Southeast Asia looks to India as US-China uncertainty grows

The past decade has seen a more mature shift in New Delhi’s foreign policy towards Southeast Asia, indicating a greater understanding of Southeast Asian countries’ acute security concerns. As New Delhi’s Act East Policy enters its 11th year, India aims to make its position as an alternative security partner in Southeast Asia more pronounced amid an uncertain Donald Trump presidency and China’s increasingly coercive activities in the South China Sea. 

Trump has been signalling his intent to leverage his “great relationship” with Chinese President Xi Jinping, and Washington is keeping its foot in the door for a possible grand bargain with Beijing in the Western Pacific. At the same time, it is uncertain whether an equitable deal is possible given the US desire for more influence on the one hand and China’s expansionist ambitions on the other.

In this regard, maritime-oriented Southeast Asian states are concerned about the potential limits in their strategic manoeuvrability in the region, prompting them to proactively diversify their security partnerships.

For Southeast Asian states, a potential US-China detente in the Western Pacific would complicate their national security calculations and plunge them into uncertainty. Hence, the only way to address these possible shocks would be to maintain an equidistant position between both structural forces, while expanding defence cooperation with like-minded partners. In this regard, the past few months have witnessed notable, but not largely publicised, security negotiations between India and its Southeast Asian neighbours. 

After several years of negotiations, New Delhi and Hanoi are close to signing a US$ 700 million BrahMos missile system deal, making Vietnam the second country after the Philippines to receive the India and Russia-made supersonic cruise missiles. With a speed of Mach 2.8 and a range of 290 kilometres (400-500 kilometres for the upgraded versions), the BrahMos operates based on a “fire and forget” principle, ensuring its precision while possessing a low radar signature, making it difficult to track or intercept. 

While China’s extensive claims in the South China Sea overlap Vietnam’s lawful 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which has led to complex relations between both nations, Hanoi has traditionally sought to address its tensions with Beijing peacefully and without triggering any notion of engaging in bloc politics, despite Vietnam’s expanding ties with the West. 

However, China’s pressure on Southeast Asian nations continues to grow. For instance, despite a delineation agreement between Hanoi and Beijing on the Gulf of Tonkin in 2000, China’s delineation of a new baseline in the Gulf was declared in March 2024. This move not only discards the mutually agreed upon bilateral agreement on the Gulf but also departs considerably from the principles of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In September 2024, Chinese maritime forces beat Vietnamese fishermen with metal rods close to the Paracel Island Given this strategic reality, Vietnam recognises the need to offset China’s assertiveness by bolstering its physical deterrence without explicitly taking any side in the US-China power competition. 

Unlike other regional powers, India’s adherence to strategic autonomy converges well with Vietnam’s strategic culture of self-reliance. The Vietnam-India Defence Partnership is a time-tested relationship that has emerged since the second half of the Cold War. Additionally, the Act East Policy has added momentum to the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, creating a more defined role for India’s capacity-building efforts. Therefore, the BrahMos deal will be a practical and natural progression in strengthening the bilateral defence partnership and bolstering Vietnam’s capacity to secure its maritime security interests in the South China Sea.

Since 2016, the Philippines-India security partnership witnessed considerable feats — from increased maritime security activities, reciprocal high-level visits to the BrahMos deal, and the institutionalisation of new bilateral defence mechanisms. Moreover, as the Philippines is operationalising its Comprehensive Archipelagic Defence Concept (CADC) to secure its EEZ, Manila has endeavoured to procure more defence assets to modernise its armed forces and coast guard.

This comes against China’s belligerent activities against the Philippines’ lawful activities within its waters. The most recent involved dangerous manoeuvres by a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) helicopter against a Philippine Bureau of Fisheries and Resources (BFAR) plane conducting routine overflight operations near the Scarborough Shoal on 11 February. 

The evident likelihood of China’s continued provocations in Philippine waters has necessitated a thorough prioritisation of acquiring more assets to provide the Philippine military with an advantage amid the largely asymmetric bilateral dynamics. Accordingly, Philippine Army chief Lieutenant General Roy Galido recently stated that Manila has already appropriated a budget to acquire short-range air defence systems. India’s Akash missile system has drawn significant interest from Manila. 

Along with being affordable and battle-tested, the Akash system, which was also exported by India to Armenia in 2024, will enhance the Philippines’ air defence capabilities. With an over 90% success rate, the Akash is one of the few existing air defence systems to intercept aircraft and missiles at such a calibre. With the Philippines likely to make a deal worth over US$200 million, this will be India’s second major defence export to the Southeast Asian state following the BrahMos deal. Moreover, along with providing equipment, India has also indicated supporting the Philippines’ self-reliance interests in its defence industry.

Along with Vietnam, Indonesia is also in the final stages of its negotiations over a US$ 450 million BrahMos deal with India. During Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto’s visit to New Delhi as a guest of honour at India’s Republic Day in January, he held a joint meeting with BrahMos CEO Jaiteerth Joshi and Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Following the joint meeting, Admiral Muhammad Ali, chief of staff of the Indonesian Navy, visited the BrahMos Aerospace Private Limited in New Delhi on 27 January for extensive discussions on the defence system.

This comes at a time when China has been increasing its assertive incursions in the Natuna Sea — leading to frequent confrontations with the Indonesian Navy within the Southeast Asian nation’s EEZ. While Prabowo has shown flexibility in managing relations with Beijing, he is unlikely to downplay chances of more confrontation with China over miscalculations. Thus, he is likely to enhance the momentum behind Indonesia’s military modernisation, known as the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) programme. 

As a large archipelagic state, Indonesia must secure its vast EEZ and skies. However, Indonesia’s military lacks robust land-based anti-ship and surface-to-air defence capabilities. Therefore, the BrahMos will add an important layer of deterrence against China’s incursions in the Indonesian EEZ. The sale of a major defence system may serve as a much-needed catalyst to deepen India-Indonesia defence ties further. Moreover, for New Delhi, an enhanced security partnership with the largest Southeast Asian state would also elevate its image in the region. 

Through New Delhi’s reinvigorated political will, the Act East Policy has allowed India to diversify its strategic engagements with its Southeast Asian neighbours. Recent developments also show India’s efforts to maintain flexibility when engaging with regional states that may share common concerns but possess varying ways of dealing with them.

As the security architecture of Southeast Asia continues to exacerbate due to the uncertainty of the US-China power competition, India will need to not only elevate its foreign policy outreach to regional states but also ensure its consistency in engaging in areas that matter most to them, along with proactively navigating its ties with Washington and Beijing.

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