Modi 3.0: Charting India’s course in the face of the dragon

Prime Minister Modi was sworn in for the third consecutive time as the Prime Minister of India. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) also became the first non-Congress Party in India’s democratic history to form a government for the third consecutive time.

Despite the BJP’s success in forming the government, it has suffered a major electoral defeat as it failed to cross the majority mark of 272 out of 543 seats in the lower house of the parliament, the Lok Sabha. Therefore, unlike in his past two terms, Prime Minister Modi will lead a coalition government.

While the electoral downsizing puts a dent in the BJP’s overconfidence, it calms the critics of Indian democracy in the West, who feel the BJP’s Hindutva ideology undermines minority voices and contributes to democratic decay. Meanwhile, the rise of strong opposition is the key highlight of these elections, serving as a crucial check and balance on the BJP and ensuring a more inclusive and balanced approach to government policies.

The outcomes of the elections took all political pundits by surprise. The BJP was expecting a smooth victory premised on Modi’s image as a doer who succeeded in making India the 5th largest economy in the world. It was also counting on the votes of the majority Hindu population; this was considered a sure thing after it supported the construction of a Ram Temple at Ayodhya, the birthplace of Hindu lord Rama. Prime Minister Modi inaugurated the temple in January 2024.

In the event, though the BJP succeeded in convincing the majority Hindu population, the minorities, especially Muslims, seem to have not taken it well. Additionally, the BJP appears to have been undermined by the Congress Party-led opposition, which succeeded in infusing the fears of constitutional decay in case the BJP won for the third time.

Interestingly, BJP kicked off its electoral campaign by talking about Modi’s development politics, but soon, the campaign missed coherence and the opposition took the chance to convincingly raise the issues of unemployment and inflation. The “Modi wave” was also stymied by local issues that people were more concerned with rather than national leadership.

The resultant coalition government now curtails the BJP’s complete dominance. Coalition partners have bargained for several key ministerial portfolios and as the administration progresses, differences of views may disrupt the smooth running of the government.

However, Prime Minister Modi has been able to retain important ministries for the BJP leadership and has reappointed Home Affairs Minister Amit Shah, Finance Minister Nirmala Sitaraman, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, who all seemed to have done well in their portfolios in Modi’s second term (2019-2024).

By retaining these ministries, the BJP is reflecting on the priorities of Modi 3.0, which were laid out in its election manifesto, including strong law and order, making India the third-largest economy by 2027, and building robust border and security infrastructure on India’s western and eastern borders with Pakistan and China, respectively. Not to mention ensuring India’s status as a “Vishwaguru” (world leader).

With Jaishankar’s leadership in foreign affairs continuing, the BJP-led coalition government promises to continue focusing on India’s neighbourhood, particularly countries in the Himalayas and the Indian Ocean.

In his first term, Modi introduced the “Neighbourhood First” policy aimed at deepening ties with the member countries of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), including Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, following Pakistan’s noncompliance in curtailing its support to the terror industry, Delhi has frozen all its communication with Islamabad.

Among the world leaders congratulating Modi was Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, but Sharif’s message did not convey the warmth that Delhi had been expecting for the past several decades. Pakistan is now left to the dealings of India’s national security agencies and nothing beyond that.

Afghanistan, on the other hand, puts India in a dilemma as to whether to recognise the Taliban government or not. Despite sharing goodwill with the people of Afghanistan and hosting a large Afghan refugee population in India, Delhi hesitates to trust the Taliban due to their close links with Pakistan and China.

While Modi ducked inviting leaders from Pakistan and Afghanistan to the inauguration of his government on 9 June due to its strategic calculations, he invited leaders from Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Mauritius, and Seychelles, exhibiting continuity of India’s “Neighborhood First” policy and the Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) vision.

Delhi is aiming to consolidate its regional influence, especially in response to the growing China challenge across the Himalayas and the Indian Ocean. India is also devising strategies to enhance its capability to engage with Indian Ocean countries in case of a potential Trump presidency to address the China threat.

