merely responding to a “hypothetical question” — as she later explained — saying she was not advocating the use of force to defend Taiwan, but emphasising that Taiwan’s stability relates to Japan’s maritime security. If China blockades Taiwan, Japan’s energy imports and foreign trade routes would be threatened, and Japan would therefore have to respond. However, Beijing will not accept such an explanation. In China’s understanding, Takaichi’s remarks — made in her capacity as prime minister — constitute a blatant interference in China’s internal affairs, and her statement crosses four of China’s most untouchable red lines.

“Taiwan contingency equals Japan contingency” is often treated externally as a standard slogan of Japanese conservatives. But Takaichi’s version of the statement is clearer, more direct and carries a stronger “national stance” character than ever before. First, she is speaking as prime minister — previous comments by Abe or Aso were made after leaving office. Second, her remarks were delivered in the National Diet, a central state institution, not at a party meeting or media interview.

For Beijing, Takaichi’s words convey two layers of political meaning:

First, she openly negates the political foundation of the 1972 normalisation of diplomatic relations. The joint communique and subsequent four political documents clearly state that Japan “fully understands and respects China’s position that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China”. Takaichi’s remarks entirely contradict this position. In Beijing’s view, this is a direct challenge to the “one China” principle and far exceeds the scope of ordinary diplomatic disagreement.

Second, she signals that Japan will shift from “possibly assisting the United States” to “actively intervening” in China’s unification efforts. If Japan defines a Taiwan contingency as a situation threatening its national survival, the legal effect is equivalent to authorising the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to take military action on the Taiwan issue and obstruct China’s unification. In Beijing’s strategic assessment, this would amount to a fundamental shift in Japan’s Taiwan policy.

Judging from China’s reaction, Takaichi has touched the core of China’s Taiwan policy — not merely a superficial disagreement.

Takaichi is not merely repeating the phrase “Taiwan contingency”. She elevated it to the level of a “situation threatening Japan’s survival”. This phrase carries a clear implication of military mobilisation in Japan’s domestic political context, and it easily triggers China’s profound historical sensitivity.

Japan used the excuse of “national survival in peril” when launching the July 7th incident (Lugouqiao) and the Pacific War. Takaichi’s formulation is thus quickly understood by Chinese public opinion as “Japan’s right wing repackaging pre-war mobilisation rhetoric using the Taiwan issue”, intensifying suspicions that Japanese conservatives — represented by Takaichi — are preparing to revive militarist logic, and could be planning to intervene militarily when China seeks national unification, even fighting China over Taiwan.

This is not an emotional reaction from Beijing, but an assessment grounded in current political realities. In recent years, Japan’s right-wing forces have indeed used the Taiwan issue to push against the constraints of the post-war system. As a central figure of this movement, Takaichi has actively deepened political engagement with Taiwan: meeting Taiwanese political figures, awarding honours to the senior advisor to the President and former ambassador to Japan Frank Hsieh, and issuing provocative pro-Taiwan statements immediately after taking office. Beijing therefore believes Takaichi’s remarks are part of a planned strategic agenda rather than an impulsive comment.

Under such a framework, Beijing is concerned not about a single sentence, but about the possibility that Japan is systematically crafting a roadmap to “use the Taiwan issue to lift SDF restrictions and pursue national normalisation”.

This point is rarely discussed externally, and Beijing will not mention it publicly because it concerns Xi Jinping’s political authority. But it is arguably the most important reason for Beijing’s extreme reaction.

During the China-Japan summit in Busan, Takaichi told Xi that she wished to stabilise bilateral relations and uphold the 1972 normalisation commitments. Yet within a week of returning to Tokyo, she delivered remarks in the Diet that contradicted these commitments. For China’s top leader, such “saying one thing in person and another back home” is not only insincere diplomacy — it directly challenges political authority.

The diplomatic wording “by order of superiors” highlights the sensitivity and seriousness of the matter. In China’s diplomatic system, this phrase indicates that the order for the demarche came from the highest levels — likely Xi Jinping himself — rather than routine diplomatic channels. It is used only when the top leader believes his authority must be reaffirmed.

In the Chinese political context, foreign leaders acting inconsistently in this way is understood as an affront to the paramount leader’s authority. For Xi — whose authority is exceptionally consolidated — such a perceived personal slight is even less tolerable. Beijing’s anger toward Takaichi is therefore directed not only at a policy disagreement but at what it sees as a deliberate act of betrayal.

A central objective of China’s Taiwan strategy is to keep the issue “manageable” and prevent its internationalisation. If the Japanese prime minister publicly declares in the Diet that “a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency” and Beijing responds mildly, Western countries will infer that similar statements can be used to push beyond the limits of their One-China policies.

In fact, some British MPs have already expressed comparable views; Germany, Australia, Canada, and the EU could also treat Japan’s move as a model to emulate. This is precisely the scenario Beijing fears most: a shift from a primarily US-China confrontation over Taiwan to a broad multilateral standoff between China and the West. In the future, not only Western states but even some non-Western countries may openly support Taiwan in such a manner, thereby trampling China’s bottom line.

Beijing cannot allow Japan to become the origin point of such a “demonstration effect,” and therefore must respond firmly to halt the chain reaction of Taiwan’s internationalisation.

For Takaichi herself, she may believe she is merely reiterating Japan’s longstanding position on Taiwan. But she has overlooked the fact that the effect of political language depends on three variables: who says it, where it is said and the geopolitical structure in which it is said. As Japan’s prime minister, speaking in the Diet, and doing so immediately after making commitments to Xi Jinping — while Japan’s right-wing forces push hard for “national normalisation” — Takaichi’s remarks simultaneously crossed China’s sovereignty red line, historical red line, political authority red line and strategic red line.

Any one of these red lines could provoke a strong reaction from Beijing. The combination of all four ensures that Beijing’s response will be systematic and uncompromising.

In the coming weeks, the intensity of Beijing’s countermeasures is unlikely to diminish and will likely continue to escalate. If Takaichi refuses to retract her remarks, China-Japan relations may enter a prolonged and potentially irreversible new phase. What warrants further observation is not only Beijing’s counteractions, but also whether Takaichi’s adventurism triggers policy divisions within Japan itself. If Japan’s security policy continues to shift rightward, the long-term trajectory of China-Japan relations may become even more complicated than currently anticipated.

Related: China may turn Japan row into a strategic ‘new normal’ | Japanese academic: What Sanae Takaichi meant by ‘a survival-threatening situation’