China’s Iran dilemma: Why Beijing can’t fully embrace Tehran

Since the outbreak of the Gaza–Israel war on 7 October 2023, the geopolitical landscape in the Middle East has undergone significant changes. Iran, at least for the time being, finds itself in a challenging position. The “Axis of Resistance”, which Tehran has spent decades supporting, appears to be crumbling, and Iran itself has faced direct military strikes from Israel and the US, severely undermining its regional strategic standing. 

Under these circumstances, Iran’s willingness to cooperate with China has noticeably increased. Of course, cooperation with Iran could be beneficial to China. There remains room for further deepening the bilateral relationship between China and Iran.

Since Israel launched a war against Iran on 13 June, and especially after the US bombed Iran’s nuclear facilities on 22 June, there has been growing concern within Iran, particularly among the public, about the escalation of the conflict, alongside hopes that the country could leverage the war as an opportunity for significant transformation. 

However, the Iranian people have been disappointed, as decision-makers have yet to implement any substantial reforms. For instance, although more women in major cities such as Tehran are choosing not to wear the hijab, issues related to female attire, such as the hijab — which sparked intense social unrest in Iran in 2022 — remain highly sensitive, as reflected in the significant controversy surrounding the recently concluded Kish Island marathon.

What cannot be ignored is that the political struggles within Iran have further intensified. The forces advocating for reform, represented by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, have not seen any improvement in their domestic situation due to the Twelve-Day War with Israel. Reformists who do not hold core power still have ideals but cannot put them into practice. However, it is evident that the conservatives who hold real power are facing increasingly strong public anger.

Considering the ongoing pressure from Israel and the US on Iran, and even the possibility of the next war, conservatives must consider the future of their country and even themselves. Internal political struggles and social divisions have exacerbated Iran’s difficulties.

From an external perspective, without the cooperation and support of peripheral forces such as Hamas, Hezbollah and the former Assad regime in Syria, coupled with the deterrence brought about by direct military strikes by Israel and the US, Iran’s regional influence has significantly declined. Israel, with its rising geopolitical position, has gained a greater psychological advantage over Iran. 

After the Twelve-Day War, Iranians generally believe that the negotiations between the US and Iran are just a cover for Israel to launch a war, which further strengthens Iran’s distrust of the US. At the same time, Iran’s willingness to deepen cooperation with China has increased.

In fact, while the Twelve-Day War was still ongoing, there were calls within Iran to strengthen military cooperation with China, particularly by procuring Chinese military equipment and weapons. 

During and after the war, rumours of Chinese arms supplies to Iran spread widely in international discourse, amplified in part by Iranian officials and state media. It is obvious that strengthening national defence construction is currently the top priority for Iranian decision-makers. When Russia was unable to supply Iran with the promised weapons and defence equipment, Chinese fighter jets that have shone in the Pakistan–India conflict have become Iran’s desired targets, as well as China’s air defence equipment.

In the past six months, several mainstream Iranian media have sent me interview requests, mainly on how to deepen Iran–China relations. Before the Twelve-Day War, an Iranian media emphasised a trilateral “alliance” among Iran, Russia and China — an interpretation I do not share.

Another focus of Iranian media is how the international sanctions affect China’s interactions with Iran. Sanctions are certainly a key factor constraining the relationship between China and Iran, but they are not the only ones. My viewpoint has also been increasingly recognised by Iranians, including some Iranian scholars who believe that Tehran’s policy towards China is problematic.

Iranian expert Hossein Qaheri, who has long focused on Iran–China relations, recently stated that apart from sanctions, the main challenge facing this bilateral relationship is Iran’s lack of clear mechanisms and necessary political will. He believes that Iran has not aligned with China’s strategic priorities, but has unrealistic expectations of China. 

He also believes that Iran has neither a comprehensive strategy nor a long-term plan in terms of its relationship with China so far. Unlike Iranians who often criticise that China’s assistance is not enough, Qaheri believes that Iran’s own mismanagement has led to China’s unwillingness to provide new help. “We have yet to utilise even half; yet we express dissatisfaction that China does not extend further finance,” Qaheri said. Such views are gaining more recognition in Iran today.

At present, Iran is eager to further deepen its bilateral relations with China, which is certainly a good thing for China. After all, no matter how Iran’s strength and influence are weakened, it remains a power in the Middle East, especially in West Asia, and an indispensable role in any peace and political arrangements in the region. 

Haunted by the costs of an earlier foreign policy built on exclusive reliance on Washington, Tehran is now turning towards a more diversified diplomacy. Even after improving relations with Western countries such as the US, Iran will not easily abandon cooperation with China.

However, for China, deepening cooperation with Iran still faces some practical difficulties. Firstly, sanctions remain the biggest obstacle to China’s powerful companies and enterprises doing business with Iran. Secondly, Iran’s investment and trade environment has also had some negative impacts on China’s enthusiasm and willingness. The investment environment in Iran, in particular, needs to be improved. Thirdly, the uncertainty of Iran’s future also reminds China to face this country with caution. Even Iranians themselves cannot determine what their country’s future will be like, and a foreign country is even more uncertain about this, which will certainly limit China’s willingness to interact with Iran.

I believe Beijing hopes that the sanctions imposed on Iran can be lifted soon and is willing to work towards this end. China also does not want Iran to undergo drastic changes in a turbulent manner. Once Iran embarks on a healthy development path and sanctions are reduced or lifted, China will attempt to engage in comprehensive cooperation with Iran. If the strategic mutual trust between the two countries is satisfactory, cooperation in the military field is also possible.

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