China’s 2+2 diplomacy in Southeast Asia: Building bridges or papering cracks?
China has pushed for 2+2 or even 3+3 joint dialogue mechanisms with a few Southeast Asian countries amid the worldwide disruption caused by Trump’s policies and tariffs, says ISEAS researcher Lye Liang Fook. These platforms could potentially draw Southeast Asia closer to China provided they can overcome constraints such as the lack of trust and China’s actions in the South China Sea.
China is pushing for more joint defence, security and foreign policy dialogue mechanisms with other countries, especially with Southeast Asia. Beijing wants a more comprehensive partnership, including stronger foreign policy to defence and security ties, on top of its economic and sociocultural engagement with these countries.
However, such mechanisms are not as substantive as similar platforms by other countries, and they face challenges related to mutual trust and differences over the South China Sea.
Compared to the US, China is a latecomer on the 2+2 front...
US as first mover
2+2 joint dialogue mechanisms, comprising foreign policy and defence representatives of any two countries, are not new. They normally exist between countries that trust each other, share common values like freedom, democracy and the rule of law, and are motivated to work together to address common external threats.
The US and Japan established their first 2+2 joint dialogue mechanism in 1960, after signing a security treaty in the same year. These two democracies, with a high degree of trust, then saw the need to form an alliance against the threat posed by communist China and the Soviet Union. This platform was upgraded to full cabinet level representation on both sides in 1995 to update and strengthen their partnership after the Cold War ended.
Compared to the US, China is a latecomer on the 2+2 front, convening its first 2+2 dialogue mechanism with South Korea at the director-general level in 2002, and its first high-level strategic security consultations with Russia in 2005. Although the topics discussed are wide ranging, the latter is not strictly a 2+2 mechanism, as the Chinese side is led by Politburo member and Foreign Minister Wang Yi and the Russian side is led by the Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu.
Beijing strengthens joint dialogue mechanisms with SEA
More recently, Beijing has pushed for 2+2 joint dialogue mechanisms with Southeast Asia, particularly during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia in April 2025.
In Cambodia, the two countries decided to establish a strategic dialogue mechanism between the foreign and defence ministers to coordinate positions on major strategic issues and advance cooperation in relevant fields. In Malaysia, the two countries agreed to set up a joint foreign and defence dialogue mechanism to expand high-level strategic communication and political security cooperation.
Beijing further seeks to build and strengthen all-round relations, including defence and security ties, with a region that China regards as an integral part of its neighbourhood diplomacy.
Going further, China and Vietnam agreed to establish the 3+3 strategic dialogue mechanism on diplomacy, defence and public security at the ministerial level and organise the first such meeting at an appropriate time. The two countries had earlier convened a joint foreign policy, defence and security dialogue at the vice-ministerial level in December 2024, China’s first with a foreign country.
Scoring another first, China and Indonesia held a joint foreign and defence ministers’ dialogue in April 2025, days after Xi’s Southeast Asia visit. This is the first 2+2 joint ministerial level dialogue China has had with a foreign country.
China’s push for 2+2 or even 3+3 joint dialogue mechanisms serves a number of objectives. For one, China wants to burnish its credentials as a reliable and predictable partner that supports an open, stable and multi-polar world and a liberal, multilateral trading order.
In particular, at the inaugural China-Indonesia joint foreign and defence ministers’ dialogue in April 2025, Beijing emphasised the importance of working together with Indonesia, the world’s fourth largest populous country and a key member of the global south, to maintain world peace and stability, defend international fairness and equality, and promote global development cooperation against unilateralism and hegemonism, in an apparent swipe at the US.
Beijing further seeks to build and strengthen all-round relations, including defence and security ties, with a region that China regards as an integral part of its neighbourhood diplomacy.
Moreover, as Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia have all signed on to China’s ”community of shared future” vision, Beijing wants to show that it accords priority to developing ties with these countries, especially when they face potentially high US tariffs. In other words, China is saying it can do more with countries that endorse its global initiatives. Beijing has further highlighted that the dialogue mechanisms demonstrate the strategic mutual trust China has with these countries.
