From ‘peaceful’ to ‘all efforts’: Is China signalling a shift on Taiwan?

“… firmly supports all efforts made by China to achieve national reunification…”

Over the past two years, the phrase above has repeatedly appeared in joint statements signed between the Chinese government and its diplomatic allies, drawing attention from Western media and academics. The focus revolves around two words: “all efforts”.

The latest issue of The Economist published an article titled “China’s stunning new campaign to turn the world against Taiwan”, which claims that 70 countries have now officially endorsed China’s sovereignty over Taiwan, and that China is entitled to pursue “all efforts” to achieve reunification, without specifying that those efforts should be peaceful.

The Lowy Institute also published an academic report last month titled “Five One-Chinas: The contest to define Taiwan”, which systematically analyses the positions of the 193 UN member states on the Taiwan issue.

The report reached a similar conclusion as The Economist: 89 countries — nearly half of all UN member states — endorse both the “one China” principle and support China’s efforts to “achieve national reunification”. The report also asserted that these countries did not stipulate that these efforts should be peaceful, “arguably consenting to Beijing using force to take control of Taiwan”.

The Economist article pointed out that most of those countries have adopted that new wording in the past 18 months, after a Chinese diplomatic offensive across the global south.

Judging from the timing of major political events of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), it appears that after its 20th Party Congress, “peaceful reunification, one country, two systems” remains Beijing’s basic policy for resolving the Taiwan issue. But it is true that after the 20th Party Congress, China gradually mentioned “peaceful” less frequently in joint statements issued with its diplomatic allies; Hong Kong media have published articles focusing on this phenomenon as well.

Take Kazakhstan for example. The 2023 joint statement between China and Kazakhstan still included the phrase expressing Kazakhstan’s support for “all efforts made by the Chinese government to realise the peaceful reunification of the country”. But in 2024, the word “peaceful” is no longer found in the joint statement between both countries. As mainland China’s permanent comprehensive strategic partner and the birthplace of the Belt and Road Initiative, Kazakhstan’s statements on the Taiwan issue are seen as an important reflection of Beijing’s policy demands.

In terms of quantity, the support of African nations for Beijing’s political claims regarding Taiwan is particularly crucial. In September 2024, the Beijing Declaration signed between China and 53 African countries omitted the mention of “peaceful reunification”, only asserting that Africa “firmly supports all efforts by the Chinese government to achieve national reunification”. In contrast, the Dakar Declaration signed between China and Africa in 2021 made no mention of Taiwan, only stressing that both sides would give each other firm support in “upholding territorial integrity, sovereignty, security and development interests”, as well as in “resolving territorial and maritime disputes peacefully through friendly consultation and negotiation”.

Two months prior to the CCP’s 20th Party Congress in October 2022, then US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan, drawing outrage from Beijing, which not only launched military drills encircling Taiwan, but also stressed in its 20th Party Congress report, in the section on Taiwan: “We will implement our Party’s overall policy for resolving the Taiwan question in the new era, maintain the initiative and the ability to steer in cross-strait relations, and unswervingly advance the cause of national reunification.”

Unlike the report to the 19th Party Congress, asserting that mainland China will “maintain the initiative and the ability to steer” in the 20th Party Congress report suggests that between 2022 and 2027, the CCP will be more proactive and assertive in its approach with regard to Taiwan, moving away from the previous strategy of “placing our hopes on the people of Taiwan”.

Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan is believed to have been the turning point that accelerated the CCP’s shift towards taking the lead and acting proactively regarding Taiwan. On top of that — with the victory of Lai Ching-te in the 2024 presidential election and faced with the possibility of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) maintaining long-term governance in Taiwan — Beijing took active measures across legal, military and diplomatic arenas by adopting a “salami-slicing” approach to strengthen its capability to take Taiwan, in order to counter the advancement of official exchanges between the US and Taiwan in a similar “salami-slicing” manner.

On the legal aspect, Beijing has released documents pertaining to the punishment of Taiwanese independence separatists. Militarily, it has intensified pressure from grey zone tactics, with Chinese military aircraft regularly entering Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), while the Chinese coast guard consistently carries out routine patrols in the waters between Xiamen and Kinmen. Observers have also speculated that the disruption of underwater cables to Taiwan’s outlying island of Matsu is part of Beijing’s grey zone tactics.

Diplomatically, aside from poaching Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, Beijing persuaded its allies to omit the term “peaceful” in joint statements, instead adopting the phrase “firmly supports all efforts by the Chinese government to achieve national reunification”, as a standard phrasing. This strategy has effectively laid the groundwork for potential military actions against Taiwan, providing a legal basis for legitimacy as well as pre-emptively making diplomatic preparations to reduce international condemnation.

Theoretically, countries that support “all efforts by the Chinese government to achieve national reunification” are expected to — barring a regime change — remain silent and refrain from condemnation in response to any Chinese action, including military reunification or blockades of the Taiwan Strait, or else it would effectively violate the promises made in their joint statement. Even if a UN member state were to initiate a motion to condemn China, it would not pass given China’s status as a permanent member of the Security Council with veto power.

Beijing’s latest move was the People’s Liberation Army Eastern Command proactively announcing the passage of US warships through the Taiwan Strait on 12th February — ahead of the US. Chang Ching, analyst at Taiwan’s Society of Strategic Studies, opined that this was out of the norm, and that the mainland’s intention in doing so was a clear expression that the Taiwan Strait is now under its sphere of influence. 

Reducing any mention of peace, becoming more proactive and urging diplomatic allies to support the “one China” principle does not necessarily mean that Beijing would resort to force when it comes to reunification with Taiwan. Beijing is also looking to employ diplomatic means to establish its claim that Taiwan is an inseparable part of China under the “one China” principle as an internationally accepted fact, reducing the necessity of military action towards Taiwan. As to which direction this approach will take, the attitude of the new US administration would play a factor.

Since taking office, Donald Trump has yet to make a clear statement on the Taiwan issue. Optimistically, the hard head-to-head clash between the unpredictability of Trump’s tendency to say whatever he desires against Beijing’s increased dominance and proactiveness towards Taiwan could possibly lead to a new point of equilibrium vis-a-vis the “balance of terror” for the Taiwan Strait.

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “中共二十大后涉台少提“和平”为哪般？”.

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