China visit before Trump: Can Cheng Li-wun rescue the Kuomintang?

On 30 March, Cheng Li-wun, chairwoman of Taiwan’s opposition Kuomintang (KMT), announced that she had accepted an invitation from the CCP Central Committee and General Secretary Xi Jinping to visit Jiangsu, Shanghai and Beijing from 7 to 12 April, marking the first step in the cross-strait peace initiative she had been mulling over since taking office in late 2025.

Cheng made clear that the visit would be conducted in line with the KMT’s longstanding policy of upholding the 1992 Consensus and opposing Taiwan independence. She said she hoped to demonstrate— to the people of Taiwan and the international community — that cross-strait relations are not destined for war, and that with wisdom and effort, both sides can chart a broad path toward peace.

On 26 April 2005, then KMT chairman Lien Chan made his first “icebreaking” trip to the mainland, achieving the first formal reconciliation between the KMT and CCP leadership in 60 years. He and then CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao issued five joint visions for peaceful cross-strait development. Cheng was Lien’s spokesperson on that trip, and that was the first time she set foot on the mainland.

The Lien-Hu meeting took place against the backdrop of then Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian’s announcement of a “constitutional reform” timetable — widely seen as tantamount to a schedule for Taiwan independence — and Beijing’s countermove in passing the Anti-Secession Law. In such a tense climate, Lien pushed ahead despite criticism from external circles, and his bold step had profound and lasting implications for subsequent KMT-CCP and cross-strait relations.

Cheng stressed that in recent years, Taiwan has often been described by foreign media as “the most dangerous place on earth”, and expressed the hope that her April visit would usher in a warmer spring in cross-strait ties. Cheng added that she would focus on issues such as Taiwan’s industry and Taiwan businesses on the mainland, while also hoping to make a tangible contribution to regional stability.

The ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), however, criticised the KMT for embracing a “common political foundation” with Beijing, arguing that the move would divide Taiwan internally and weaken public unity. Given the KMT’s continued opposition to arms purchases, the DPP said Beijing’s arrangement of Cheng’s visit raised suspicions that this was a case of “blocking arms sales in exchange for a Cheng-Xi meeting”.

Sources familiar with the mainland system told Lianhe Zaobao that Xinhua’s phrasing — saying that “the CCP Central Committee and General Secretary Xi Jinping” welcomed and invited Cheng to lead a delegation — was extremely rare, a phrasing previously used only for Lien Chan’s first visit. This showed how seriously the CCP leadership was taking the trip. With the invitation coming from the CCP Central Committee, the reception would be at a higher level; in addition to a Cheng-Xi meeting, members and secretaries of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) were also expected to be part of the reception.

Since losing power in 2016, the KMT has not seriously reflected on its shortcomings in governance, but has instead often blamed its defeat on the 1992 Consensus, arguing that the stance hurt it at the ballot box when it came to domestic elections. This cost the party to lose its core convictions, with even staunch deep-Blue figures deriding the KMT as having been reduced to a mere appendage of the DPP.

Since becoming KMT chair, Cheng has repeatedly stressed that the 1992 Consensus is a crucial foundation for cross-strait peace, and has expressed her willingness to meet Xi. She firmly believes that if she can visit mainland China in the first half of the year, followed by the US, her strong advocacy for cross-strait peace will become a major advantage for the KMT in the year-end local elections and the 2028 presidential election.

However, Cheng underestimated the local factions within this century-old party, as well as the many influential figures who command their own followings and pursue their own agendas. While the party leadership had previously coordinated and proposed a party-backed “NT$380 billion (about US$11.7 billion) + N” military procurement plan, no consensus was reached.

For instance, Taichung mayor Lu Shiow-yen of the KMT, who is seen as a potential contender for Taiwan president, continued to argue publicly after returning from a visit to the US that a reasonable defence budget should be between NT$800 billion and NT$1 trillion. Not to mention former KMT party chairman Eric Chu, who has repeatedly organised events to quietly compete with Cheng.

Even the Ma Ying-jeou Foundation, long an active promoter of cross-strait youth exchanges, has been rocked by internal strife. KMT vice-chairman Hsiao Hsu-tsen, who had been working hard to pave the way for a “Cheng-Xi meeting” and to formulate a series of post-meeting visions and initiatives, was abruptly sacked by former President Ma Ying-jeou — whom Hsiao suggested had “forgotten many things”, an apparent allusion to circulating rumours about cognitive decline. Planned youth exchange visits involving several student groups were also subsequently called off.

While Cheng is a political veteran and an eloquent speaker, it is no easy task to drive the reform and development of this century-old party. To work through differences and reach alignment with party elders and local factions is not something that can be accomplished in the short term, all the more so given the differing positions within the party on the stance, pace and approach to cross-strait relations.

In particular, with year-end local elections approaching, some key figures hoping to contest county and mayoral posts are also concerned that a “Cheng-Xi meeting” could affect their vote share.

In addition, Ko Wen-je, founding chairman of the opposition Taiwan People’s Party, was recently sentenced to 17 years in prison for corruption over the Core Pacific case. Cheng, who has pursued cooperation with the party, now faces internal pressure from some members questioning whether she should support Ko’s innocence. Questions such as how to drive blue-white cooperation going forward will all test Cheng’s leadership.

As Cheng finds herself deeply entangled in internal party turmoil, Taiwan President and DPP chair Lai Ching-te deliberately pointed out at a Central Executive Committee meeting in March that Cheng was a signatory to the 1996 younger generation platform for the Taiwan independence movement (《台湾独立运动的新世代纲领》), drawing public attention to perceived inconsistencies in her political stance. Meanwhile, the mainland has extended an invitation for a “Cheng-Xi meeting”, a move that, to some extent, signals its support for her efforts to promote cross-strait peace.

Cheng is set to depart for the mainland soon, but given that the KMT is not in power and with local elections approaching, it is unlikely that the trip will produce concrete outcomes. A more probable approach would be to first create a positive atmosphere for interaction, build a bridge of mutual trust between both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and pragmatically advance issues such as cross-strait exchanges, personnel visits, and economic cooperation with Taiwanese businesses, laying the groundwork for broader and deeper dialogue and interaction in the future.

This article was first published in Lianhe Zaobao as “郑丽文能开创两岸和煦温暖的春天”.

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