Geopolitical shifts: Russia’s eastward pivot and China’s western push
Academic Yerkin Nazarbay says that without the currently escalating Russia-Ukraine war in Europe, the Kremlin would not be able to openly and justifiably initiate its eastward development strategy.
Amid the increasingly intense competition among the US, China and Russia, there has been significant international media attention on the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Russia and China, which was established just one day after the founding of the People’s Republic of China.
Furthermore, there is the deepening new trends and strategic choices in the international geopolitical landscape — that is, the strategic cooperation and competition between major powers on the two continents in the new millennium, based on the Russia-Ukraine war, the new Cold War between the US and China, and the conflict in Gaza.
In other words, in the new international relations framework characterised by geopolitical confrontation, how will Russia’s “Far East development” strategy, which started with the war in Ukraine, interact with or impact China’s Western Region Development Strategy, which has been ongoing for nearly 25 years?
Can the local geopolitical and economic effects stemming from the opposing East-West strategies of China and Russia directly or indirectly alter the global geopolitical balance tied to the new Cold War between the US and China? In what ways will the concurrent Gaza conflict and shifts in the Middle East reshape the power balance in the Indo-Pacific region and inland Eurasia?
Russia is clearly focusing on the past and remembering history, while China emphasises building on the present and looking to the future.
These are the three core focal points that are receiving significant international attention. The breadth and scope of these issues are unprecedented, with each unique characteristic and detail potentially triggering unexpected domino effects.
China and Russia’s ‘no limits’ relations
Based on information from Russian news agency Sputnik and the official website of the Chinese embassy in Russia on the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations, Russia is clearly focusing on the past and remembering history, while China emphasises building on the present and looking to the future.
For Moscow, the strategic partnership between Russia and China must be rooted in the Sino-Russia connections and support for China that characterised the early years of “new China”, a sense of gratitude conducive to the economic prosperity of Russia’s Far East and political stability in the Indo-Pacific region.
In contrast, Beijing has high hopes for a Sino-Russian strategic partnership, based on non-aggression and mutually beneficial coexistence as outlined in the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation (the 2001 Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship) established in the new millennium, rather than a reassessment of past grievances.
Ultimately, the concept of a “no-limits” partnership between China and Russia, as described by Foreign Minister and then Chinese State Councilor Wang Yi in 2021 as part of the principles of Sino-Russian strategic cooperation — no end limits, no forbidden areas and no upper bounds — serves as both a summary and a forward-looking statement marking the 20th anniversary of the signing of the Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship. The implementation of this concept hinges on the unshakeable bilateral consensus within the framework of the overland Silk Road Economic Belt of no obstacles, no exclusion and no restrictions.
However, it has been proven that sustaining these “three Nos” in Sino-Russian strategic cooperation is challenging. First, the outbreak of Kazakhstan’s “Bloody January” in 2022, which, with the successful intervention of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), compelled China to adopt a wait-and-see approach. Second, the full-scale Russia-Ukraine war and its prolonged stalemate have naturally divided the overland geopolitical and economic connections between China and Europe. Finally, the reversal of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the escalation of the Gaza conflict have severely restricted China’s influence in the Middle East to areas south of the Hindu Kush mountain range.
In light of this, Beijing must adhere to the corrective principle of no alliances, no confrontation and no targeting of third parties in order to avoid returning to the old path reminiscent of the Sino-Soviet antagonism. Otherwise, the overall strategic pressure from the US will be focused on either one of them, leading to unimaginable consequences.
Strategic outcomes of China’s western region development
It is well known that the current China-Russia relationship is fundamentally similar to the ancient conflicts between the Xiongnu and Han peoples, the continuation of a millennium-long vertical competition across the Eurasian steppes. The biggest difference now is that there is no longer a “Southern Xiongnu” tribe for the Central Plains powers to exploit — any form of fragmentation on the steppes will no longer produce a direct Attila-like threat to the European continent.
The strategy of “using barbarians to counter barbarians” has become a thing of the past, and Russia is no longer the sole “steppe empire” in the Eurasian core region. Mongolia and the five Central Asian countries are neither land power buffers nor the backyard of a great power. Only the historical precedent of Han dynastry diplomat Zhang Qian’s mission to the western regions is still regarded as a feasible approach. The strategy of “uniting with the west to counter the north” remains a steadfast policy.
The result is a rise of great powers striving for dominance, advancing westwards into Russia’s traditional sphere of influence... a brand new railway-based geopolitical and economic order that can match Russia but centred around Xinjiang.
