Older Taiwanese now favour Japan over US and China

19 May 2025
politics
Shin Kawashima
Professor of International Relations, Graduate School of Arts & Sciences, University of Tokyo
A public opinion survey on Taiwanese perceptions of Japan shows the Taiwanese have more favourable views of Japan as compared to three years ago. Japanese academic Shin Kawashima tells us more.
A Japan Airlines passenger plane lands as people visit a market in Taipei on 20 March 2025. (I-Hwa Cheng/AFP)
A Japan Airlines passenger plane lands as people visit a market in Taipei on 20 March 2025. (I-Hwa Cheng/AFP)

The Japan–Taiwan Exchange Association has released the results of its triennial public opinion survey on Taiwanese perceptions of Japan, which has been conducted since 2009. The 2024 results show continuity with the previous survey in 2021 and earlier, while also highlighting new trends in how Taiwan views Japan. In short, Taiwanese sentiment toward Japan has improved, but the underlying reason appears to stem from growing unease about the US.

A closer look by age group reveals that this surge is mainly driven by middle-aged and elderly respondents. 

Taiwan’s new favourite

First, in response to the question “Apart from Taiwan, which country do you like the most?”, 76% of respondents named Japan, significantly higher than the 60% recorded in the previous survey. However, a closer look by age group reveals that this surge is mainly driven by middle-aged and elderly respondents.

Specifically, favourable impressions of Japan among those aged 50–64 increased sharply from 47% in 2021 to 74% in 2024. For the 65–80 age group, the figure rose from 51% to 70%. In 2021, a clear generational gap existed, with nearly 70% of younger people holding favourable views of Japan compared to only about 50% of those over 50. However, the 2024 survey shows this gap has narrowed significantly.

What is behind this change? One clue can be found in responses to the question: “Which country should Taiwan be closest to?” The percentage of individuals selecting Japan surged from 46% in 2021 to 70% in 2024. This increase was evident across all age groups, with the 50–64 age group rising from 34% to 65%, and the 65–80 age group increasing from 41% to 65%. These represent substantial gains. Meanwhile, the percentage of people naming the US dropped from 24% to 13%, and those naming China declined from 15% to 11%.

People visit a shopping street in Asakusa district near Sensoji Temple, a popular tourist location in Tokyo, during the last day of “Golden Week” holiday on 6 May 2025. (Philip Fong/AFP)

These shifts suggest that Taiwanese society’s sentiment toward China has worsened due to both military and non-military pressure from Beijing, which is unsurprising. But at the same time, trust in the US appears to be wavering as well. These changing attitudes have had a direct impact on how Taiwan now feels about Japan.

People in the 50–64 age group may view Japan’s influence on Taiwan as significant culturally, but still limited in political or security matters.

Still a generational gap

However, a generational gap in Taiwanese public sentiment toward Japan persists. When asked, “Which country has the greatest influence on Taiwan?” those selecting Japan rose from 13% in 2021 to 30%, while the figure for the US dropped from 58% to 48%. Among age groups, 41% of respondents in their 30s chose Japan, compared to just 24% of those aged 50–64, an increase from 13% in 2021. This suggests that people in the 50–64 age group may view Japan’s influence on Taiwan as significant culturally, but still limited in political or security matters.

Furthermore, the common view that young people have very positive feelings toward Japan is not entirely supported by the data. In response to the question “Do you feel close to Japan?”, although the overall figure has risen, the proportion of those in their 20s dropped from 90% in 2021 to 83%, and among those in their 30s, it declined slightly from 89% to 88%, showing either a decrease or a plateau. In contrast, positive feelings among older generations increased: from 66% to 76% among those aged 50–64, and from 67% to 78% among those aged 65–80.

This shift in sentiment among people over 50 is also reflected in answers to the question, “How do you think current Japan–Taiwan relations compare with the past?” While overall positive responses increased, the percentage of those in their 20s who felt relations had improved dropped from 73% to 69%, and among those in their 30s, it fell from 78% to 69%. Conversely, the 50–64 age group saw an increase from 51% to 70%, and the 65–80 age group from 61% to 71%. These results reveal a significant generational divide in perceptions of Japan–Taiwan relations.

People walk in front of a Uniqlo store in Shanghai, China, 28 February 2025. (Go Nakamura/Reuters)

Additionally, the shift among people over 50 likely stems from deteriorating perceptions of both the US and China. What stands out is that for those under 30, the perception that Japan–Taiwan relations have improved has not gotten better — in fact, it has slightly worsened.

Cooling ties?

In reality, compared to the era of the Abe Shinzo administration, Japan–Taiwan relations have not seen major developments in recent years. Since the Ishiba administration took office, exchanges between Japanese and Taiwanese lawmakers have become more subdued.

While the general trend of younger age groups showing higher levels of trust in Japan has not changed — and it cannot be said that the younger generation is turning away from Japan — their attitudes toward Japan–Taiwan relations, particularly those in their 30s, deserve attention.

The Ishiba Shigeru government is seeking to “improve” ties with China and has not strongly pushed policies to deepen Japan–Taiwan relations. Moreover, members of the Seiwa Seisaku Kenkyūkai (the Abe faction), which had previously advanced Japan–Taiwan ties, currently do not hold key posts in government or within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. Although Japan–Taiwan relations remain generally favourable, this opinion poll reflects the presence of various underlying concerns.