So far, minilaterals like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue Forum (Quad) have not explicitly said that they see China as a primary challenge. Besides, the possibility of the US withdrawing from minilateral groupings, including Quad, looms large if Donald Trump makes a comeback in the White House.

Moreover, India has had challenges in Sri Lanka and continues to face an anti-India government in the Maldives. While damage control in Sri Lanka and the Maldives will be important for Modi 3.0 from a global trade and security perspective, countering Chinese manoeuvrings in Mauritius and Seychelles is critical for India’s Indian Ocean strategy.

Following the Galwan Valley clashes in 2020, no political dialogue has taken place besides military-level talks. However, soon after Prime Minister Modi won the third term, the newly appointed Chinese ambassador to India, Xu Feihong posted on X: “Look forward to making joint efforts with the Indian side for a sound and stable China-India relationship, which is in line with the interests and expectations of both countries, the region and the world.”

Following the Chinese ambassador’s congratulatory wishes, Chinese state media China Daily put up a taunting editorial stating: “With India’s parliamentary election result hopefully reducing the jingoism in India, there is no need for the territorial dispute in the border region between the two neighbours to be hyped up and allowed to define the overall bilateral ties.” The editorial further warned India of the risks of decoupling amid growing bilateral trade between India and China (this stands at US$118.4 billion in FY 2023-24).

More surprising is China’s perception that the West influences India’s stance on the border conflict. On the contrary, India is rightfully demanding the restoration of the status quo ante of April 2020 along the LAC. Notably, Modi received a congratulatory message from Premier Li Qiang but not from Xi Jinping.

There are several reasons for Xi’s silence, one of which could be his unwillingness to open dialogue at the top level, potentially weakening China’s territorial claims. This diplomatic snub highlights the ongoing tension between the two nations and underscores the complexity of resolving border disputes in the current geopolitical climate.

India’s insistence on China returning to the pre-2020 status quo reflects Delhi’s determination to uphold India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. There are low possibilities of Modi and Xi meeting on the sidelines of the SCO summit in Kazakhstan (July), the UN General Assembly (September) and the BRICS summit in Russia (October) later this year, and producing any tangible results.

However, the “no limits” strategic partnership between India’s traditional ally Russia and its arch-rival China is more pressing for India. This cooperation has already diminished prospects for peace in Ukraine, and the possibility of Russia framing the India-China border conflict in a Western context further worries India about securing global support. This dynamic complicates India’s diplomatic strategy, emphasising the need for a nuanced approach to balancing relationships with these global players.

Modi 3.0’s foreign and defence policy largely focuses on countering Chinese influence in the region and aiming to elevate India’s global leadership role.

While Modi chose neighbouring Bhutan for his first foreign visits in 2014 and 2019, he opted to visit Italy for his third term to participate in the G7 summit, where India was invited as an outreach member. During this visit, Prime Minister Modi held talks with his Italian counterpart, Giorgia Meloni, who had just had an astounding victory in the European Parliament elections. There are indications that India seeks to strengthen its ties with the West, especially as traditional alliances, including with Russia, undergo changes.

Also, Modi 3.0 will see a robust partnership with the US, India’s second-largest trading partner and a significant strategic ally. The relationship has flourished through enhanced defence industrial cooperation, the US-India initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET), the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), and the 2+2 ministerial dialogue.

Additionally, India seeks to strengthen its role as a credible voice for the global south. India showcased its diplomatic prowess by achieving a 100% consensus-based Delhi Declaration at the G20 Summit in New Delhi last year. As major powers vie for global influence, India, as a regional power, finds the global south a suitable platform to assert its leadership and expand its diplomatic reach.

In conclusion, with a range of foreign policy priorities shaping Modi’s third term, his upcoming meetings with global leaders, including Xi Jinping, will be closely watched.

While opening a political dialogue with China could help ease tensions on India’s eastern border, it remains unlikely. China has recently stationed its advanced J-20 twinjet all-weather stealth fifth-generation fighter aircraft near the border with India, prompting India to bolster its own border infrastructure in response to the China threat.

Additionally, India’s quest for a leadership role in the global south will further face competition from China, with Beijing opening up its deep pockets, and matching that will be critical for India.

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