How the US presidential election could shape India’s China strategy

During the sixth Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) leaders’ summit in the US on 21 September, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his counterparts announced new initiatives to solidify areas of cooperation and to set up the Quad to endure for the long term.

In his bilateral meeting with US President Joe Biden, Modi conveyed his appreciation for the “unparalleled contributions” made by Biden in “giving impetus to the India-US partnership”. Modi was keen to ensure India’s continued strategic cooperation with the US, especially when the Biden administration is in the terminal stage, and the ongoing presidential race hints at a probable return of former President Trump to the White House. Modi was careful in navigating this uncertain political landscape.

At this time, top on Modi’s mind would be to consolidate gains made under Biden while preparing for potential shifts in the US foreign policy, ensuring that India’s strategic interests remain safeguarded, regardless of the outcome of the 2024 US elections. This is especially in the context of addressing the “China threat”, which has been the central pillar of the India-US strategic partnership in the past ten years and a driving force behind their deepening defence and economic cooperation, with the Quad serving as an effective platform.

The Quad’s effectiveness in the counter-China strategy is clear from Beijing’s annoyance over the Quad: it has alleged that the minilateral grouping is “steeped in the obsolete Cold War and zero-sum mentality and reeks of military confrontation” and it “runs counter to the trend of the times and is doomed to be rejected”. This reaction underscores China’s growing unease as the Quad solidifies its role in curbing Beijing’s expanding influence in the Indo-Pacific, mainly through joint military exercises, economic partnerships and strategic security initiatives. 

For India, the Quad is a continuation of the Modi administration’s effective turnaround in Indian foreign policy, moving from historical hesitation in engaging with the US and a non-aligned stance to aligning with like-minded countries in response to new threats emerging on its eastern border. The border conflict with China in June 2020 at the Galwan Valley along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) resulted in the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers during violent clashes with the Chinese Army, marking one of the most deadly military confrontations between the two nations in decades. 

While India took preventive measures to tackle the Chinese aggression at the LAC, including heavy deployment of the army personnel at the LAC, and blocking 400 Chinese apps such as TikTok, WeChat, PubG, etc., it doubled up efforts to align with the US to jointly “de-risk” their respective economies and diversify away from strategic dependencies on Beijing.

Despite this, India and the US recognise that China cannot be ignored. For instance, China remained the fourth-largest trading partner of the US, with total trade amounting to US$575 billion in 2023. Similarly, China was India’s top trading partner, with trade between the two countries reaching US$136.98 billion in the same year.

Acknowledging this challenge in addressing the China challenge, the US developed IAC — invest, align, compete — a strategy that Secretary of State Antony Blinken laid out in a speech in 2022. The strategy seeks to strengthen the US’s competitive position and secure its interests and values “while carefully managing this vital relationship” with China.

Throughout the Biden administration, the US has said that competition with China “does not have to lead to conflict, confrontation, or a new Cold War” and that the US intends on “responsibly managing competition” — in terms of trade, military, technology and geopolitical influence. India has been a critical partner in this regard.

For instance, the American semiconductor sector saw a remarkable shift with the CHIPS and Science Act 2022, which incentivised the industry and pushed for more R&D and an immediate rise in investments crucial to stymie critical tech from falling into Beijing’s hands.

Building on this momentum, on 9 September, the US State Department announced a partnership with the India Semiconductor Mission under India’s Ministry of Electronics and IT. This partnership aims to explore “opportunities and diversifying the global semiconductor ecosystem under the International Technology Security and Innovation Fund” created by the CHIPS Act 2022. 

What follows towards the alignment is economic de-risking through trade diversification to avoid strategic dependencies that have, in a China-led world order, become a global challenge for the economies worldwide, especially those in the global south.

Key examples of alignment included initiatives like iCET — initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET) in 2023 — bringing Washington and Delhi closer in sectors like space, semiconductors, advanced telecommunications, artificial intelligence, etc. On 21 September, the US and India also announced the setting up of a semiconductor fabrication plant in India, which will be supported by the India Semiconductor Mission and a strategic technology partnership between Bharat Semi, 3rdiTech and the US Space Force.

These efforts reflect a deepening of India-US ties, positioning both countries to shape the technological and geopolitical landscape of the future collaboratively.

Therefore, India and the US have a long way to go in advancing their cooperation in sectors like science and technology, defence partnerships, and energy by deepening strategic convergences. Today, India and the US are among the closest partners in the world — “a partnership of democracies looking into the 21st century with hope, ambition, and confidence” as defined by the India-US “Comprehensive Global and Strategic Partnership”, which is “anchored in a new level of trust and mutual understanding and enriched by the warm bonds of family and friendship that inextricably link our countries together”.

It is unlikely that there will be any significant shifts if Trump returns to office. Prime Minister Modi and President Trump have shared a strong personal rapport, evident from high-profile events like “Howdy, Modi!” in Houston, Texas, in September 2019 and “Namaste Trump” in Ahmedabad, India, in 2020.

Their past mutual admiration and strategic alignment reflect those key initiatives, especially ones involving counter-China elements, would remain intact. Agreements in areas like science and technology, defence, cyber and critical technology have received a bipartisan nod. Therefore, the partnership will endure any bumps ahead.

However, considering Donald Trump has been no big fan of multilateral forums such as NATO and the WTO, it will be crucial to observe whether he adopts a similar stance towards minilateral forums like Quad. His stance could significantly affect the forum’s effectiveness, particularly in addressing the “China challenge”.

Additionally, suppose a Trump presidency manages to improve relations with China, this might result in a decreased US interest or engagement in the Quad’s activities — a phenomenon that was observed in Australia-China ties in 2008, when Canberra withdrew from the first iteration of the Quad.

Recent advancements in China-Australia ties, especially an important visit by China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Australia in March 2024 — after seven years by a high-level Chinese official — were seen as a breakthrough amid Beijing’s trade restrictions on Australia. Shortly after, Chinese tariffs on Australian wine were announced to be lifted, opening a large market for a large wine producer.

If Australia takes Chinese concerns in a transactional spirit with trade taking the lead, the possibility of Canberra not wanting to complicate its engagement with Beijing and thus opting for a cautious rethinking over Quad may get real. 

Additionally, India is upping its bilateral engagements with key partners in the Indo-Pacific region and reiterating its traditional ties with Russia, Europe and the Islamic world.

In the first 100 days of Modi 3.0, there have been extensive high-level visits from Vietnam and Malaysia, and Modi recently travelled to Brunei and Singapore. India is putting forward its version of “ASEAN centrality”, which not only explores deeper trade and economic ties but also emphasises defence cooperation.

Additionally, Modi travelled to Russia in July and Poland and Ukraine in August, marking India’s rise as a key negotiator for bringing peace in Europe. At the same time, he sought reassurances from Russia on energy supplies and economic cooperation amid global geopolitical tensions, particularly in the context of increasing competition and strategic manoeuvring with China.

Related: Modi’s Ukraine trip: Is India a better peace messenger than China? | Enduring bonds: India-Russia ties amid Western pressure