What is certain is that six major geopolitical incidents catalysed the emergence of a Eurasian version of the “western development” strategy: the establishment of diplomatic relations between the US and China during the Mao Zedong era; the reform and opening-up initiated by Deng Xiaoping; the economic globalisation under Jiang Zemin; along with the geopolitical events of Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union; the dissolution of the Soviet Union under Boris Yeltsin; and the international counter-terrorism efforts during Vladimir Putin’s tenure.
The result is a rise of great powers striving for dominance, advancing westwards into Russia’s traditional sphere of influence — the border areas that lie at the crossroads of Central Europe and the Middle East, specifically Transoxiana, the South Caucasus, and the western steppes of Southern Russia — a brand new railway-based geopolitical and economic order that can match Russia but centred around Xinjiang.
Among these roles, the strategic mission of “New Sevastopol” is to ensure uninterrupted passage through three major north-south straits: the Malacca Strait, the Taiwan Strait and the Tsushima Strait.
Strategic vision of Russia’s Far East development
While major Russian Far Eastern border cities such as Vladivostok, Ussuriysk, Khabarovsk and Blagoveshchensk, as well as the inland region of Siberia bordering Lake Baikal and the coastal areas to the west, are still recognised or tacitly accepted by the Chinese as the modern territories of “Haishenwai (海参崴, Vladivostok), Shuangchengzi (双城子, Ussuriysk), Boli (伯力, Khabarovsk), Miaojie (庙街, Nikolayevsk-na-Amure, a town in Khabarovsk), Beihai (北海, Lake Baikal) and Outer Northeast (外东北, Outer Manchuria), the Russians have likewise not forgotten Dalniy city (Dalian/Russian Dalian, also known as Kvantunskaya Oblast) and Port Arthur (Lushun) near the end of the Chinese Eastern Railway during the time of tsarist Russia, as well as the iconic Saint Sophia Cathedral in the heart of Harbin, the “Moscow of the East”.
During Russian President Putin’s high-profile visit to Harbin Institute of Technology on 17 May this year, he emphasised that the university was established over a century ago by Russian professionals as a modern training centre for the development of railway infrastructure in the continental landmass west of the Pacific. This long-standing relationship with Russia is one of the main reasons for the close ties between the institution and Russia since its inception.
Before the Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship expires in 2026, Vladivostok remains the core of Russia’s Far East development strategy, a true “New Moscow of the East”, as well as the highly anticipated “New Sevastopol” and a “New St. Petersburg” oriented toward Southeast Asia.
Among these roles, the strategic mission of “New Sevastopol” is to ensure uninterrupted passage through three major north-south straits: the Malacca Strait, the Taiwan Strait and the Tsushima Strait. The economies along these maritime routes will serve as geopolitical lifelines and major maritime arteries for the future “New Moscow of the East”.
In contrast, the historical mission of “New St. Petersburg” is to convey to the world that its hinterland is no longer an inaccessible frontier, but rather a great Siberia integrated with Moscovy, while the western Pacific is viewed as the “New Baltic Sea”, continuing the maritime traditions of Peter the Great and representing Russia’s historically inseparable sacred territory and homeland.
Without the currently escalating Russia-Ukraine war in Europe, the Kremlin would not be able to openly and justifiably initiate its eastward development strategy, which involves relocating its defence and military-industrial system to the east.
Strategic layout of Russia’s ‘eastern Moscow’
Without the currently escalating Russia-Ukraine war in Europe, the Kremlin would not be able to openly and justifiably initiate its eastward development strategy, which involves relocating its defence and military-industrial system to the east.
This is because the central authorities in Moscow have to address urgent needs by fighting fire with fire, significantly increasing the geopolitical strategic pressure on itself in the western region. This is done first by maximising the impact of the geopolitical challenges posed by NATO and the EU, then releasing without reservation all internal and external pressures eastward, allowing the resultant chaos to flow from west to east into the western Pacific, where land and sea powers converge.
All the while it is quietly observing and adapting, ensuring that the US-China new Cold War does not spill over into Russian Asia, while simultaneously leveraging the situation to resolve long-standing border issues in the Far East, thus preventing previous safeguards from becoming mere “historical documents”.
The Russian proverb “Moscow was not built in a day” is equivalent to the Western saying “Rome was not built in a day”, suggesting that “eastern Moscow” is not only the “fourth Rome” of the future Christian world but also the “second Rome” of Russian Eurasia, and even the “first Rome” of Asia, representing an enduring sacred lineage.
To this end, the Kremlin must establish counterparts to the “New Moscow of the East” in the Russian Far East, by developing the “Belarus of the East” on the Korean Peninsula and the “Ukraine of the East” in the Manchurian Plain, to create a sustainable urban cluster in the Far East while also forming a new strategic buffer zone. This would effectively eliminate all forms of geopolitical land and maritime risks.
This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “俄国“东部大开发” VS 中国“西部大开发””.
