Does socialist North Korea have any friends left?
As Pyongyang leans ever closer to Moscow, its relations with China and other socialist states remain strained. With sanctions, nuclear tensions and diverging interests, North Korea’s circle of friends is narrowing fast. Japanese academic Atsuhito Isozaki gives his analysis.
North Korea has been steadily deepening its relationship with Russia across multiple fields, yet its ties with China have been fraught and uneven. North Korean state media frequently runs favourable coverage of Russian President Vladimir Putin, while scarcely mentioning Chinese President Xi Jinping.
In January, Kim Jong Un’s letter to Putin was prominently reported as headline news; by contrast, the exchange of New Year greetings with Xi was glossed over, with coverage limited to citing only the official titles “General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and President of the People’s Republic of China.”
While China and North Korea have had a military alliance since 1961, this alliance does not necessarily function effectively when crises arise. Because of this, North Korea has long sought to advance its nuclear and missile programmes through self-reliance. However, the Xi administration has consistently opposed North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons, a stance that has become a source of Kim Jong Un’s dissatisfaction.
... such a one-sided tilt toward Russia does not fully align with North Korea’s diplomatic philosophy, which centres on autonomy.
Ties with Russia and China
Against this backdrop, North Korea has gradually shifted toward strengthening its ties with Putin. Despite economic sanctions, North Korea has been able to export large quantities of weapons, and the Putin government has openly expressed support for North Korea’s military buildup. For Pyongyang, pursuing a pro-Russia path has thus been the most natural choice.
That said, such a one-sided tilt toward Russia does not fully align with North Korea’s diplomatic philosophy, which centres on autonomy. Accordingly, since last autumn, Pyongyang has also begun efforts to repair its relationship with China. In September, Kim Jong Un attended the commemoration of the 80th anniversary of victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan held in Beijing, and held his first summit with Xi Jinping in six years. In October, on the occasion of the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Workers’ Party of Korea, China’s second-ranking leader, Premier Li Qiang, visited Pyongyang. Nevertheless, deep-seated mutual distrust persists between the two sides, and high-level exchanges soon fell back into stagnation.
Socialist ties, uneven ground
Even so, North Korea continues to pursue diplomatic diversification in its own way. At the October celebrations, Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary To Lam and Dmitry Medvedev, head of Russia’s ruling United Russia party, were both in attendance, while Lao President Thongloun Sisoulith made the trip to offer congratulations. Apart from Russia, strengthening solidarity with other socialist countries was explicitly identified by Kim Jong Un in his speech as a key diplomatic direction.
Only five socialist states remain today, including North Korea, yet forging close unity with them is by no means easy for Pyongyang.
Notably, the only socialist country absent from these events was Cuba. Although Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel held a summit with Kim Jong Un in 2018, Cuba had established diplomatic relations with South Korea in early 2025 despite strong opposition from North Korea. This episode has continued to cast a shadow over bilateral ties.
Every New Year’s Day, Kim Jong Un sends a message of congratulations marking the victory of the Cuban Revolution in 1959. Yet this year’s message, like last year’s, consisted of only a single, perfunctory sentence, making North Korea’s dissatisfaction with Cuba all too evident.
Only five socialist states remain today, including North Korea, yet forging close unity with them is by no means easy for Pyongyang. The reasons lie in significant differences among these countries in their approaches toward relations with the US and South Korea, as well as in their economic policies.
As for the Vietnam-North Korea summit held in Pyongyang last year, North Korean media offered only a cursory report, whereas Vietnamese outlets disclosed far more concrete details, as both leaders agreed to strengthen exchanges of delegations at all levels. Vietnam expressed its willingness to share experience in reform and opening-up and in managing external economic relations, and voiced hopes of expanding cooperation in tourism, as well as jointly producing radio and television programmes introducing each other’s cultures.
The key issue, however, is whether countries can truly activate economic relations with North Korea under the framework of United Nations Security Council sanctions. Vietnam, at least, places great importance on international rules, and despite being a fellow socialist state, strictly enforces sanctions on North Korea. All North Korean restaurants in Hanoi have been closed, and the only North Koreans now residing in Vietnam are embassy staff and their families.
Whether the Putin regime or the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, both will eventually come to an end. North Korea cannot rely on Russia alone indefinitely.
Returns on investment?
Many observers believe that North Korea has reaped substantial returns by exporting weapons to Russia and dispatching personnel. As sanctions on North Korea have in effect become increasingly hollow, Pyongyang hopes that neighbouring socialist countries will also “go with the flow” and gradually strengthen bilateral economic ties.
Kim Jong Un’s expression to Xi Jinping of a desire to develop China-North Korea trade is a matter of public record. Yet frictions surrounding North Korea’s nuclear development persist, imposing inherent limits on any rapprochement. Vietnam and Laos, unless they stand to gain extraordinary benefits of their own, are likewise unlikely to openly violate UN sanctions and expand trade with North Korea.
Whether the Putin regime or the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, both will eventually come to an end. North Korea cannot rely on Russia alone indefinitely. Whether Kim Jong Un can put forward a practical and workable strategy to broaden North Korea’s “circle of friends” remains a focal point of continued international attention.
