Why Japan is no closer to joining AUKUS

On 8 April, the defence ministers of AUKUS — Australia, the UK and the US — issued the AUKUS Defense Ministers’ Joint Statement, clearly expounding under the Pillar II section that they have recognised “Japan’s strengths and its close bilateral defence partnerships with all three countries” and are “considering cooperation with Japan on AUKUS Pillar II advanced capability projects”.

Two days later, Japan Prime Minister Fumio Kishida visited the US, with a similar line repeated in the United States-Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement.

Since the two events happened consecutively, people naturally concluded that Japan would be joining AUKUS.

Against the complex backdrop of intensifying China-US strategic rivalry, deteriorating China-Japan relations and the ramping up of the US’s containment strategy against China in the Indo-Pacific region, it seems natural and inevitable that Japan would join AUKUS.

First, Japan has close bilateral relations with the three AUKUS countries — it is a US ally, and its relations with the UK and Australia have rapidly warmed in recent years as well. The Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) entered into force on 13 August 2023 and took effect on 15 October later that year, whereby the entry procedures for each country’s forces are simplified, to carry out joint exercises and disaster relief.

Second, China is their common opponent or enemy. In international society, relations between countries are most stable when they share an enemy or adversary; at the same time, ideological similarities among the four countries strengthen mutual cooperation.

Third, the US’s active advancement. From the Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy to the Indo-Pacific strategy, three US administrations have considered China as the country’s main strategic competitor. The US hopes to strengthen cooperation with its allies to defend against a powerful enemy.

Next, Japan’s considerable strength in high-tech fields. Pillar II of AUKUS involves quantum technologies, undersea capabilities, artificial intelligence, hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities, electronic warfare capabilities, innovation and information sharing, and more. It is highly likely that the four countries will have strong chemistry in their cooperation in Pillar II. Thus, it is unsurprising that AUKUS could become JAUKUS.

But another school of thought believes in the reverse — they think that Japan still has a long way to go before it can join AUKUS. This belief encompasses two positions, the first one being “Japan’s initiative”.

Academics represented by Liu Jiangyong of Tsinghua University believe that after the Japanese government passed the revisions to the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy and the Defense Buildup Program on 16 December 2022, Japan’s defence strategy saw a major shift from “defence” to “offence”.

In order to become a “normal country” as soon as possible, the Kishida administration attempted to free Japan from Article 9 of the Constitution by joining AUKUS to become a de facto fully autonomous state. But the US does not buy this.

The other position is the “US blank cheque” perspective. On 13 May, Japanese Michito Tsuruoka, an international academic, wrote an article titled “Why AUKUS Will Not Become JAUKUS” published by the Diplomat. He said, “Even limited cooperation in specific areas in Pillar II on advanced defense technologies will prove difficult to fully implement, with challenges on both sides. Pillar I on nuclear-powered submarines will not involve other countries given the highly sensitive nature of the project.”

US and Japanese officials’ actions and words around the time of Kishida’s visit to the US also confirmed Tsuruoka’s viewpoint.

Prior to Kishida’s visit to the US, US ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel stated in an article carried by the Wall Street Journal on 5 April that Japan would become the first additional partner in AUKUS’s Pillar II.

However, Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi expressed on 8 April that no decision has been made with regard to cooperation with AUKUS.

On 10 April during the joint press conference with US President Joe Biden, Kishida was especially careful, stating that Japan has consistently supported AUKUS because it felt that the alliance contributed to the peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. But as for direct cooperation with AUKUS, Japan had not decided on anything yet.

Tsuruoka opined that this meant that there was a lack of enthusiasm from Japan on the prospect of joining AUKUS, pointing out that the timing of the AUKUS defence ministers’ meeting and the US-Japan summit, as well as the content of the respective joint statements, were all carefully crafted by the US.

I agree with Tsuruoka’s viewpoint. Both the AUKUS joint statement emphasising increased cooperation with Japan and the US-Japan joint statement urging greater Japanese collaboration with AUKUS can be seen as “blank cheques” offered by the US to entice Japan, encouraging Japan to assume a more proactive role in the US’s strategic competition with China in the Indo-Pacific region. Such actions could potentially lead to an Indo-Pacific crisis similar to Ukraine, ultimately advancing US interests.

There are many obstacles standing in the way of Japan joining AUKUS; besides what Tsuruoka pointed out about the highly exclusive nature of AUKUS Pillar I nuclear technologies, there are also aspects of extremely sensitive technological secrets for Pillar II. This level of secrecy goes beyond the Five Eyes alliance, which is why AUKUS is made up of only three countries in the Five Eyes whose interests were more aligned.

A third factor that impedes Japan’s joining AUKUS would be the cultural differences between Japan and the three countries. Peter Katzenstein, a renowned US international relations academic, pointed out in A World of Regions that culture was one of the foundations for the US forming military alliances.

Among the US’s alliances, the Five Eyes formed by countries with Anglo-Saxon culture occupied the highest tier, followed by NATO, which is composed of countries with a Christian culture. One of the reasons why there is no Asian version of NATO is because the US rejects forming any military organisation like NATO in regions without a common cultural basis.

Considering the two factors of culture and security, AUKUS is likely the top military alliance among all the alliances the US presently has; even New Zealand and Canada do not as yet make the cut to join in, much less Japan.

Hence, what seems to be Japan being a step away from joining AUKUS is in fact a farcical case of the US “deceiving” Japan while further disrupting order in the Indo-Pacific region. Even if Japan were to work with AUKUS in the future, it would only be in some marginal high-tech fields under Pillar II — far from the state of AUKUS becoming JAUKUS.

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “日本加入AUKUS只差临门一脚？”.

Related: Why AUKUS’s expansion is inevitable | If at first you don’t succeed: Australia woos the Indo-Pacific on AUKUS