In contrast, the inaugural 2+2 China-Indonesia joint defence and foreign ministers’ meeting in April 2025 is long on rhetoric but short on specific activities of defence and security cooperation.
Substance or symbolism?
One way to assess the joint dialogue mechanisms is to examine whether they are underpinned by regular bilateral activities or exercises. At the inaugural 3+3 joint dialogue mechanism between China and Vietnam in December 2024, it was reported that the two sides had a candid and in-depth exchange on international and regional issues of common concern.
Existing bilateral engagements, such as the 8th China-Vietnam Border Defence Friendship Exchange (in April 2024), the joint public security working group meetings (in January 2024), and the first joint counter-terrorism exercise (in August 2024) were mentioned. China further highlighted that the regular joint patrols between the Chinese and Vietnamese coast guards would be carried out in the Tonkin Gulf around the time of Xi’s Vietnam visit. The two countries appear to have a number of engagements at the foreign policy, defence and security levels to justify their 3+3 joint dialogue mechanism.
In contrast, the inaugural 2+2 China-Indonesia joint defence and foreign ministers’ meeting in April 2025 is long on rhetoric but short on specific activities of defence and security cooperation. Indonesia’s defence ministry statement, which stressed the importance of increasing high-level military personnel exchanges, joint training, and practical collaboration between the armed forces and defence industry of both sides, suggests that there is much room for improvement.
At the same meeting, the two countries signed an MOU to establish a comprehensive strategic dialogue mechanism, presumably an overarching platform to oversee bilateral interactions between the two countries. However, it is unclear whether the 2+2 joint defence and foreign ministers dialogue mechanism would eventually be subsumed under this comprehensive dialogue mechanism or continue to exist as a separate entity. Another outcome was the signing of documents on cooperation in maritime security and other fields, although details are lacking.
Comparing with the US
Another way of assessing the 2+2 joint dialogue mechanisms is to compare it with similar platforms the US has with countries like Japan and Indonesia which have more substantive collaboration.
China’s joint dialogue mechanisms with some Southeast Asian countries are nowhere as advanced as what the US has achieved with its allies and key partners.
At the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee meeting in July 2024, America announced the reconstitution of the US Forces Japan as a joint force headquarters that includes their Japanese counterparts to facilitate deeper interoperability and cooperation on joint bilateral operations. They further agreed to accelerate cooperation on Japan’s acquisition of Tomahawk cruise missiles, and highlighted their cooperation on Japan’s stand-off missile procurement, such as the US Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles with Extended Range (JASSM-ER).
Although the first US-Indonesia 2+2 senior officials’ foreign policy and defence dialogue was inaugurated only in October 2023, a major highlight of their cooperation is the longstanding Super Garuda Shield Exercise in Indonesia, that evolved from a bilateral exercise between the US and Indonesia in 2006 to an combined multilateral exercise involving a growing number of countries (from seven to 14 countries in 2023 and 2024 respectively).
Concrete measures for building trust needed
China’s joint dialogue mechanisms with some Southeast Asian countries are nowhere as advanced as what the US has achieved with its allies and key partners. Nevertheless, China appears to have stolen a march on the US by holding the first-ever 2+2 with Indonesia at the ministerial level, while the US-Indonesia 2+2 remains at the senior officials’ level. But this is more form than substance, as the latter has more substantive engagements. Furthermore, China and a number of Southeast Asian countries do not share a common strategic outlook and the level of mutual trust is not as high as claimed by China.
Both Vietnam and Malaysia have differences with China especially over the South China Sea and are wary of China’s aggressive moves in the area. Even Indonesia has occasional run-ins with Chinese fishing boats and coast guard vessels in its waters and has refused to recognise China’s nine-dash lines.
Moreover, it is unclear what the China-Indonesia maritime security cooperation entails and whether they will be effective in building trust and creating the basis for stronger bilateral ties, although Beijing has asserted that their collaboration will help to safeguard peace and stability in the South China Sea and set an example for cooperation with other countries. The above uncertainties and constraints will likely limit how far China’s joint dialogue mechanisms with Southeast Asia will go.
