China’s military leadership vacuum: A boon or bane for Taiwan?

Following last week’s removal of Central Military Commission (CMC) vice-chairman Zhang Youxia and CMC member Liu Zhenli, only top leader Xi Jinping and CMC vice-chairman Zhang Shengmin remain in the CMC. 

Eyes are on how this will affect the ability of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to attack Taiwan, with Taiwanese academics assessing that even as the timeline for an offensive against Taiwan by the mainland may be strategically shortened in the short term, competition among younger generals to fill the vacancies, coupled with their eagerness to demonstrate loyalty, could also spark greater aggressiveness towards Taiwan.

China’s Ministry of National Defense announced on 24 January that Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli — who also serves as chief of staff of the CMC Joint Staff Department — are suspected of serious violations of discipline and law. Following deliberation by the CCP Central Committee, it was decided that both would be placed under formal investigation.

This means that within the current CMC, which began its term in 2022, five generals — including He Weidong, Li Shangfu and Miao Hua, in addition to Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli — have now fallen, leaving only Xi Jinping still in office. The sole remaining general on the CMC is Zhang Shengmin, who last year replaced He Weidong as a CMC vice-chairman. Zhang also concurrently serves as director of the CMC Joint Operations Command Center.

However, Zhang Shengmin has long overseen discipline-related work and lacks operational combat experience. With the fall of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli — two of the very few senior officers with actual combat experience — the top echelon of China’s military leadership is now almost entirely devoid of commanders with real-world operational command experience.

Since abolishing the longstanding “four general departments” system in 2016 — a structure under the CMC that had concentrated power and resources — China has instead established multiple functional departments directly under the CMC. These bodies serve as advisory, executive and support organs of the commission, enabling the CMC chairman to issue directives more directly down the chain of command. As a result, decision-making pathways have been shortened and obstacles to cross-service coordination reduced.

A closer look at the backgrounds and posts held by these fallen senior officers shows that Li Shangfu and Liu Zhenli both had headed the Joint Staff Department, which is responsible for joint operations, exercises and operational planning. Before his downfall, He Weidong served as director of the CMC Joint Operations Command Center, the highest operational command authority.

In addition, He Weidong previously served as commander of the Eastern Theater Command, which is responsible for the main assault forces in a Taiwan contingency. After then US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022, it was He who oversaw the planning of the PLA’s large-scale encirclement exercises around the island.

With the CMC leadership now facing a vacuum of combat experience, and with key posts in joint operations planning left successively vacant, observers are paying close attention to whether the PLA’s combat readiness and operational capabilities have declined, potentially affecting its ability to attack Taiwan.

However, just one day before Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were placed under investigation, the PLA once again launched a “joint combat readiness patrol” around the Taiwan Strait. This marked the third such patrol conducted by the mainland since the beginning of the year.

According to Taiwan’s military, the PLA deployed 26 aircraft in a single day, with 18 crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait and entering northern, central and southwestern airspace. In addition, six PLA naval vessels continued operations around the strait. On the same day, Taiwan also detected a Chinese drifting balloon traversing airspace near the island.

These deployments did not differ significantly from previous joint combat readiness patrols, indicating that such routine military actions directed at Taiwan have not been visibly affected by turbulence in the PLA’s senior leadership.

In response, Lin Ying-Yu, an associate professor at the Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies at Tamkang University, told Lianhe Zaobao that under current conditions the PLA’s approach to a Taiwan operation may be “strategically relatively cautious, but tactically more proactive”.

He pointed out, “There is no one with real experience commanding troops” at the level of the CMC at present, which could impose practical constraints on the planning of joint operations or large-scale military actions.

However, Lin believes that naval and air operations in surrounding waters, as well as grey-zone activities, are more likely to continue. He noted that actions such as joint combat readiness patrols not only serve to demonstrate domestically that the PLA can continue functioning after leadership changes, but also send a signal to neighbouring countries that its combat capability is not immediately weakened by personnel reshuffles.

Shen Ming-Shih, a research fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research’s Division of National Security Research, also told Lianhe Zaobao that the PLA’s joint operations system extends from the CMC’s Joint Operations Command Center all the way down to grassroots brigade-level command posts. Even if there are personnel changes involving the chief of staff of the joint staff department or a vice-chairman, deputies can assume acting roles in the short term, allowing the organisation to maintain its basic functions.

However, Shen also pointed out that the PLA’s joint operations capabilities are not yet fully mature in areas such as command, control, communications, information, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, as well as data-link integration. Based on past large-scale exercises targeting Taiwan, there remain shortcomings in command integration between the Rocket Force, group armies and theatre commands, indicating that the effectiveness of joint operations is still in need of long-term coordination and refinement. 

Thus, what truly warrants close observation is whether new personnel arrangements will bring about a period of adjustment, and whether existing operational patterns will be altered as a result.

Meanwhile, Lin cautioned that personnel shake-ups could also affect the behavioural pattern of mid- to senior-level officers.

He noted that a new wave of relatively younger officers is certain to be promoted, and that some commanders at the theatre-command level may be inclined to demonstrate loyalty or seek advancement through more assertive actions, potentially giving rise to the problem of “putting political loyalty before professional competence”.

Lin pointed out that such structural changes could affect the PLA’s personnel and professional culture in the long term. He believes that if promotion and trust depended more on political factors than on professional competence, the outside world would naturally question the PLA’s actual combat effectiveness.

Meanwhile, Shen believes that while the PLA’s high-level personnel shake-up may affect decision-making on a Taiwan operation, whether such an operation is ultimately carried out still depends on internal readiness and the external environment.

He said that beyond the PLA’s internal personnel and military readiness, whether it would use force against Taiwan still heavily depends on external circumstances, including US policy, the trajectory of regional conflicts, and political developments within Taiwan. Shen believes these external factors remain key variables influencing Beijing’s decision-making.

Overall, Taiwan academics generally believe that the structural changes at the core of the CMC will, in the short term, require the PLA to adjust and coordinate its operational planning and command functions. While the political direction of Beijing’s push for reunification with Taiwan remains unchanged, the tempo, conditions and decision-making processes of related military actions now present greater uncertainties worthy of close observation.

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “中共军委高层真空或使攻台战略短期收缩”.

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