China-Russia relations: The limits of ‘no limits’

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Russia in May 2025 underscores the two countries’ commitment to draw closer in light of global uncertainties. China regards Russia as a key player in a multipolar world order and in standing up to the US on issues of common concern. It also values Russia’s support for China to pursue reunification with Taiwan through various measures. But declaration of a “no limits” partnership notwithstanding, there are limits to how close they can get due to their divergent interests, and trade and investment concerns.

Beijing started to lay the foundation for closer China-Russia ties more than a decade ago. Most notably, Xi visited Russia in his first overseas trip as president in 2013 and travelled a second time to Russia in the same year. Xi visited Russia again in his first overseas visit in 2014 to attend the Sochi Winter Olympics. Since 2013, Xi has travelled 11 times to Russia and met his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin on more than 40 occasions, averaging three to four encounters a year. In contrast, Xi has only visited America five times over the past 12 years.

The emphasis in China-Russia relations has shifted over time as well. In the initial years, Xi regarded Russia as an important country in demonstrating a new type of major power relations where big powers, including the US, can harmoniously coexist with China for mutual benefit and jointly contribute to world peace and prosperity. However, with tougher US measures against China starting from the first Trump administration, and especially after Western sanctions on Russia after it invaded Ukraine, China and Russia have drawn closer to each other.

China’s burgeoning trade with Russia, reaching a new high of US$244.8 billion in 2024, has been an economic lifeline that has enabled Russia to withstand Western sanctions. The two countries have further committed to significant progress in bilateral trade and investment by 2030 during Xi’s visit.

Beijing has also been accused of providing direct military aid to Russia, beyond dual-use technologies. China has further refrained from condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and has abstained from UN resolutions condemning the invasion. It only supported the US-proposed UNSC Resolution 2774  in February 2025, which called for a swift end to the conflict and urged a lasting peace between Russia and Ukraine. This was probably because the resolution did not condemn Russia and was consistent with China’s call on all parties to the conflict to settle their differences through a political settlement.

Xi’s visit to Russia in May 2025 has reinforced Russia’s importance to China in a number of ways. Xi seeks closer ties with Russia as a counterweight to an increasingly unfriendly America. During his visit, more than 20 agreements in a broad range of areas were signed. Apart from the mutual benefits, strengthening ties with Russia provides Beijing with some leverage as it begins talks with America on tariff matters.

Interestingly, Xi’s visit to Russia from 7 to 10 May coincided with China’s announcement — on the very day his trip began — that Vice-Premier He Lifeng would visit Switzerland from 9 to 12 May to hold talks with US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent. The underlying message to America is that China will strengthen ties with Russia and other regions and countries, irrespective of the outcome of talks with the US.

China further regards Russia not only as a key pole in a multipolar world but also as a bulwark against forces that disrupt the existing order. In a veiled criticism of the US, Xi told Putin when they met that amid the forces of unilateralism and bullying by powerful countries, China will work with Russia to promote an equal and orderly multipolar world and inclusive economic globalisation.

Xi added that China and Russia have a special responsibility entrusted by the times to maintain the stable and smooth operation of the global multilateral trading system and industrial and supply chains, as well as safeguard international fairness and justice.

Although China insists that its relationship with Russia is not directed at any third party, there is a discernible shift in Beijing’s willingness to work more closely with Moscow against the US on issues of common concern. In other words, Beijing has abandoned its earlier discourse of pursuing a new type of major power relations to one where Russia is Beijing’s partner of choice to jointly stand up to America.

China used stronger language to refer to Taiwan’s reunification during Xi’s visit to Russia in May 2025. In their joint communique, Russia expressed its firm support for the measures taken by the Chinese government to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and achieve national reunification. In Xi’s earlier visit to Russia in 2023, the joint communique issued then ended the reference to Taiwan by saying that Russia firmly supported China’s efforts to safeguard its national sovereignty and territorial integrity, without mentioning achieving national reunification.

Additionally, in a published article before his arrival in Moscow, Xi devoted two out of 13 paragraphs in the article to the Taiwan issue. Going further, the article said that Russia firmly supports all measures (that includes the use of force) to achieve national reunification. Taiwan was not even mentioned in the joint communique ten years ago in 2015 when Xi attended the 70th anniversary victory parade in Moscow.

The greater focus on the Taiwan issue during Xi’s most recent visit is most likely driven by Beijing’s concern with Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party’s pro-independence stance and the US and other extra-regional powers meddling in the Taiwan issue. Nevertheless, it could also be argued that China is trying to rally more countries, especially Russia, to express support for Taiwan’s reunification via all measures.

While Russia is unlikely to get directly involved in the event of a cross-strait conflict, it could be a valuable partner to China at the United Nations to abstain from, if not to oppose, any resolution condemning China’s use of force against Taiwan. Russia could even render assistance to enable China to prosecute a military campaign to reunify Taiwan, just as Beijing has provided some support for Russia in the current conflict in Ukraine.

China-Russia ties are not without challenges. Foremost among them is that both are ambitious powers and their interests may not always coincide. For example, the two countries have competing interests in Central Asia (considered Russia’s traditional sphere of influence) and the Arctic (a relatively new area of competition between the two), which appear to be downplayed at the moment due to their common opposition to the US.

Although China and Russia have asserted that their ties are based on equality and mutual respect, the relationship is an asymmetrical one where Russia is regarded as a junior partner to China. Due to Western sanctions, Russia’s dependence on China has increased. China has become a major market for Russian exports such as oil, gas, and other products and often at discounted prices. China’s exports to Russia such as cars and auto parts, electronics and other consumer products have also surged. Russia’s heavy reliance on China seems to have rankled Moscow and raise questions about Russia’s big power status when Beijing has the leverage and can strike a hard bargain with Moscow.

The negative impact of Chinese goods flooding the Russian market has led Moscow to impose fees to stem the inflow of these products. Also, while Russia officially welcomes more Chinese investments, such investment flows are not always smooth sailing.

Since 2022, the two countries have been mired in talks over the Power of Siberia-2 gas pipeline, that would deliver gas from Siberia to China, due to disagreements over issues like gas pricing and cost sharing, and even the route. It was telling that in his remarks to the media during Xi’s visit, Putin mentioned the Power of Siberia-1 gas pipeline and the Far Eastern Gas Pipeline while leaving out the Power of Siberia-2 gas pipeline. The above challenges could constrain the two countries from significantly increasing their trade and investment by 2030.

While China-Russia relations have strengthened over the years, there are certainly caveats to their claims of a “no limits” partnership.

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