Scarborough Shoal incident: A test for ASEAN, China and regional stability
A recent incident between the Philippine Coast Guard and China’s maritime forces could presage a change in tactics by the latter. If this is so, tensions in the disputed area might head north.
The collision between a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) destroyer and a China Coast Guard (CCG) cutter on 11 August was unquestionably a major loss of face for China’s maritime forces.
But other than an embarrassment, if the incident presages a change in tactics by Beijing in the South China Sea (SCS), the disputed area might see tensions raised up a notch.
The incident took place near Scarborough Shoal, 120 nautical miles southeast of Luzon. Although the Philippines claims ownership of the shoal, China has exercised de facto control over it since 2012, when it seized the maritime feature from the Philippines after a standoff.
The incident
That morning, the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) vessel BRP Suluan was delivering provisions to Filipino fisherfolk as part of the Kadiwa programme, an initiative by the administration of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr to support fishing communities.
The CCG cutter Nanyu, supported by the PLAN destroyer CNS Guilin, tried to stop the Suluan’s mission by giving chase. During the pursuit, the two Chinese vessels appeared to try and sandwich the Suluan in a pincer movement.
The damage was so severe that the crew of the CCG ship very likely sustained casualties and possibly even fatalities, though China has neither confirmed nor denied it.
This manoeuvre was highly dangerous and in violation of the 1972 Collision Regulations and the 2014 Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES). With regard to the latter, while China seems willing to “practise” CUES at sea, it is unwilling to implement them in real world situations.
As the smaller and more agile PCG cutter evaded its pursuers, the Guilin collided with the Nanyu, causing extensive damage to the latter’s bow. The damage was so severe that the crew of the CCG ship very likely sustained casualties and possibly even fatalities, though China has neither confirmed nor denied it. The Suluan’s offers of medical assistance were ignored by the CCG.
Different stories
Subsequently, both countries offered competing narratives of the incident.
China’s state-owned Global Times accused the PCG of “dangerous and “provocative” manoeuvres while the Philippine Department of National Defense called China’s conduct “atrocious and inane”.
If CCG did suffer fatalities, it is one of the most serious incidents in the SCS for decades.
But it also raises some troubling questions about whether China’s maritime forces have escalated their grey zone tactics and, if they have, what this means for the SCS dispute going forward.
While the PLAN has always played a support role for CCG operations in the SCS, it has rarely intervened so directly as it did on 11 August, preferring to adopt an “over the horizon” role where it provided support from afar.
For the Philippines, the 11 August incident was a violation of a 2012 agreement between the two countries not to deploy naval vessels at Scarborough Shoal.
Impact of the incident
It may have been that Beijing decided to employ heavier-handed tactics as a punitive measure in response to Marcos’s comments about how the Philippines would inevitably be dragged into a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Or it could be that China has decided to escalate its grey zone tactics by approving closer operational coordination between the PLAN and CCG, including joint patrols in the SCS.
... Marcos said that if anyone from the PCG were killed in such an incident with China, this would be a “red line”, and that both Manila and Washington would consider this to be “very close” to an act of war...
That would put regional coast guards at a distinct disadvantage. A warship is much larger and more powerful than a cutter and, as the collision demonstrated, capable of inflicting greater damage during ramming manoeuvres. At the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2024, Marcos said that if anyone from the PCG were killed in such an incident with China, this would be a “red line”, and that both Manila and Washington would consider this to be “very close” to an act of war that would require “joint action”.
Will the incident raise tensions in the South China Sea?
It already has. Two days after it occurred, the destroyer USS Higgins conducted a freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) at Scarborough Shoal. This was the first FONOP to take place since President Donald Trump took office in January, and only the second at the reef since 2019. On the same day, a Chinese fighter jet “intercepted” a PCG turboprop aircraft carrying journalists near the shoal.
If further joint PCG-PLAN operations do become the norm, expect tensions in the SCS to rise a notch higher.
Finally, a Code of Conduct?
But no matter what happens over the next few months, the Scarborough Shoal incident once again underscores the need for a comprehensive and binding Code of Conduct (COC) for the SCS. This includes a list of prohibited activities such as dangerous life-threatening manoeuvres.
It remains to be seen whether, under President Marcos’s watch, the decades-long COC process will finally reach its long-awaited conclusion.
Officials from ASEAN and China have been negotiating the COC for a decade now, with no end in sight. In a recent media interview, President Marcos Jr said that when the Philippines takes over as ASEAN chair in 2026, Manila would push for the conclusion of a binding COC that year.
Many are sceptical regarding this prospect, given that the Philippines must fit this into the long, complex agenda that includes issues involving Myanmar, the Thai-Cambodian conflict, and other regional issues. It remains to be seen whether, under President Marcos’s watch, the decades-long COC process will finally reach its long-awaited conclusion.
The longer the process takes, the higher the risk that a collision between a Chinese vessel and a Philippine one will trigger a crisis neither side wants.
This article was first published in Fulcrum, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute’s blogsite.
