Greater China-Russia strategic alignment links two ‘battlefields’ of Eurasia
Although the Russia-Ukraine war and Taiwan Strait situations are different, strategic alignment between China and Russia on issues involving Japan and the “one China” principle during critical moments means there is room for linkages and even mutual restraint between the two “battlefields” in Eurasia, observes Lianhe Zaobao’s associate China news editor Sim Tze Wei.
Alarm bells sounded in the security landscapes of Europe and Asia recently, with a flurry of diplomatic manoeuvres taking centre stage around the Russia-Ukraine peace agreement and China-Japan tensions on the Taiwan issue.
The two ‘battlefields’ in Eurasia
Steve Witkoff, US special envoy to the Middle East, visited Moscow to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin; French President Emmanuel Macron is in China to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping; Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi headed to Moscow to co-chair strategic security consultations with Russia’s Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu; even Putin, who rarely goes on official visits abroad, is in India this week to meet with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
The frontlines of major power diplomacy are unconventionally active, featuring various tactics to forge alliances and create divisions, with high-level representatives from both the US and China even appearing in Moscow at the same time.
Amid these frequent diplomatic exchanges, Shoigu’s meeting with Wang stands out, with the former remarking that both Russia and China have sufficient experience in “severing the head of the militarist hydra”. This especially strong and vivid expression underscores the unprecedentedly high level of strategic cooperation between Russia and China.
China’s official statement also emphatically stated that both nations agree on the need to “resolutely uphold the outcomes of World War II victory achieved with sacrifice and blood”, and to “resolutely counter any attempts to revive fascism or Japanese militarism”.
... strategic alignment between China and Russia on issues involving Japan and the “one China” principle during critical moments means there is room for linkages and even mutual restraint between the two “battlefields” in Eurasia.
The statements from China and Russia are directly targeted at Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remarks as well as the more central issue of Taiwan behind them.
Although the Russia-Ukraine war and Taiwan Strait situations are different, strategic alignment between China and Russia on issues involving Japan and the “one China” principle during critical moments means there is room for linkages and even mutual restraint between the two “battlefields” in Eurasia.
A worst-case scenario
In an interview with The Economist in October, NATO secretary-general Mark Rutte warned that if mainland China were to launch an attack on Taiwan, he is convinced “it would not be a one-front war” as Beijing might ask Russia to simultaneously launch an attack on European NATO territories to keep NATO in check.
He further stated that cooperation between NATO and the Indo-Pacific region is crucial, and argued that the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic should not be viewed as separate theatres.
... increased military cooperation between China and Russia not only alters the strategic calculations and defence planning in Taipei, Tokyo and Washington, but also in Europe. — an article in MERICS
A report in September by US media outlets stated that UK-based think tank Royal United Services Institute’s analysis of documents provided by hackers claimed that Russia has agreed to supply military equipment and training to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), with the intent of diversifying the PLA’s options for landing operations against Taiwan.
German think tank Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) also carried an article in November, stating that increased military cooperation between China and Russia not only alters the strategic calculations and defence planning in Taipei, Tokyo and Washington, but also in Europe. Closer collaboration between China and Russia, along with North Korea, could directly threaten the defence lines at both the northern and southern approaches of the first island chain.
The article also said that in a Taiwan contingency scenario, Moscow could exert pressure on and contain Tokyo through the Sea of Okhotsk, the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea, while Beijing’s growing influence in the Pacific could provide Moscow with time and space to expand its own influence in Europe.
As early as October 2023, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States published a report stating that “the risk of military conflict with either or both Russia and China, while not inevitable, has grown,” stressing that “the United States and its Allies and partners must be ready to deter and defeat both adversaries simultaneously”.
In a commentary on the commission’s report, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace said, “A two-theater war — in Europe and the Asia-Pacific — involving China and Russia simultaneously is arguably the worst-case scenario the United States could face in an era of so-called great-power competition.”
Since Beijing and Moscow announced a “no limits” strategic partnership in early February 2022, Western political circles and think tanks have remained highly alert to the increasingly aligned positions of China and Russia on strategic issues involving their respective core interests.
Core interests at stake
China-Europe relations have also become delicate and complicated due to the Russia-Ukraine war and the Taiwan issue. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has created a security threat for Europe, and many European countries believe that China has supported Russia in the war, leading to deep dissatisfaction that the West has been unable to effectively isolate Moscow. Europe’s increasing involvement in the Taiwan issue has likewise irritated Beijing.
Since 2020, countries such as the UK, France, the Netherlands, Italy and Germany have increasingly sent frigates through the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. In November this year, Taiwan’s Vice-President Hsiao Bi-khim travelled to Brussels to attend the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China summit and delivered a speech at the European Parliament, prompting a protest from Beijing. Germany’s foreign minister, after making remarks on the Taiwan issue, abruptly cancelled his visit to China just two days before departure in October.
Last Thursday and Friday, Wang Yi spoke by phone with Emmanuel Bonne, the foreign affairs adviser to the French president, and met with the UK’s national security adviser Jonathan Powell in Beijing. He called on both Britain and France to uphold the “one-China” principle and jointly defend the achievements of the victory of World War II.
European countries not only believe Beijing has supported Russia in the Ukraine war, but are also angry over China’s rare-earth export controls, which have affected them.
This is seen as part of Beijing’s outreach to Europe — on top of communicating with US President Donald Trump and sending letters to the United Nations — following Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s “Taiwan contingency” comments, as Beijing seeks support from individual European countries. However, most analysts believe this effort will have little effect. European countries not only believe Beijing has supported Russia in the Ukraine war, but are also angry over China’s rare-earth export controls, which have affected them.
An academic in mainland China shared that some European voices now believe that if Beijing does not proactively help Europe on the Russia-Ukraine issue, Europe will create trouble for Beijing on the Taiwan issue. Ukraine is Europe’s core interest; if Beijing does not believe or accept this, then Europe will make trouble on Taiwan to make Beijing feel that its own core interests are being harmed.
It is clear that the spillover effects of the Russia-Ukraine war, combined with Takaichi’s black-swan remarks, have gradually pushed the Taiwan Strait situation into a more complex international arena, beyond just US-China rivalry. Europe’s heightened vigilance towards deepening China-Russia strategic coordination has also made the imagined link between the “battlefields” of Asia and Europe clearer.
This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “中俄战略对表牵动两战场”.
