Southeast Asia’s middle power strategy in US-China rivalry

As the Middle East teeters on the brink of a full-scale regional conflict and the war in Ukraine rages on, Asia is also witnessing increased militarisation and heightened risks of unintended conflict. This is driven by the intensifying strategic contestation between the US and China, which will underpin geopolitical realities for years to come.

With bipartisan consensus that it is China — not Russia, Iran or any other country — that poses the most salient strategic threat to the US, Asia’s leaders must expect that the US will continue to focus its resources on containing China and corral like-minded countries to manage the challenge. The question is what role Southeast Asian countries and other middle powers can play to manage heightening tensions and bolster regional security. 

In a demonstration of its deterrence capabilities, China, on 25 September, carried out a test launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) into the Pacific Ocean — the first such test in 44 years. China has also been stepping up its military drills in the South China Sea, including with Russia.

Some of these drills appear to be a response to drills undertaken by the US and its allies and partners in the region. China’s most recent exercise, carried out between 30 September and 1 October, coincided with a five-nation exercise involving the US, the Philippines, Australia, Japan and New Zealand.

The US, for its part, has kept up its schedule of multilateral and bilateral exercises. On 7 October, it commenced yet another joint naval exercise with the navies of the Philippines, Australia, Canada, France, Japan and the UK. Dubbed Exercise Sama Sama, the two-week drills are being carried out off the coast of Luzon, facing Taiwan. They involve anti-submarine, anti-surface and anti-air warfare exercises. These exercises are the eighth iteration in the series, which started initially as a bilateral exercise between the US and the Philippines.

Perhaps the most significant development arising from the step-up of US military exercises with the Philippines has been the decision to leave its Typhon missile system in the Philippines indefinitely. The land-based system is capable of firing subsonic cruise missiles and Tomahawk land-attack missiles. With its 1,000-mile (1,600km) range, it will put parts of China in range. Unsurprisingly, China has strongly denounced the move.

Indeed, from the Chinese perspective, the maritime waters of East and Southeast Asia are looking increasingly crowded with a step-up of presence from other extra-regional powers. The three European countries with expeditionary naval capacity — France, Germany and the UK — have also regularly sent warships to the Indo-Pacific.

The German navy’s frigate deployment in September through the Taiwan Strait en route to the South China Sea drew expected criticism from China. In 2025, the Royal Navy plans to send a carrier strike group to the region with two Norwegian ships, including one frigate accompanying it (the last such deployment was in 2021). France and the UK have also reportedly discussed the option of a joint carrier deployment to the Indo-Pacific.

The region can expect China to continue to frame such deployments as provocative and destabilising to regional security. But how should Southeast Asian countries respond?

The region should accept that US-China strategic competition is a structural reality and that it will be a primary arena where this competition will play out. This cannot be wished away.

While there has been much handwringing about the level of US diplomatic engagement and commitment to the region, US defence engagements have remained largely consistent. Between 2003-2022, the US conducted 1,113 military exercises with 14 regional countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines. The corresponding figure for China is 128. As it has been argued by conservative strategist Elbridge Colby, tipped as a possible candidate for national security adviser under a prospective Trump 2.0 administration, the US will want to focus more on the Indo-Pacific, not less.

Under these circumstances, it is in Southeast Asia’s interests to welcome the independent involvement of extra-regional powers as a demonstration of their commitment to keep vital sea lanes of communication free and open amid greater US-China contestation.

As Germany has recently demonstrated, it is helpful that these powers are seen to be acting out of their own strategic interests, rather than at the behest of the US (which could invite more criticism from China that such moves are intended to hem in or intimidate it).

In fact, it should not be a bridge too far to advocate for more frequent exercises between Southeast Asian navies and transiting navies from Europe. Such exercises promote interoperability between navies and, theoretically, help send deterrent signals to potential challengers to the status quo. They could also be an opportunity for more Southeast Asian countries to do their part to contribute to efforts to uphold the rights of freedom of navigation on the high seas.

Japan and Australia can participate in such exercises. Since 2017, Japan has sent its Izumo-class carriers and escort ships to the Indo-Pacific annually, conducting exercises with other middle powers such as Australia and Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Australia has a similar but smaller series of Indo-Pacific deployments called Indo-Pacific Endeavour.

Australia and Japan are growing security players in the region, and their participation in exercises between European navies and their Southeast Asian counterparts would underscore a shared commitment to regional stability.

There will be challenges. European navies deploy in the region only periodically. Southeast Asian navies lack the wherewithal to keep up with frequent military exercises. Such exercises would have some but not too significant a deterrent effect.

However, their value would lie in establishing and reinforcing norms that seek to uphold the current maritime rules of the road and keep the peace. Given the increasingly frequent confrontations between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea, there is little evidence to suggest that such initiatives are unnecessary.

This article was first published in Fulcrum, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute’s blogsite.

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