Entangled ambitions: Chinese investment and Balochistan’s ethno-nationalist unrest

Balochistan, Pakistan’s largest and most resource-rich province, has long been a hotbed of armed uprisings against the Pakistani state. Ethnic Baloch grievances, shaped by colonial history and a sense of marginalisation, have fuelled persistent unrest.

Today, Chinese investments, particularly under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), are caught in the crosshairs of these tensions, as Baloch rights and nationalist movements view foreign involvement as an extension of historical exploitation. 

The roots of Baloch resistance trace back to the colonial era. During the 19th-century “great game” between Britain and Russia, Balochistan was moulded into a buffer zone to protect British India from potential incursions through Afghanistan.

British authorities exploited tribal divisions through divide-and-rule tactics, deepening local mistrust. These strategies perpetuated economic exploitation and societal fragmentation, laying the groundwork for the Baloch nationalist movement, which emerged in the last decades of British rule.

After Pakistan’s independence in 1947, Balochistan’s forced annexation only reinforced colonial patterns of resource extraction and strategic control. The Pakistani state, like its colonial predecessor, treated Balochistan as a periphery valuable primarily for its strategic location and natural resources.

Despite vast reserves of gas, coal, copper and gold, Balochistan remains Pakistan’s poorest and most underdeveloped province. Resource control has historically been monopolised by the central government, leaving the local population impoverished and alienated.

The Sui gas field, for example, supplied gas to other provinces long before Balochistan itself benefited. Similar trends have occurred with other major projects like the Saindak mine, where profits have disproportionately gone to foreign companies, bypassing local communities. Such economic exclusion, coupled with limited political representation, has perpetuated a sense of disenfranchisement among the Baloch people.

Pakistan’s political structure has further aggravated Balochistan’s marginalisation. The most populous provinces, such as Punjab and Sindh, wield disproportionate influence in national decision making, often sidelining Balochistan’s needs.

The passage of the 18th Amendment in 2010 aimed to devolve more powers to the provinces and increase their share of federal revenue. However, Balochistan’s deep-rooted grievances have persisted, as the military continues to exert significant control over political and economic decisions in the region, particularly in matters of security and resource management.

The military’s dominant role has reinforced local perceptions of the Pakistani state as a colonial-style occupying entity. State violence, including enforced disappearances by security forces, has intensified mistrust and fuelled separatist sentiment. This longstanding alienation has created fertile ground for insurgent movements like the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), which has waged a decades-long conflict against the state. 

The CPEC, a multi-billion-dollar infrastructure initiative and a key project under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), promised to boost Pakistan’s economy. Balochistan was positioned to play a central role in this transformation.

The development of Gwadar port, a key component of CPEC, was promoted as a pivotal project for the region, potentially turning Balochistan into a major trade link connecting western China to the Arabian Sea. 

CPEC promised locals job creation, improved infrastructure, economic upliftment, and reduced marginalisation, particularly in underdeveloped regions like Balochistan, by integrating them into national and international markets. However, despite being operational, Gwadar has proven disappointing, failing to attract significant economic activity and falling short of its promise as a bustling transhipment hub. 

Moreover, Chinese companies are now also shifting their investment strategies in Pakistan from large-scale infrastructure projects to smaller, quicker-return initiatives due to ongoing security threats and financial challenges. These setbacks cast doubt on the official narratives surrounding CPEC’s success, with companies like the China Power Hub Generation Company facing severe financial difficulties.

Ten years after CPEC’s launch, Gwadar remains underdeveloped, with its population facing poverty, water shortages, and basic infrastructural deficits. Moreover, instead of opportunity, many residents see the port’s development as yet another instance of resource exploitation, with the profits benefiting outsiders — both the central government and foreign investors — rather than the local population. 

The Baloch resistance to CPEC has manifested in both armed insurgency and non-violent protests. Militant groups like the BLA have targeted CPEC projects, viewing them as symbols of the Pakistani state’s control over Balochistan’s natural resources, which they argue benefit only Pakistan’s elite and foreign investors.

These attacks on infrastructure and personnel, including Chinese nationals, involved in CPEC highlight the militant wing’s opposition to what they consider a violation of Baloch sovereignty. Just this week, the BLA claimed responsibility for the explosion near the Karachi airport that killed two Chinese nationals.

Recently, violence linked to groups like the BLA resulted in over 70 deaths in Balochistan, with casualties including 14 soldiers, 21 militants and 23 civilians in various assaults. The unrest involved ambushes along highways, vehicle fires and explosions on rail links.

At the same time, non-violent resistance to CPEC is focused on peaceful grassroots mobilisations for justice against state violence and the marginalisation of the Baloch people, led by activists such as Dr Mahrang Baloch from the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC). The BYC organised large-scale protests in Gwadar in July 2024, where security forces used roadblocks and teargas to suppress a gathering of people protesting state oppression and CPEC’s impacts. 

“CPEC is not a development project for the people of Balochistan”, argued Mahrang Baloch. “It is a tool of exploitation that has only brought more suffering to our land. Our resources are being taken, our environment is being destroyed, and our people are being displaced, all in the name of development.” Her comments point to how infrastructure development under CPEC has fuelled local resentment rather than addressing longstanding socioeconomic issues. 

What sets the BYC apart from other Baloch rights movements is the prominence of women like Mahrang at its helm. Its emergence has drawn considerable national and international attention to the plight of the Baloch people, and it represents a significant shift in the political landscape of Balochistan.

Chinese investments in Balochistan, particularly under CPEC, have become entangled in the province’s longstanding ethno-nationalist unrest. While China and Pakistan appear committed to this partnership, until Baloch grievances over resource control, political representation, and human rights abuses are addressed, tensions will likely persist, posing significant challenges for both nations and Pakistan’s foreign investors.

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