The impact of Trump 2.0 on the Philippines

In a scheduled call to congratulate the victory of US President-elect Donald Trump by Ferdinand Marcos Jr, the former asked the latter, “How is Imelda?” While their exchange appears cordial, significant challenges remain regarding how both countries will navigate the geopolitical realities of the region.

The Philippines relies heavily on the US for security and there is clearly increased uncertainty with the incoming US administration. Trump is known for his “America First” policy, which prioritises US interests in terms of economic, foreign and trade policies. This is mostly enacted through protectionist and even unilateral measures.

As such, Trump’s re-election does bring to the fore complex ramifications for the US-Philippine alliance, the South China Sea issue and the broader dynamics of the Indo-Pacific region.

Notably, Marcos Jr has unequivocally shown support for the US’s strategic goals in the region, a significant deviation from his predecessor who preferred a closer relationship with China. He sought to improve security and defence ties with Washington as a way to respond to China’s continuous aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea. Will this rekindled US-Philippine relationship continue under the second Trump presidency?

I expect that the relationship will persist considering that the Philippines has always been tied at the hip with the US, with the exception of the Duterte administration. In the 2024 State of Southeast Asia Survey, the US has generally seen a decline in popularity in the region. Nevertheless, it still enjoys broad support from the Philippines, largely due to its involvement in countering China’s assertive actions.

The change that might occur is the US’s method of engagement with other countries, including the Philippines. There will be a palpable shift from Biden’s values-based diplomacy to Trump’s transactional diplomacy. Biden focused on strengthening alliances and building on multilateral engagement; at its core is an emphasis on the integration of human rights and democratic governance. On the other hand, Trump views diplomacy as a series of transactions aimed at maximising strategic gains for the US, which often disregards alliances and existing global norms.

For example, while he imposed tariffs on China, he also extended similar measures to key allies, including Canada, Mexico and the EU. Trump also expressed dissatisfaction with allies regarding NATO spending, demanding that European nations increase military expenditure or risk reduced US support. In 2019, South Korea was also asked to pay more to maintain US troops in the country, prioritising short-term financial gains over the importance of sustaining military presence in the region. For Donald Trump, alliances are not for free and every partnership comes at a cost.

The Philippines has generally provided the US with multiple concessions driven by strategic necessity. Under the Marcos Jr administration, the number of Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) sites has been expanded from five to nine. These additional sites facilitate greater access for US military personnel at crucial military bases across the country.

Furthermore, joint military exercises between the US and the Philippines are regularly conducted to enhance coordination between the two nations’ armed forces. This was augmented by the US deployment of the Typhon missile system in the Philippines, with discussions about keeping it stationed indefinitely.

China vehemently expressed strong opposition to the deployment of US weapons to the Philippines, perceiving it as a threat. Recently, tensions further escalated with China’s deployment of PLA Navy vessels against the Philippine Coast Guard in the vicinity of Bajo de Masinloc. 

In light of the territorial dispute, the different pillars of US-Philippine security cooperation, which include the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), EDCA and the Balikatan exercises, will possibly outlast any change in leaders both in the Philippines and the US. While these cooperation mechanisms exist, the exigencies of how these are practised could be altered under Trump’s administration.

There was already a precedent when American commitment to its mutual defence obligation toward the Philippines was highly ambiguous and uncertain. During Trump’s first term, the counterpart administration was the Duterte administration; Duterte pivoted to China and downgraded the US-Philippine alliance. Hence, American commitment to the Philippines was not tested during his term because the US was sidelined. It was during the Aquino III and Obama administrations in 2014 that US uncertainty toward Philippine security became more obvious. This is a stark contrast to the recent US rhetoric that Philippine-US cooperation is ironclad.

Interestingly, it is now Marcos Jr who appears to be continuing the late Aquino III’s China policy, despite the historical animosity between the Aquinos and the Marcoses. But it would not be surprising if, during Trump 2.0, the US once again reverts to its earlier position on its commitment to Philippine security and the MDT.

The Philippines holds a critically important position for the US in advancing its objectives within the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in curtailing China’s influence. There are two critical areas in the US-China rivalry, which are the South China Sea and Taiwan. The deployment of US personnel and weapons to the Philippines serves not only to deter China’s expansionism but also to prepare for eventualities in Taiwan.

Given its geographical proximity, the Philippines has the potential to act as a staging ground or operational outpost for the US in the event of a conflict between Beijing and Taipei. Thus, it would be quite challenging for Marcos Jr to adjust his current approach to the South China Sea, which is closely linked with US strategy toward China.

The Philippines does not clearly state in official documents that it is following the US strategy against China. However, the Philippines’ actions (e.g. expanding EDCA bases) support the first island chain strategy that favours the US and possibly limits China’s maritime routes. If this strategy fails, Marcos Jr must enhance ties with allies like Japan and Australia.

Historically, Marcos Sr had a close relationship with the US despite a clear trail of corruption, human rights abuses and the rise of authoritarian rule in the Philippines. At the time, Ronald Reagan viewed Marcos Sr as a staunch ally in the Cold War, given the strategic importance of the Philippines in the US’s anti-communist agenda. I see similarities between how Marcos Jr might manage his relationship with Trump as informed by his father’s interactions with the US.

Trump’s policies are largely influenced by his personal relationships with foreign leaders. Marcos Jr could follow his father’s approach by building a personal and close rapport with Trump, leveraging that connection to the Philippines’ advantage.

Trump’s return to the White House undoubtedly raises concerns across Europe and Asia, particularly regarding the risk of diminished American commitment to long-standing alliances. The Philippines, a treaty ally of the US, has historically relied on Washington for its security. Should Trump fully reinstate his extremely insular policy of “America First”, the Philippines and other allies in Asia will likely face challenges in maintaining stability and the status quo without the robust backing that they have traditionally received from the US.

Related: Philippines must exercise its agency in a ‘rules-broken’ international order | US’s ‘Typhon’ missile system deployed in the Philippines: A dangerous move?