The myth of Trump’s global impact

The changing of national leaders is among the most important and direct factors affecting bilateral relations. And as the most influential country in the world, the US presidential election undoubtedly attracts the most attention worldwide.

Donald Trump’s re-election makes him the second US president to serve non-consecutive terms after Grover Cleveland. At the same time, incumbent US President Joe Biden is also set to become the second US president since Richard Nixon’s 1972 China visit not to visit China during his term (the first being Jimmy Carter).

However, compared with these lesser-known “seconds”, other countries are more concerned about the impact of Trump’s second presidency on their own interests, especially countries such as Germany, Japan and South Korea, which are both US allies and major competitors in the manufacturing sector. They are worried that Trump will continue to pursue “America First” policies, which could potentially reduce their security (if US willingness to protect its allies weakens) and threaten their economic development. 

While I do not deny that Trump’s return to the White House will directly affect the domestic politics and foreign policies of several countries, I think that his influence on the international landscape will be relatively limited.

The international landscape refers to the balance of power among major countries or blocs, which varies across different domains. For example, the current economic landscape features three major geopolitical economic blocs: the North American free trade area, the European Union (EU) and East Asia. The realm of military and security, on the other hand, can be divided into three camps: the US-led Western bloc represented by the G7; the camp represented by China and Russia that resists Western containment; and an extremely loose third camp comprising other countries.

Yet, amid the resurgence of nationalism, realism and great power competition, the importance of high politics (such as the military) has sharply increased. On the other hand, low politics (such as the economy) has become secondary to — and serves the interests of — high politics. As such, the current international landscape consists largely of the US-led Western bloc, the China-Russia bloc and other nations.

Changes in the international landscape are dependent on the shifting balance of power between major countries or blocs. There are two ways to enhance the power of a nation or bloc: one is through the internal development of national strength, and the other is through forming alliances with other countries.

While the former method is more reliable and practical, it often takes a longer time to accomplish. Since Trump cannot get re-elected again, it is difficult for major powers — including the US — to substantially enhance their national strength through internal development within a short period of four years. 

Theoretically, while external means of enhancing power are generally quicker, the current solidified state of international blocs leaves very limited room for manoeuvre through such means.

Although Trump has always admired and revered Russian President Vladimir Putin, even repeatedly vowing to swiftly end the Russia-Ukraine war and the war in Gaza when he takes office, such sentiments do not mean that US-Russia relations will see substantial improvement.　

When Trump took office for the first time on 20 January 2017, nearly three years had passed since the Crimean crisis. However, its impact on America’s European allies and the US establishment remained significant. Although Trump met and spoke with Putin numerous times during his term in office, US-Russia relations did not see significant improvement. 

The Russia-Ukraine war, erupting in February 2022, essentially extended the Crimean crisis, posing even greater security challenges for both western Europe and the US, though the impact was more acute for Europe.

After Trump takes office early next year, efforts to improve US-Russia relations will continue to face constraints from European allies and the American political establishment. Even if Trump encounters no opposition, Putin would be unlikely to focus solely on a four-year Trump presidency without considering long-term US strategy towards Russia.

The US is concerned about China’s rise and East Asian economic integration on the eastern side of Eurasia, while also being wary of deepening economic and trade relations between Russia and the EU on the continent’s western side.

These powers on the eastern and western flanks of Eurasia represent the most significant potential challenges to US global leadership. Consequently, US foreign strategy aims to alienate or contain both East Asia (Japan in the 1980s, now China) and Europe simultaneously. This indicates that the “partners but not allies” relationship between China and Russia is likely to endure for the foreseeable future.

Another country that can significantly affect the current international landscape is India. While India is traditionally seen as a non-aligned country, it signed the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in 1971, effectively forming a de facto alliance. 

At present, under the leadership of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his multi-alignment foreign policy, the US and India have signed four foundational agreements including the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement. India enjoys the status of a major non-NATO American ally, and both countries have also effectively formed a de facto alliance.

On 5 November, Indian news website The Print published an article pointing out that regardless of who wins the US election, the fundamental aspects of US-India relations will remain unchanged. This is because there is bipartisan consensus that China is the US’s biggest strategic rival, which — for the US — necessitates a partnership with India to contain China.

Following the 2017 Doklam standoff and especially since the 2020 Galwan Valley clash, India has been seen as siding with the US-led western bloc. US-India relations were also elevated to a Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership when Trump visited India in February 2020. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) — comprising the US, Japan, India and Australia — was also revived during Trump’s first presidency.

Therefore, US-India relations and the Quad alliance are poised to maintain their current momentum during Trump’s second term in office. Even in the extreme scenario of a significant deterioration in US-India relations, India’s current and projected strength four years from now would still make it challenging for the country to have a substantial impact on the international landscape.

Undeniably, given the US’s unique and formidable influence in technology, economics and finance, even minor adjustments by the Trump administration in these areas could have direct and significant impacts on enterprises and individuals in many countries. As novelist Wang Fang once wrote, “one speck of dust from an entire era may not seem like much, but when it falls on your head it’s like a mountain crashing on you”. 

However, we need not exaggerate the impact of Trump’s re-election on the international landscape. On the one hand, restricted by a four-year term, major strategic adjustments are difficult to implement and their effects are even harder to be seen. On the other hand, bipartisan consensus in the US is far greater than their differences, and continuity in internal affairs and foreign policy far outweighs change. Although the US is currently perceived as being trapped in polarisation once again, both parties still maintain a high degree of consensus on core values and foreign policy strategies.

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “特朗普再次当选对国际格局影响有限”.

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