G2 is back — but the world isn’t built for two anymore
Trump’s revival of the “G2” idea highlights Washington’s search for leverage amid deep domestic challenges. But in a multipolar world, China-US cooperation can only work through inclusive coordination — not a return to two-power dominance, says academic Gu Qingyang.
The idea of “G2” was first proposed by American scholars in 2005 and later appeared in US official discussions around 2008. As global conditions changed and China-US relations became more complex, the term gradually disappeared from public debate.
What surprised many observers was that on 30 October 2025 — just before the China-US leaders’ meeting in Busan — US President Donald Trump brought up the idea of “G2” again, immediately drawing global attention.
G2 in a changed context
Compared with 20 years ago, the meaning of G2 has changed profoundly. At least two major shifts in the global landscape must be recognised.
China and the US have entered a new phase of strategic proximity and mutual shaping. This reality means that any version of G2 can no longer follow the old logic.
First, the balance of power between China and the US has changed in a fundamental way.
Around 2004, the US held overwhelming advantages in economic strength, technology, finance and global influence, while China was still in a phase of “integration into the global system”. At that time, G2 largely meant China taking on more responsibilities within a US-led order.
Today, the situation is very different. China has rapidly strengthened its position in manufacturing, infrastructure, high technology and its influence across the Global South. In some areas, it is already close to — or even ahead of — the US. China and the US have entered a new phase of strategic proximity and mutual shaping. This reality means that any version of G2 can no longer follow the old logic.
Second, the global environment has shifted sharply.
For much of the past two decades, peace, development and globalisation set the tone. Today, protectionism is rising, de-globalisation is gaining force and geopolitical tensions are intensifying. Most notably, the US has increasingly moved toward isolationism and an “America First” approach, showing less willingness to provide global public goods or invest in global governance. As a result, international cooperation mechanisms are under growing strain.
Against this backdrop, the G2 now faces a very different world than it did before.
G2 now more about rivalry than consensus
At the intersection of these two changes, the meaning of G2 has inevitably evolved. On one hand, China and the US still have room to cooperate on issues such as climate change, financial stability and public health. On the other hand, as China’s overall strength grows, anxiety and defensive instincts in the US have also intensified. Competition — and even confrontation — has become more prominent. In short, today’s G2 carries far more rivalry than shared consensus.
By framing the relationship as “equal partnership”, Washington may aim to reassure Beijing while encouraging China to share economic burdens, supply chain responsibilities and even global governance costs.
From the perspective of the Trump administration, reviving the G2 idea was no accident. Trump clearly recognises that the US is facing deep structural problems: industrial hollowing-out, worsening income inequality, growing social polarisation and rising populism. These challenges cannot be solved quickly through domestic reform alone. As a result, US policy has increasingly focused on seeking resources from abroad.
The main tool has been tariffs. As the world’s largest importer, the US uses its market power to pressure trading partners to invest more in America, buy more US products and accept higher trade costs. In Trump’s view, China stands out as the most important — and potentially most “extractable” — partner.
Under the cloak of ‘equal partnership’
In this context, G2 functions more as a strategic narrative. By framing the relationship as “equal partnership”, Washington may aim to reassure Beijing while encouraging China to share economic burdens, supply chain responsibilities and even global governance costs. This approach serves domestic political messaging in the US, while also aligning with longer-term efforts to sustain American global influence.
From a strategic standpoint, the US may also hope to combine China’s strengths in the real economy and infrastructure building with America’s advantages in finance and security. Africa offers a clear example. The US mainly provides financial resources and security support, while Africa urgently needs roads, electricity, industry and jobs. If China “builds” and the US “endorses”, America’s global presence could be maintained despite its structural weaknesses.
The key question, however, is whether such a G2 arrangement is realistic and sustainable.
‘Power-sharing’ fragile and uncertain
Objectively speaking, the world is in a highly unstable phase. Global growth remains weak. New technological revolutions hold great promise, but geopolitical divisions limit their broad benefits. Climate change, public health risks, financial instability and debt pressures are all unfolding at the same time. In such a context, cooperation between China and the US would indeed be beneficial.
Yet deep and structural tensions remain. The US continues to view China’s rise with strong strategic concern. Even if Trump himself adopts a transactional approach, his administration and the broader political climate in Washington remain highly cautious — if not hostile — toward China. This reality makes any G2 aimed at true “power-sharing” fragile and uncertain.
Therefore, the real question is not whether to accept or reject a narrow China-US G2, but whether G2 can be redefined in a more open and inclusive way.
Instead of seeing G2 as China and the US “managing the world”, it may be more constructive to view it as a mechanism for cooperation between the Global North and the Global South.
G2+
Instead of seeing G2 as China and the US “managing the world”, it may be more constructive to view it as a mechanism for cooperation between the Global North and the Global South. In practice, the US still holds significant influence across the Global North, while China plays a growing coordinating role in development and economic cooperation in the Global South. If G2 is framed in this way, its exclusiveness would be reduced, and its relevance and legitimacy would increase.
Today’s global power structure is moving from unipolarity toward multipolarity. China and the US do have stronger mobilisation and coordination capacities, but the European Union, India, Russia, ASEAN and the BRICS countries are also essential actors in global governance. If G2 is understood narrowly as “rule by two powers”, it will only create anxiety and resistance. If it is understood as “coordination by two major actors, bringing others along”, it is more likely to gain acceptance.
In the end, global governance is heading toward a multi-centred system. Institutions such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organisation certainly need reform, but their core principles — consultation, inclusiveness and cooperation — remain indispensable. For China-US cooperation to have a positive effect, it must avoid exclusivity and be embedded within the broader multilateral system.
This is not about G2 domination, but G2 coordination; not exclusion, but connection.
China and the US should not stand above the world, but within the system. Only by placing their relationship within a broader framework of North-South cooperation can their interaction be morally credible, strategically sustainable and beneficial to global stability.
