China’s assertiveness towards Tokyo, Washington and Taipei is not working

On 30 October in South Korea, US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping met, reaching an agreement to end escalating trade tensions following months of bilateral brinkmanship. The detente reached by the two leaders assuaged global concerns about intensifying economic and geopolitical risks emanating from US-China competition. Xi Jinping’s assertiveness and retaliatory measures in response to President Trump’s threatened tariffs appear to have served Beijing well in the short term, but Beijing’s assertiveness will not work in the long run.  

On 7 November, Japan’s new prime minister, the first woman to hold the position, was asked by a Diet member to characterise the impact of an armed attack on Taiwan on Japan’s security. She responded by describing it as a “survival-threatening situation”, implying that it would trigger the exercise of collective self-defence by Japan’s military. The following day, China’s consul general in Osaka posted on social media: “The dirty neck that sticks itself in must be chopped off”, evoking the era of China’s “wolf warrior diplomacy”. Beijing quickly responded fiercely with political rhetoric, economic and military coercion.

Claiming that Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has crossed a red line, Japanese diplomats were summoned to Beijing for lectures, Japan-bound flights have been cancelled and Chinese tourists were warned against travelling to Japan. Imports of Japanese seafood have been banned and a PRC Coast Guard patrol passed through the Senkaku Islands. Beijing’s assertive response, however, is not having an effect in Tokyo or Taipei.

In the face of China’s coercion, Prime Minister Takaichi has stated that she will not retract her statement asserting Japan’s right to collective self-defence in a Taiwan conflict. Beijing’s assertive diplomacy and retaliation strategies have a history of failure. After Australia’s prime minister called for an independent investigation of the origins of Covid-19 in 2020, China responded with angry rhetoric, suspended diplomatic dialogues and embargoed Australian exports, including barley, wine, lobsters and coal. Australia did not back down, its economy did not collapse, and China reopened its markets to Australian goods three years later.  

Obnoxious Chinese diplomats dubbed “wolf warriors” regularly began insulting and denigrating their host countries after 2015, causing several countries, including Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Sweden to enact foreign interference countermeasures. Public opinion towards China in those targeted countries declined measurably, and political resolve to confront China’s coercion has increased. China’s military coercion directed against Australia, Japan, the Philippines and Taiwan has not resulted in deference. Instead, those countries have increased defence spending and strengthened their collective security efforts.

There are no signs that Prime Minister Takaichi and the Japanese government will back down in the face of Beijing’s assertiveness or online threats by diplomats to chop off her head. Japan’s Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi visited Yonaguni Island, just 110 kilometres from Taiwan, affirming previously announced plans to deploy medium-range surface-to-air missiles on the island. Japanese and US defence forces conducted joint logistics training on Yonaguni at the end of October, indicating its growing importance to Japan’s self-defence plans. President Trump placed a phone call to Prime Minister Takaichi immediately after his call with Xi Jinping, reassuring Tokyo about the prime minister’s relationship with the president. 

Asked about the call to Takaichi, Trump responded, “I had a great talk. I have a very good relationship with her. I also had a very good talk with President Xi of China.  And I think that part of the world is doing fine,” observing that the content of the call was “mostly trade”.

Public support for Prime Minister Takaichi’s approach towards China is strong. A recent poll found 64% of Japanese people aged 18-59 “rate the stance well”. Her overall support stands at 72%, while 77% support her engagement with Trump, giving her every incentive to stay the course. Due to over-tourism, China’s embargo on tourists has been welcomed by some Japanese, including conservative politicians. While China has many more aggressive coercive tools it could deploy, including embargoing rare earth materials, public opinion and politics in Japan will continue to favour resisting China’s coercion and strengthening relations with its neighbours and the US.

Beijing’s assertiveness has not cowed Taiwan’s leaders either. Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te has not bowed to Beijing’s intense rhetorical, political, economic or military coercion, which Taiwan officials often refer to as cognitive warfare.

In a show of support for Prime Minister Takaichi and Japanese seafood exports, President Lai posted a picture of himself enjoying a sushi lunch with products from Kagoshima and Hokkaido. More substantively, President Lai published an opinion piece in the Washington Post pledging to increase Taiwan’s defence spending to 5% of GDP by 2030 and introduce a US$40 billion supplementary defence budget to co-develop and acquire weapon systems from the US. Signalling Taiwan’s dual commitments to its own defence and importing more from the US to balance trade is most welcome in Washington, underscoring strengthening US-Taiwan relations.  

More pressure from Beijing is not intimidating Taipei or Washington. Furthermore, President Trump’s posts about his engagements with Xi Jinping have not discussed Taiwan despite Xi’s emphasis on it, reassuring Taipei that it is not a bargaining chip in Washington’s negotiations with Beijing.

President Trump is clearly committed to not only securing a trade deal with China but also managing a competitive bilateral relationship to ensure stability. Despite a broad trade agreement at the end of October and a surprise call between Xi and Trump three weeks later, structural challenges and differences remain unresolved.

Neither China nor the US were negotiating in good faith in the run-up to the agreement as they retaliated against one another and stacked threats upon threats, only to simultaneously back down from them and return to the status quo. The two sides achieved nothing but the withdrawal of expendable schemes, known as trade bait. There is no indication that either side is willing to compromise on existing policies and trade barriers or negotiate in good faith to lower them, making it likely that future rounds of negotiation will feature threats and coercion rather than a shared vision and cooperative effort to achieve a balanced and sustainable trade relationship. 

Trump’s objective of achieving a more equitable trade relationship featuring exports of US-manufactured goods to China is unachievable so long as China retains its industrial policies and strategies to lead the world in technology and advanced manufacturing. Balancing trade with only American agriculture exports will be difficult, if not impossible. Chinese importers can not be expected to buy American products if global producers offer lower prices.

China’s investments in Brazilian agriculture infrastructure, including railways and ports, are making Brazilian soybean exports more efficient and competitive, lowering world prices and making it even harder for US agriculture exports to compete for China’s business. China’s industrial policies and overcapacity directly clash with Trump’s goals to re-industrialise the US and balance trade with the rest of the world, assuring that trade frictions will arise again.  

But for now, detente may hold. President Trump said he accepted the invitation to visit China in April and offered a reciprocal invitation for Xi to make a state visit later next year. It is possible that Trump will visit China for APEC in November, and Xi will come to the US for the G20 in December next year, making four potential face-to-face meetings in 2026. Both leaders will be incentivised to avoid escalating tensions while they pursue their agendas through personal diplomacy with one another.

The US mid-term elections in November will also be a factor for President Trump as he seeks to maintain control of both houses of Congress. A chaotic, deteriorating US-China relationship marked by uncertainty will hurt voter sentiment and perhaps financial markets too, which would favour opposition candidates. President Trump has solid political and personal incentives to act with restraint until the end of 2026 and maintain the detente with President Xi.

Juggling American interests with those of its allies, particularly where allies’ interests diverge from Beijing’s, will pose an ongoing challenge for the president beyond 2026, when incentives for restraint may diminish, increasing the probability that the second half of Trump’s term will feature a return to intensifying competition and confrontation with China.

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