G7 at Kananaskis: Distracted leaders and the vanishing China agenda

China did not loom large on the G7 leaders’ agenda at their summit in Kananaskis, Canada, on 15-17 June. Indeed, there was a sudden, surprising drop in direct attention to China and a disappearance of explicit action by G7 commitments on it. 

China was a largely unspoken target on the Kananaskis summit’s trade and economic, security, energy and technology agenda and relevant to its tiny health and ecological agenda too. Overall, the G7 leaders’ approach shifted toward cooperation. The strongest signal was US President Donald Trump’s surprising suggestion that the G7 should add China as a member of this purely democratic club.

These shifts were due to the few commitments Kananaskis produced overall, the leaders’ sudden diversion to the erupting Israel-Iran war and Trump’s desire to deal with China by himself. 

During the past four G7 summits, concern with China was rising, broadening, more direct and more confrontational.

From 2021 to 2024, leaders made 20 commitments explicitly on China. In 2020, at the virtual G7 summit hosted by Trump, G7 leaders made none. They focused on combatting the Covid crisis, but did not criticise China for causing it. 

In 2021, at Cornwall, England, with the pandemic receding and in-person G7 summits resuming, leaders made two commitments on China: one on the economy and one on democracy. Both criticised China’s treatment of Hong Kong.

In 2022 at Elmau, Germany, they made six commitments on China, adding two on regional security, and all critical. 

In 2023, at Hiroshima, Japan, next door to China, they made seven such commitments, again on trade and regional security, but including one cooperative one.

In 2024 at Apulia, Italy, they again made seven, adding one on financial regulation and including two cooperative ones.

In 2025, when Canada took the G7 chair, this cadence shifted sharply.

On 20-22 May, G7 finance ministers and central bank governors met in Banff, and made 62 commitments.

Although none were on China, several commitments aimed clearly at it. In a new commitment, pushed by US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, they promised that “no countries or entities, or entities from those countries that financed or supplied the Russian war machine will be eligible to profit from Ukraine’s reconstruction”. They readily agreed, as Bessent wished, to monitor and assess non-market policies and practices. They also agreed to work on market concentration and international supply chain resilience. Adding health, they promised to address the risks of G7 “low-value importation systems”, which could bring illegal, deadly drugs such as opioids and fentanyl into their countries. 

Yet other commitments on energy, critical minerals, developing countries and the environment emphasised cooperation.

For the summit itself, none of the seven priorities set by Canada and the three thrust on it by Trump aimed directly at China, but many involved it indirectly but significantly. 

These ten priorities were the tariff and trade war, financial fragility from members’ fiscal policy, wars in Ukraine the Middle East and criminals trafficking drugs, critical mineral supply chains, artificial intelligence adoption, quantum technology, wildfires, migration, foreign interference and transnational repression, and partnerships for investment in infrastructure. 

At the summit itself, none of the 148 commitments explicitly referred to China. But the seven communiques and chair’s summary, agreed by all the leaders, including Trump, showed united concern with and consensus on China in less action-oriented ways, across the security, economy, technology and democracy fields. 

The most important document, and the only one with direct reference to China, was the chair’s summary produced at the summit’s end, having been discussed and agreed by all leaders including at their dinner the night before. It contained a paragraph that said: “Leaders highlighted the importance of a free, open, prosperous and secure Indo-Pacific, based on the rule of law, and discussed growing economic cooperation with the region. They stressed the importance of constructive and stable relations with China, while calling on China to refrain from market distortions and harmful overcapacity, tackle global challenges and promote international peace and security. Leaders discussed their ongoing serious concerns about China’s destabilising activities in the East and South China Seas and the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.” 

They thus began with the economy in a cooperative way, before moving to security and democracy in a more critical way. 

China was also the clear, if unnamed, target on several other subjects. On trade and critical minerals, the summary stated: “Leaders undertook to safeguard their economies from unfair non-market policies and practices that distort markets and drive overcapacity in ways that are harmful to workers and businesses. This includes de-risking through diversification and reduction of critical dependencies. Leaders welcomed the new Canada-led G7 initiative — the Critical Minerals Production Alliance — working with trusted international partners to guarantee supply for advanced manufacturing and defence.”

On democracy, “the G7 Leaders … condemned foreign interference, underlining the unacceptable threat of transnational repression to rights and freedoms, national security and state sovereignty”. 

On health and migration security, “highlighted the importance of ongoing collaboration to promote border security and counter migrant smuggling and illicit synthetic drug trafficking, noting recent successes. They stressed the need to work with countries of origin and transit countries.”

On energy, economic and environmental security, “they identified ways to collaborate on energy security in a changing world, with a focus on advancing technology and innovation, diversifying and strengthening critical mineral supply chains, building infrastructure, and mobilising investment. They discussed just energy transitions as well as sustainable and innovative solutions to boost energy access and affordability, while mitigating the impact on climate and the environment.” Their commitments included “securing high-standard critical mineral supply chains that power the economies of the future”.

This drop in direct attention to and the disappearance of direct action on China at Kananaskis came from three causes.

First, Kananaskis made far fewer commitments, with its 148 significantly lower than the number made at each of the four G7 summits before.

Second, leaders were diverted by the erupting new Israel-Iran war and their need for allies to support a negotiated or forceful denuclearisation and even regime change in Iran.

Third, the self-described “tariff man” Trump wished to deal with China alone, to secure a bilateral trade deal based on the negotiations in London between their ministers and his phone calls with President Xi Jinping.

Related: Has G7 sent China a clear enough message with the Hiroshima Leaders’ Communique? | G7’s global infrastructure and investment drive: Not so attractive for Southeast Asia