Trump’s tariff war is forging an unlikely BRICS unity
By wielding tariffs as a weapon against India, Brazil and South Africa — three founding members of BRICS — Trump has, in effect, pushed them toward closer alignment with China and Russia, says commentator Deng Yuwen.
Trump’s latest wave of tariffs may look aggressive on the surface, but for the BRICS grouping — long regarded as a loosely structured bloc — it may not necessarily be bad news. By wielding tariffs as a weapon against India, Brazil and South Africa — three founding members — Trump has, in effect, pushed them toward closer alignment with China and Russia, both of which have long faced US strategic pressure. This outcome may not have been Trump’s original intent, but it is a structural consequence of his tariff policy in the geopolitical arena.
The reason is straightforward: external threats can foster internal unity.
BRICS has often been seen as a loose multilateral platform because of its complex membership composition, wide disparities in development stages, differing political systems and divergent interests. China and Russia maintain high levels of coordination on security and strategic matters. Brazil and South Africa focus more on economic issues and development financing. India, meanwhile, has long pursued a multi-aligned balance, especially between China and the US.
While BRICS’s symbolic importance in the global south has grown steadily, forging strong, unified positions on geopolitical issues has been extremely difficult — until now. Trump’s tariff war has significantly altered this situation.
A game changer in BRICS dynamics?
The reason is straightforward: external threats can foster internal unity. This is a familiar pattern in international relations, but it does not always work — threats must be sufficiently direct and evenly distributed across members to break down their internal divisions. Trump’s measures have met exactly these conditions.
Citing India’s purchase of Russian oil, he doubled its existing 25% “reciprocal tariff” to a total of 50%, hitting textiles, gemstones, electronics and auto parts. Against Brazil, he cited retaliation by the Lula government against former President Jair Bolsonaro — Trump’s political ally — and raised tariffs from 10% to 50%, despite Brazil running a trade deficit with the US. For South Africa, claiming that white citizens faced persecution by their government, Trump raised tariffs to 31%.
These measures are overtly punitive, leaving almost no room for negotiation, and have created a shared “victimhood” sentiment that makes convergence easier. Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has already pledged to coordinate with India and China to resist Trump’s tariff threats collectively, rather than respond individually.
The key lies in a fundamental change in how these countries perceive the US — not as the post-Cold War hegemon willing to provide public goods and show a degree of generosity in economic cooperation, but as a nakedly transactional great power...
Many analysts believe this convergence will be short-lived, given BRICS’s persistent internal divisions and the potential for shifts in US policy. I disagree.
In my view, this enhanced cooperation is unlikely to dissipate quickly and may persist for years. The key lies in a fundamental change in how these countries perceive the US — not as the post-Cold War hegemon willing to provide public goods and show a degree of generosity in economic cooperation, but as a nakedly transactional great power whose sole yardstick is its own national interest.
Once trust is broken, it is extraordinarily difficult to restore. This is not merely a psychological fracture; it will shape policy preferences and long-term strategic planning.
India’s view of the US drastically changing
India’s case is particularly instructive. For years, New Delhi has pursued “strategic autonomy” drawing closer to Washington on security matters, accepting its role in the US’s Indo-Pacific strategy, while maintaining close energy and defence ties with Moscow and engaging China in multilateral settings like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). This flexible balancing act allowed India to secure technology, investment, and security backing from the US, while obtaining resources and diplomatic support from the China-Russia camp.
Trump’s tariff war, however, has for the first time made India realise that its role in Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy offers no protection when US economic interests are at stake. The 50% tariff has not only disrupted Indian exports but has also sparked debate among Indian policymakers and commentators over the sustainability of “reliance on the US”.
Now, faced with unpredictable US tariffs and policies, India may be more willing to cooperate with China on non-core issues, or at least refrain from actively amplifying US positions.
This reassessment will not immediately transform Sino-Indian relations — deep-seated disputes over borders, regional influence and third-party partnerships remain. But it could lead India to scale back its willingness to align with the US in multilateral forums to counter China.
Previously, India often kept its distance from BRICS and the SCO to dilute China’s influence, sometimes taking positions that Chinese observers described as obstructionist, prompting calls for its expulsion from these bodies. Now, faced with unpredictable US tariffs and policies, India may be more willing to cooperate with China on non-core issues, or at least refrain from actively amplifying US positions.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s upcoming first visit to China in seven years — attending the SCO summit in Tianjin — and India’s suspension of US arms purchases both send subtle signals of this shift. This “reduced obstruction” could help BRICS reach consensus more efficiently.
This does not mean India will strategically align with China across the board. Its security anxieties and competitive instincts toward China run deep, and its dependence on the US in military, technological and investment terms will not disappear overnight. Yet in great power diplomacy, even small adjustments in attitude can create new space for cooperation.
For example, in advancing local currency settlements, developing BRICS’s multilateral development bank loan mechanisms, or coordinating positions in the WTO or the UN, India may be more willing than before to join collective actions rather than hold back.
Giving more momentum to ‘de-dollarisation’
Trump’s tariff war also indirectly reinforces BRICS’s consensus on the need for “de-dollarisation” and reducing dependence on a unipolar financial system. Tariff barriers are not just a trade issue; they rest on the institutional advantages of dollar hegemony.
The US can impose large-scale protectionism without fear of a currency credibility crisis, while others must contend with currency depreciation, capital flight and other risks. Countering US tariff pressure thus requires not only finding alternative markets but also building trade and financial systems that minimise dollar intermediation. This goal — long discussed but slow to advance — may now gain real momentum under external pressure.
Equally important is the accelerating effect of US policy unpredictability on BRICS cohesion. Even if Trump does not return to office, America’s deep political polarisation and the rise of protectionist sentiment have already nudged both major parties toward economic tightening.
For BRICS members, this means they can no longer assume the stability of economic engagement with the US. The old formula — “do business with America while balancing politically with China and Russia” — may have to give way to “diversify risk while guarding against sudden US reversals”. This strategic mindset shift alone could drive BRICS to strengthen mutual trust mechanisms and coordinate more closely against external shocks.
... if external pressures persist — especially in the form of US tariffs and financial sanctions — BRICS may be compelled to accelerate institutionalisation.
Great institutionalisation of BRICS may now be a greater priority
In the long term, BRICS’s ability to achieve effective geopolitical coordination will depend on whether it can institutionalise mechanisms for reconciling interests. Currently, BRICS decision-making relies heavily on summit consensus and bilateral consultations, lacking supranational bodies like those of the EU. This slows its ability to respond to fast-changing developments.
However, if external pressures persist — especially in the form of US tariffs and financial sanctions — BRICS may be compelled to accelerate institutionalisation. Historical precedent shows that many international organisations achieve cohesion under external threat; NATO during the Cold War is a classic example.
In sum, Trump’s tariff war may not only prompt short-term BRICS cooperation but also inject long-term momentum into both its psychological and institutional foundations. The transformation of America’s image, the breakdown of trust, the need for risk diversification and subtle shifts in India’s stance toward China all contribute to this trend.
For BRICS, this is both a challenge and a historic opportunity: if it can convert unity forged under external pressure into sustainable institution-building and strategic coordination, it could emerge as a far more influential player in reshaping the global order.
Seen from this angle, Trump’s tariff war may appear on the surface as a targeted economic strike against certain countries’ exports, but its deeper effects on international relations and the global balance of power go well beyond trade itself.
