Has Xi Jinping lost power?

At the Politburo meeting on 30 June, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) reviewed the document titled “Regulations on the Work of the Party Central Committee’s Decision-making, Deliberative and Coordinating Institutions” (herein known as “working regulations”).

The Politburo stated during the meeting that the Central Committee’s decision-making and coordinating institutions should implement more effective leadership and coordination for major work, but not make decisions on behalf of the responsible bureaucratic agencies. The bodies referred to as “decision-making, deliberative and coordinating institutions” are commonly known as leading groups (or committees).

The meeting drew considerable attention from international analysts and commentators despite the limited information released. Many external observers interpreted the reforms discussed at the meeting as a power grab by factions critical of Xi Jinping. However, this interpretation may not fully reflect the realities of the meeting. According to recent CCTV news coverage, there has been no reduction in either the frequency or duration of Xi’s reported activities. Thus, he remains firmly in power and continues to shape the party’s agenda.

How should we interpret the Politburo’s meeting on the working regulations? The following analysis approaches this issue from several perspectives. In summary, the discussion on the working regulations not only fails to demonstrate a decline in Xi Jinping’s authority, but in fact highlights the high level of prestige he continues to hold within the party.  

The working regulations suggest that Xi Jinping may no longer believe that large leading groups necessarily hold decision-making power. Simply put, when Xi first established such leading groups after 2013, it was primarily to challenge Jiang Zemin’s faction and to undermine the influence of rival leaders in the Politburo and its Standing Committee who were outside of Xi’s faction.

Xi Jinping established the Central Comprehensively Deepening Reforms Commission in November 2013, as well as the National Security Commission and the Central Leading Group for Cybersecurity and Informatization in 2014 (now known as the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission). In addition, Xi personally served as the leader of these groups. This approach allows him to weaken the power of other factions within the Politburo and the State Council.

However, in recent years, as Xi’s power has consolidated and the Politburo members have been almost entirely appointed by his confidants, he no longer needs to rely on these leadership groups to seize power. In fact, since around 2020, CCTV’s news coverage of these decision-making, deliberative and coordinating institutions has declined significantly. This also suggests that both the frequency and significance of meetings of such large leadership groups may be declining. 

The distinctive function of the large leading groups — officially called the “Party Central Committee’s Decision-making, Deliberative and Coordinating Institutions” — under Xi Jinping is that the leader holds decision-making authority within the meetings. However, this practice is at odds with the formal functions of the Politburo.

In the past, the leading group itself functioned primarily as a “coordinating institution”, focusing on coordination, while major decisions were made by the Politburo and its Standing Committee. After Xi established the decision-making, deliberative and coordinating institutions in 2013, decision-making increasingly took place within these large leading groups, while the Politburo and its Standing Committee appeared to serve primarily a ratifying role.

Now that Xi Jinping has consolidated power and is in full control, he must recognise that leading groups or committees are not formally authorised to exercise decision-making power. Therefore, he must address the institutional tension between the large leading groups and the Politburo.

In short, the working regulations are not intended to weaken Xi’s power, but rather to balance out the distribution of authority between the large leading groups and the Politburo. One possible development is that these large leading groups will retain only coordination functions, without decision-making authority.  

Essentially, the working regulations aim to make the central decision-making process more orderly and efficient. This development should not be viewed as a conspiracy by senior cadres and party elders to undermine Xi Jinping’s authority. Despite these institutional adjustments, it remains unlikely that these large leading groups will be abolished. 

In today’s political landscape, where Xi Jinping emphasises top-level design, many decisions must be implemented through mechanisms with a broader “span of control”. These large leadership groups demonstrate the organisation’s flexibility and control, remaining key to decision-making and departmental coordination.

Therefore, in the future, important issues may be discussed within large leadership groups, but final decisions will most likely be made by the Politburo. This arrangement would clarify the relationship between the two bodies. 

The effective operation of the large-scale leadership group established by Xi Jinping requires a leader with strong charismatic authority. As mentioned above, the key function of this type of leadership group is to address information bottlenecks and consolidate decision-making authority — a complex task that demands not only authority but also exceptional personal influence to unify and steer the group effectively.

A leader of a leading group who possesses personal prestige is more likely to gain compliance from team members. In recent years, the high efficiency of the CCP’s political system has largely depended on a set of decision-making, deliberative and coordinating institutions led by Xi Jinping. But will a general secretary after the Xi Jinping period possess the same authority to steer such a complex institution? This is a question worth pondering. 

In other words, Xi’s recent political authority is rooted in rule by man rather than rule by law. The more efficient the system appears now, the more it may constrain the CCP’s political operations in the future. In particular, if Xi appoints a technocratic bureaucrat as general secretary — someone without extensive personal networks or prestige — it is likely that he will struggle to lead the operation of these large leadership groups. Therefore, Xi must reduce the decision-making role of these groups and gradually transfer their authority to the Politburo and its Standing Committee. This approach also aligns with the CCP’s established political norms.

Therefore, recent discussions within the CCP about its working regulations should not be seen as a sign of declining authority for Xi Jinping. Rather, when examined on three levels — the absence of political struggle, the effort to define a clearer relationship between large leading groups and the Politburo, and the exploration of possible decision-making models for the post-Xi era — these “reforms” or regulatory adjustments reflect Xi’s continued emphasis on top-level design. The goal is to enhance bureaucratic integration and coordination in line with overarching national development priorities.

From this perspective, Xi Jinping’s power remains intact, and he possesses sufficient authority to implement a new plan for the party’s decision-making mechanism.

Related: How Xi Jinping consolidated power over the past decade | China’s Communist Party faces tall order at third plenum