China’s Middle East strategy in the Trump era: Navigating uncertainty
Though initially vocal in its support for the Palestinian cause, Beijing has tempered its stance in a calculated shift of geopolitical priorities. However, says academic Alessandro Arduino, this does not mean that China will see easy advancements in the Middle East.
Following a fragile truce in Gaza, both sides have rushed to declare victory. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, insists that Hamas forced Israel to retreat — a stance with little support outside Iran’s severely weakened “axis of resistance”. Meanwhile, Israel’s claim that Hamas has been neutralised is equally contentious, as Hamas fighters — armed and waving their green flags — have reappeared on Gaza’s streets despite 15 months of relentless Israeli bombardment.
Gaza’s humanitarian crisis grows
This uneasy ceasefire underscores the grim calculus of international relations, where a familiar adversary can be seen as more manageable than an unpredictable threat. Though hostilities have paused, conditions have not returned to the days before 7 October 2023. Israel’s campaign has sharply degraded Hamas’s operational capacity — killing thousands of militants, destroying key tunnels, and dismantling rocket production sites — yet Gaza’s humanitarian crisis grows more dire by the day. Unexploded ordnance, food shortages and a lack of medical care pose immediate dangers for its civilian population.
China’s position has evolved in step with Israel’s military gains. Though initially vocal in its support for the Palestinian cause, Beijing has tempered its stance in a calculated shift of geopolitical priorities. The current truce is unlikely to hold as is and may soon transform — albeit short of all-out war.
Unlike Beijing’s high-profile diplomatic successes in 2023 normalising ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran and the 2024 attempt to reconcile Palestinian factions, it appears less inclined this time to take the lead including potential involvement in Gaza’s reconstruction. Nevertheless, China’s tempered stance could restore China’s previous level of influence in a region where Turkey is expanding its reach from Syria to Libya, and where Israel’s deterrent posture remains robust.
While Beijing hopes to reclaim its diplomatic footing, the recalibrated US stance under President Donald Trump — who remains a staunch supporter of Israel — complicates China’s ambitions.
China’s tempered stance complicated by the US
Since the ceasefire, China has maintained its earlier call for restraint and dialogue, aiming to ease regional tensions and work with the international community for stability in the Middle East. Its shuttle diplomacy is back on display: Zhan Jun, China’s top envoy, has visited Israel and Palestine, marking the first such trip since the outbreak of war in October 2023.
While Beijing hopes to reclaim its diplomatic footing, the recalibrated US stance under President Donald Trump — who remains a staunch supporter of Israel — complicates China’s ambitions. The recent appointments of Marco Rubio as secretary of state and Elise Stefanik as US ambassador to the United Nations, both supporters of Israel, make the new administration’s pro-Israel stance abundantly clear.
Meanwhile, the swearing-in of Michael DiMino, a former CIA analyst, as US deputy assistant secretary of defence for the Middle East signals the Trump administration’s diminished focus on the region. DiMino has previously stated that the US’s “vital or existential” interests in the Middle East are “minimal to nonexistent”, endorsing a policy of “offshore balancing” that would involve withdrawing US troops from Iraq and Syria. Even so, this does not necessarily confer an immediate advantage to China.
Beijing’s possible advancements in the Middle East are kept in place by the friction with the US and the growing closeness between the US and Israel.
China may not be able to meet up to expectations on both sides
During talks in Israel, Zhan Jun applauded the ceasefire and emphasised the importance of hostage-release agreements, while encouraging greater Sino-Israeli collaboration. In discussions with Palestinian leaders in the West Bank, he reiterated China’s longstanding endorsement of Palestinian self-determination and the “two-state solution”.
Yet even before the rebuilding phase fully begins, it is clear that expectations on both sides may outstrip what China is ready or able to offer. Palestinians hope for substantial Chinese investment, and Israelis remain wary of Beijing’s earlier condemnations of civilian casualties and occupation policies.
China’s financial diplomacy — spanning from Gaza to Syria — and its willingness to open new business avenues with Israel might yet shift the regional calculus in Beijing’s favour...
A UN-led reconstruction effort may include China, especially if wealthy Gulf states finance the initial phases. Still, the fragility of the truce, combined with China’s economic concerns at home, suggests Beijing will be careful about committing large-scale resources. Its capacity to shape outcomes in the Israeli-Palestinian arena will also hinge on how it reconciles past partnerships with current US-Israel dynamics. President Trump’s unpredictability could pressure Prime Minister Netanyahu to move in line with Washington’s tune, casting further doubt on whether the ceasefire can evolve into a lasting solution.
Israel is a key American ally in the Middle East, and Trump’s presidency adds another layer of uncertainty to Beijing’s moves in the region. Even so, China’s financial diplomacy — spanning from Gaza to Syria — and its willingness to open new business avenues with Israel might yet shift the regional calculus in Beijing’s favour, should it navigate these diplomatic minefields and capitalise on any openings in post-conflict reconstruction.
