How will China fill its military leadership vacuum?
With the recent personnel upheaval in China’s military, the army’s professional competence and judgment will be affected in the short term. Lianhe Zaobao associate China news editor Sim Tze Wei takes a look at the options ahead to fill the leadership vacuum.
A major personnel shake-up has hit the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s Central Military Commission (CMC), with its second-in-command Zhang Youxia and Joint Staff Department chief of staff Liu Zhenli both officially announced as having fallen from power, sending ripples through the system.
From seven members down to two
Following an announcement by China’s Ministry of National Defense on 24 January, the current CMC leadership, which comprised seven members after the 2022 reshuffle, has been reduced to just two: CMC Chairman Xi Jinping and Vice-Chairman Zhang Shengmin.
This rare situation has, in recent days, sparked analyses and conspiracy theories from various angles across overseas media and social media platforms.
Amid the spread of sensational and often far-fetched claims, Chinese President Xi met visiting Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo on 27 January, while Defence Minister Dong Jun also appeared the same day in a video call with Russian Defence Minister Andrei Belousov, with relevant footage and photographs being released by state media.
If Zhang Youxia’s downfall is linked to the failure to appoint new members to the CMC at the fourth plenum last October, the entire chain of information immediately becomes more multi-dimensional.
At the time, both Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were believed to have already come under suspicion, though the chain of evidence was not yet complete, and they remained in their CMC posts overseeing day-to-day work.
After He Weidong, Miao Hua and Li Shangfu fell from power, the 20th CMC was operating with only four members by the time the fourth plenum convened: Xi Jinping, Zhang Youxia, Liu Zhenli and Zhang Shengmin. Any addition of CMC members must be passed by a plenary session of the CCP Central Committee, making the fourth plenum a timely window for such appointments.
But surprisingly, only Zhang Shengmin — then a CMC member and secretary of the Discipline Inspection Commission — was promoted to vice-chairman, with no new CMC members appointed at all, leaving the commission’s leadership still not at full strength.
... the next window to observe any additions to the CMC falls to the fifth plenum, expected at the next Central Committee meeting later this year.
Few eligible candidates to fill the vacuum
Zhang Youxia’s official downfall announced on 24 January has also shed light on why the CMC leadership failed to be rebuilt at the fourth plenum.
At the time, both Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were believed to have already come under suspicion, though the chain of evidence was not yet complete, and they remained in their CMC posts overseeing day-to-day work. Under such circumstances, any candidate promoted to CMC membership would not have gained the trust of the top leader, making it impossible to rebuild the commission’s leadership.
With the downfall of Zhang and Liu, the question of when the CMC leadership can be rebuilt has once again become a focal point of external attention.
The upcoming Two Sessions in March — annual sessions of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference — offer a crucial window into Chinese politics. The plenary meeting of the PLA delegation is certain to attract intense attention, and media outlets are expected to pull out all the stops in attempts to question the PLA representatives.
However, according to procedure, the Two Sessions do not have the authority to appoint new CMC members; they can only approve the appointments made by a plenary session of the CCP Central Committee. Therefore, the next window to observe any additions to the CMC falls to the fifth plenum, expected at the next Central Committee meeting later this year.
By convention, CMC members are drawn from officers holding the rank of full general. However, the swift and forceful anti-corruption campaign has all but wiped out the PLA’s top-ranked generals, leaving very few eligible candidates to serve as CMC members.
Sing Tao Daily reported in October last year that, according to incomplete statistics, 28 full generals had been removed or had “disappeared” in less than three years. At the fourth plenum, as many as 63% of military members of the Central Committee were absent.
A more probable outcome would be the addition of two members, forming a four-member commission — just over half of the original size — while using the transitional period to conduct extremely cautious vetting of candidates...
At the promotion ceremony for full generals held last December, footage aired on CCTV showed that apart from the two newly promoted generals, only four full generals were present: Zhang Youxia, Zhang Shengmin, Liu Zhenli and Dong Jun. Compared with the previous promotion ceremony, 16 full generals were absent. Following the subsequent downfall of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, there are two fewer full generals.
But while the CMC has been reduced to what is effectively a “two-member leadership”, it is believed that in key departments, such as the CMC Joint Staff Department, deputy officials are already acting in a caretaker capacity to maintain basic day-to-day operations.
Yang Zhibin and Han Shengyan, commanders of the Eastern and Central Theater Commands respectively — both promoted to full general last December — are highly likely candidates for elevation.
Possible scenarios
With more than a year to go before the leadership transition at the CCP’s 21st Party Congress, the question is whether this incomplete configuration of the CMC will persist until the transition, or whether changes will occur beforehand.
One possible scenario is that additional CMC members will be appointed at upcoming party plenums. It is highly unlikely, however, that the body would be restored to its full seven-member lineup. A more probable outcome would be the addition of two members, forming a four-member commission — just over half of the original size — while using the transitional period to conduct extremely cautious vetting of candidates, ensuring that no duplicitous or deceitful figures who hold divided loyalties are selected.
If so, Yang Zhibin and Han Shengyan, commanders of the Eastern and Central Theater Commands respectively — both promoted to full general last December — are highly likely candidates for elevation. The fact that they were promoted when the anti-corruption storm was at its fiercest indicates that they passed rigorous scrutiny, have no direct connection to the Zhang Youxia case, met the test of political loyalty, and are trusted by the CMC chairman.
Another possible scenario is that the CMC holds a promotion ceremony for full generals ahead of the PLA’s Army Day on 1 August this year, elevating several officers who have passed vetting. These newly promoted generals, however, may not be added to the current CMC, but instead groomed as candidates for the next CMC following the 21st Party Congress.
A third possibility is that the current “two-member” arrangement is maintained until the leadership transition, though this is considered less likely, as it may not conform to organisational norms.
Such a massive personnel upheaval is likely, in the short term, to exact a cost in terms of the PLA’s professional competence and judgment.
The sweeping move to bring down the second-ranking figure among the “second-generation communists” at the top of the PLA, according to an editorial in the PLA Daily, is intended to “drive the People’s Army to shed its skin and be reborn, injecting powerful momentum into the development of a strong military”, and to ensure that “the more thorough the anti-corruption campaign, the greater the confidence and resolve to achieve the centenary goal of the PLA’s founding”.
Such a massive personnel upheaval is likely, in the short term, to exact a cost in terms of the PLA’s professional competence and judgment. Whether it can, over the longer run, truly enable the military to reinvent itself and complete a process of renewal amid dramatic change remains to be seen. Whatever the ultimate trajectory, the Zhang Youxia affair is destined to become a major turning point in the history of China’s political and military development.
This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “中共中央军委领导班子何时能重建？”.
