Xi Jinping’s red lines: Will the US comply?

Chinese President Xi Jinping outlined four red lines for China-US relations during his meeting with US President Joe Biden: the Taiwan question, democracy and human rights, China’s path and system, and China’s development right. These four red lines apply not only to the outgoing Biden administration but also to the incoming Donald Trump administration.

Among these four red lines, the Taiwan question is the most volatile one that could pose a real threat of conflict between China and the US; the other three red lines are more open to interpretation. 

Democracy and human rights issues mainly include the US’s accusations against China regarding Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, and its treatment of dissidents. China’s path and system refer to the US’s criticism of China’s political system and ideology, while China’s development rights concern the US’s suppression of China’s economic and technological advancement.

That is to say, of the four red lines, the Taiwan question is the only one capable of drastically destabilising China-US relations and provoking a direct conflict; the other three afford greater opportunity for negotiation and compromise.

Although Xi stressed that these four red lines “must not be challenged or crossed”, it remains questionable whether the US will observe them. Based on past experience and the current situation, both the Biden administration and the incoming Trump administration have and will continue to push the boundaries on these four red lines.

On the Taiwan question, which China considers the most important and sensitive aspect of China-US relations, the US has progressively eroded the “one China” policy established after the normalisation of relations in 1979. Both the Trump and Biden administrations have increased military, political and international support for Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) since 2016.

From mainland China’s perspective, the US has consistently played the “Taiwan card” and covertly and overtly supported “Taiwan independence” to contain China’s development, gradually hollowing out the one China policy. 

Some Chinese academics even think that the US’s “one China” policy exists only in name — the US is only using the “one China” policy during high-level meetings to placate China and prevent a complete severing of ties. 

This argument is not unfounded either. Just prior to Biden’s meeting with Xi in Peru, Biden shook hands and chatted with Lin Hsin-i, Taiwan’s envoy to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) informal dialogue. Taiwanese sources described the interaction as cordial, with Lin even extending an invitation to Biden to visit Taiwan.

While it is not uncommon for US presidents to shake hands and exchange pleasantries with Taiwan representatives at APEC meetings, amid the various “Taiwan independence” rhetoric and actions of Taiwan’s Lai Ching-te administration that have constantly angered the mainland, Beijing is certainly displeased with the interaction between Biden and Lin, particularly the invitation for Biden to visit Taiwan.

In addition to drawing a red line on the Taiwan issue during his meeting with Biden, Xi also made the rare move of emphasising that if the US truly wants to maintain peace across the Taiwan Strait, it is crucial to recognise the true nature of Lai and the DPP authorities in seeking “Taiwan independence”, handle the Taiwan question with extra prudence, unequivocally oppose “Taiwan independence”, and support the mainland’s peaceful reunification.

This is the first time Xi has publicly named and criticised a Taiwan president during a meeting with a foreign leader. This signals that Beijing has no hope for Lai and serves as a public warning to the US not to get too close to Lai’s administration, lest it jeopardises peace in the Taiwan Strait.

But the US does not think that fostering ties with Taiwan poses a threat to peace in the Taiwan Strait. On the contrary, Biden reiterated that the US’s one China policy remains consistent, guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three US-China Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances. The US opposes any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side, and urged the mainland to cease its destabilising military activities around Taiwan.

In other words, the US maintains that its one China policy is not only based on the three Joint Communiques, as emphasised by the mainland, but also on the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances, which support Taiwan, providing a legal basis for US support for Taiwan. Furthermore, the US also thinks that the primary cause of tension in the Taiwan Strait is not “Taiwan independence” provocations, as mainland China claims, but rather the mainland’s military activities directed at Taiwan.

The differing perceptions between China and the US on the one China policy and tensions in the Taiwan Strait stem primarily from their differing interests. For the US, maintaining support for Taiwan as a counterbalance to the mainland and having the ability to challenge Beijing’s red lines on the Taiwan issue when necessary are important strategic and tactical tools to contain China’s rise. 

Given the bipartisan consensus that China is the US’s biggest strategic rival, neither Biden nor Trump will forgo leveraging the Taiwan issue. Thus, despite China’s red lines, the Taiwan issue remains the most likely cause of a rupture in China-US relations.

On the other hand, regardless of how useful the “Taiwan card” is, the US is unlikely to risk a major confrontation with China, as doing so could easily escalate to war. Once war erupts on the Taiwan Strait, while mainland China’s development would  suffer a severe setback and even stagnation, the US would also be faced with a serious dilemma of whether to engage in a military confrontation with China, and potentially losing the “Taiwan card” forever if things go south.

This is the fundamental reason why the Biden administration has repeatedly warned against escalating the competition with China into conflict. Even a hawkish Trump administration would be unlikely to readily initiate war with China. 

Although it is foreseeable that the US will not fully adhere to all of Xi’s four red lines, it does not negate their significance. In reality, after years of comprehensive competition, both China and the US are exploring new avenues for engagement. China’s growing comprehensive national power, particularly its military might, means that it is no longer forced to yield to US pressure like before. China is also becoming more adept at negotiating from a position of strength.

As the Biden administration draws to a close, Xi used his final meeting with Biden to both delineate red lines for China-US relations and express China’s wish for stability, continued cooperation and effective management of disagreements. 

For Trump, who is set to return to the White House and is known for his deal-making skills, the content of the meeting between Xi and Biden may not be important, as Trump is likely to have his own “Trump-style” agenda and methods for dealing with China.

In the face of China-US relations over the coming years, China’s fundamental approach to dealing with the Trump administration will be to counter moves as they come and engage in negotiations while relying on its own strength.

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “习近平给中美关系划红线能否收效？”.

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