Cambodia’s calculated decisions in acquiring Chinese naval vessels
Rather than look a gift horse in the mouth, observers should consider Cambodia’s own agency and decision making rather than assuming it is merely a passive or compliant recipient of military aid from China.
In early September 2024, Cambodia confirmed that China will gift it two Type 056C corvettes, due for delivery by 2025. This news sparked varied reactions, with some viewing it as a sign of China’s expanding regional influence amid heightened Sino-US rivalry.
Such a view overlooks Cambodia’s agency and security needs. From Cambodia’s viewpoint, this marks a watershed moment in the country’s naval development, one that has long called for serious investment in addressing offshore patrol and shoreline protection.
Changing needs of the Cambodian Navy
The arrival of the two corvettes would be an improvement over Cambodia’s existing fast attack crafts and patrol boats, which were mostly built by China or the former Soviet Union from the 1940s-1990s. In the mid-2000s, China donated at least 14 patrol boats and small warships to help Cambodia address piracy, smuggling and other transnational crimes.
According to the 2000 DWP, the Cambodian Navy’s main priority was to shift from riverine operations to coastal patrol and protection then, while acquiring modern vessels was not the immediate priority; however, in the 2022 DWP, acquiring modern destroyers and patrol vessels is a clear priority for maritime border protection.
Before the 2022 DWP, consistent language in the 2000 DWP and the 2006 Defence Strategic Review recognised the navy’s limited ability to patrol and protect Cambodia’s shoreline due to outdated and small patrol craft.
China has become Cambodia’s primary supplier of modern military equipment, outpacing the US between 2011 and 2023.
Growing Chinese role in Cambodia’s defence ecosystem
Cambodian Navy Chief Admiral Tea Vinh had recognised the limited capacity of his forces and floated the idea of acquiring modern naval vessels. During a five-day rescue drill with the Chinese Navy from 22-26 February 2016, he met his counterpart Rear Admiral Yu Manjian.
Tea Vinh requested two ships of unspecified types to “defend Cambodian maritime territory”. However, the spokesperson of the Cambodian Navy called it a wish list, qualifying that Cambodia was unsure if China would agree.
Now, China has made good on the request. Given an ongoing US arms embargo set in 2021, which limits Cambodia’s access to US-made weapons, and China’s range of budget-friendly weaponry, China has become Cambodia’s primary supplier of modern military equipment, outpacing the US between 2011 and 2023.
... this upgrade enables the navy to conduct medium-range patrols beyond territorial waters and could strengthen Cambodia’s search-and-rescue readiness in jointly managed waters with Vietnam (under the 1982 Historical Water Agreement).
Addressing maritime vulnerabilities
Cambodia’s new corvettes can be seen as part of a long-term strategy to address maritime vulnerabilities. Modern corvettes are typically equipped with anti-aircraft, anti-submarine and anti-surface weapon systems, and electronic warfare capabilities. Thus, they are suitable for patrol surveillance and protecting a nation’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which are waters extending up to 200 nautical miles beyond territorial seas.
Consequently, this upgrade enables the navy to conduct medium-range patrols beyond territorial waters and could strengthen Cambodia’s search-and-rescue readiness in jointly managed waters with Vietnam (under the 1982 Historical Water Agreement).
While awaiting maritime delimitation with Vietnam, the 1982 Agreement acknowledges both countries’ traditional fishing practices; Cambodia has not ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The corvettes could potentially also improve Cambodia’s ability to safeguard oil assets in the Gulf of Thailand.
The above implications, overlooked by foreign news outlets which privilege the theme of US-China rivalry, highlight the corvettes’ role as a tool for Cambodia to assert its sovereignty and safeguard its maritime domain.
Cambodia shares the same goal as its Southeast Asian neighbours, to maintain its autonomy and full sovereignty while working with foreign partners.
Maintaining autonomy and sovereignty
Yet the acquisition has reignited discussions about the Ream Naval Base, with some foreign news narratives shifting from allegations that it is a permanent Chinese military base to claims that Cambodia is allowing the Chinese exclusive access. These narratives overlook the nuances of bilateral defence cooperation, which becomes evident when we compare other Southeast Asian countries’ practices.
Singapore has maintained arrangements with the US for military access allowing the US Navy to dock at Changi Naval Base for maintenance, the Philippines has signed an Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement with the US getting access to five military bases, and Thailand gives the US military access to its U-Tapao air and Sattahip naval bases. Yet these arrangements are not portrayed as these countries unequivocally siding with the US to counter China.
One might argue that Cambodia’s situation is different due to its less advanced economy and diplomatic clout. However, Cambodia shares the same goal as its Southeast Asian neighbours, to maintain its autonomy and full sovereignty while working with foreign partners. Back in February 2019, former Prime Minister (PM) Hun Sen wrote on his Facebook page that Cambodia wanted good relations with other countries as long as they did not interfere with Cambodia’s internal affairs.
Despite its close ties with China, Cambodia is unlikely to grant China exclusive access to the Ream Naval Base, as this would alarm Vietnam and Thailand, given the base’s proximity to the Gulf of Thailand and Vietnam’s southern flank. Cambodia also notes US sensitivity over Ream.
Under PM Hun Manet, Cambodia would want to begin anew and strive to prevent the base from disrupting the rapprochement following the visit of US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin in July 2024. Allowing China exclusive access would prevent Cambodia from diversifying its foreign policy options.
In discussing the gift of Cambodia’s corvettes from China, it is vital to avoid oversimplification and recognise the nuanced realities on the ground.
Cambodia’s “open-door” policy at Ream counters narratives alleging exclusive Chinese access while reinforcing its commitment to diplomatic diversification. By welcoming other navies, Cambodia seeks to preserve its strategic autonomy.
Already, Cambodia has welcomed the Japanese Naval delegation’s visits in 2022 and allowed HMS Spey of the Royal British Navy to dock at Ream for a five-day goodwill visit in 2023. In early October, Deputy PM Sun Chantol declared at the CSIS’s ASEAN Leadership Forum in Washington DC that Ream would welcome port calls from any navy, including the US, for humanitarian work or joint exercises.
In discussing the gift of Cambodia’s corvettes from China, it is vital to avoid oversimplification and recognise the nuanced realities on the ground. Acknowledging Cambodia’s agency and capacity to make calculated decisions aligned with its national interests even as it manages asymmetrical relationships with larger powers will allow for a more accurate understanding of Cambodia’s defence strategy.
This article was first published in Fulcrum, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute’s blogsite.
